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ABSTRACT
Due to the interest in engineering in the initial 
phases of the safety movement, and the divergent backgrounds 
of safety directors today, writers and practitioners in the 
safety field are engaged in a lively debate which centers 
around the question "What characteristics should a person 
have to make the best safety director?" In an attempt to 
answer the question a primary research project was under* 
taken to test the following hypotheses!
Hypothesis One; Safety directors who are more effec­
tive have attitudes about certain organizational, technical 
and behavioral concepts that are different from the attitudes 
of the less effective safety directors. Also, the more 
effective safety directors tend to have stronger convictions 
about the technical and behavioral concepts than do the less 
effective safety directors.
Hypothesis Two: Safety directors with nonengineering
backgrounds have different attitudes about certain technical 
and behavioral concepts than those with engineering back­
grounds. Those with nonengineering backgrounds value and 
have stronger convictions about the behavioral concepts than
xviii
those with engineering backgrounds, and engineers value and 
have stronger convictions about the technical concepts than 
nonengineers. Additionally, there is a relationship between 
the college degree held and managerial effectiveness.
Hypothesis Three: Experience affects attitudes toward
behavioral and technical concepts and/or the effectiveness 
of the safety directors.
Hypothesis Four: The organizational position of the
safety director affects the amount of power he possesses. 
Also, the amount of power and the position of the safety 
director have an influence on his effectiveness.
The data used to test the above hypotheses was 
gathered by sending 583 questionnaires (42.5 percent re­
turned) to safety directors in four industries - Petroleum 
Refining, Chemical, Electrical Manufacturing, and Trans­
portation Equipment. The questionnaire included a semantic 
differential test of seven organizational, technical, and 
behavioral concepts, and questions to gather detailed in­
formation on organization characteristics, educational 
data, experience of the safety director, and accident 
statistics.
The sampled safety directors were divided into ef­
fective and ineffective classifications based on the 
geometric mean of the accident frequency rates by industry.
xix
At the .05 level of significance the effective safety 
directors had different and stronger convictions on the 
technical and behavioral concepts relating to accident 
prevention. The first hypothesis was accepted, which put 
added emphasis on attitudes in later analysis.
No correlation existed between educational variables 
and accident records. A test for attitude differences in­
dicated that the education variable played a minor role in 
causing differences in attitudes when compared to other 
variables. Hypothesis Two was rejected and it was concluded 
that engineers and nonengineers make equally good (or bad) 
safety directors.
Based on an analysis of experience that portion of the 
third hypothesis dealing with experience and attitudes was 
accepted while the portion concerning experience and ef­
fectiveness was rejected. It was concluded that experience, 
may be helpful in attaining strong attitudes on the tested 
concepts.
No apparent relationship was found between the levels
in the plant, the level of the safety directors, and the
amount of power the safety directors possessed. Also, no
correlation existed between position, power, and accident
frequency rates, so the fourth hypothesis was rejected.
However, an analysis of attitudes did indicate that the
xx
more powerful safety directors had stronger convictions on
«
the concepts than the less powerful.
Simple, multiple, and intercorrelation analysis was 
performed on thirty-one variables, and the accident fre­
quency and severity rates. Each industry was handled sep­
arately, and combined with others where appropriate. No 
significant correlation existed between the variables and 
accident records. It was apparent that of the variables 
analyzed, the attitudes of the safety directors was the 
most significant in relation to effectiveness.
xxi
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
Statement of the Problem 
History of Industrial Accidents 
Industrial accidents which are caused by unsafe 
conditions and unsafe acts have always been with us. But 
not until the Industrial Revolution and subsequent passage 
of workmen's compensation laws did industry take explicit 
and meaningful action to reduce accidents.
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, roost industrial 
activity was carried on in the home under the cottage system. 
The injuries were regarded primarily as the victim's own 
fault and the employer assumed little or no responsibility 
for the accident. But the Industrial Revolution brought 
about the use of new sources of power and improved machines 
which were placed in large factories. Machines that were 
designed with virtually no consideration for safety increased 
the hazards of work. Overcrowded conditions in the large 
factories and the use of untrained workers added to the 
danger.
Eventually the attitude of the worker toward employer 
liability began to change. The worker could see that the 
employer was partly at fault when a workman was killed or 
injured by a hazardous condition that could have been 
eliminated.^ But is was difficult for the employee to get 
an adequate court settlement from the employer. The main 
reason was that the employee rarely filed suit for he did 
not want to jeopardize his job by suing his employer. Also, 
it was difficult to prove a case in court since there were 
three doctrines of common law that served as an adequate 
defense against suits brought by injured employees. First, 
the "fellow-servant" rule relieved the employer of liability 
for injury as a result of negligence or carelessness of 
fellow employees. Second, the "contributory negligence" 
concept relieved the employer of liability if the worker's 
own negligence caused the accident. And thirdly, the 
"assumption of risk" rule assumed that the employee accepted 
all the customary risks of the job.^ Thus the employee had
^Additional historical background can be found in 
Rollin H. Simonds and John V. Grimaldi, Safety Management 
(revised edition, Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 
1963), pp. 3-24; Roland P. Blake, Industrial Safety (third 
edition, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hal1, Inc., 1963), 
pp. 12-31; and U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Standards, Safety In Industry: Introduction to Industrial 
Safety (Builetin”l67, Washington, D. £.: TFT S. Government
Printing Office, 1965)•
2Simonds and Grimaldi, o£. cit., pp. 17-18.
the burden of proving that an accident was the employer's 
fault, and the employee could not do so if the employer 
could establish any of the following about the accidenti
1. The accident was the fault of a fellow worker.
2. The accident was the fault of the injured employee.
3. The injured employee had assumed the risks of his
job and the accident resulted from those risks.
The correct this situation, workmen's compensation laws 
were passed in the early 1900's to provide compensation for 
all injuries arising out of employment. The employer is 
held liable not on the basis of his fault or negligence, 
but on the basis of social policy. Since accidents are an 
immediate and inescapable expense to employers " . . .  work­
men 's compensation laws have done more to promote their 
interest in safety than all other influences put together."^ 
The safety movement began with the passage of workmen's 
compensation laws and increased industrialization. Xn 1892 
Joliet Works of the Illinois Steel Company established a 
Safety Department and the United States Steel Corporation 
followed in 1906. The Association of Iron and Steel 
Electrical Engineers held the first "Safety Congress" in 
1912. Delegates from this Congress formed a committee
3Blake, op. clt., p. 16.
which included industrial and other types of safety and 
which established the National Safety Council in 1914.4 
This organization now has thousands of members and is 
probably the most outstanding safety organization today.
To accomplish the aims of developing safety engineering as 
a profession and improving accident prevention techniques 
and knowledge, a group of engineers incorporated the Ameri­
can Society of Safety Engineers in 1915. But the most 
significant fact today is that thousands of firms are 
practicing an accident prevention program.
The results of the safety movement have been dramatic. 
In 1912 an estimated 18,000 to 21,000 worker's lives were 
lost. By 1967 this was reduced to 14,200 even though the 
work force had more than doubled and the gross national 
product had increased by eigbt-rold.5 Figure 1-1 and 
Figure 1-2 further illustrate the effect of the responsible 
attitude toward safety by management. This reduction in 
deaths, accident frequency, and accident severity rates is 
good from a humanitarian point of view, but the economic
*A chronological history of the National Safety 
Council and the American Society of Safety Engineers can be 
found in Russell DeReamer, Modern Safety Practices (New 
Yorki John Wiley fi Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 316-319.
^Accident Facts (Chicago* National Safety Council, 
1968), p. 23.
5FIGURE 1-1 
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6FIGURE 1-2
SEVERITY AND FREQUENCY RATE TRENDS
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Source: Accident Facts (Chicago: National Safety
Council, 1963), p. 28.
consequences of the reduction are also important. It is 
estimated that for every dollar invested in safety there 
is a net return of from $1.60 to $2.00.® Additionally, 
research suggests that there is a positive correlation be­
tween safety and production efficiency.7
The conclusions based on the safety accomplishments 
to date are:
1. disabling injuries can be reduced
2 . it pays to do so**
3. the expenditures required to do so are relatively 
small compared to the return on investment in 
safety
4. most injuries result from a combination of physi­
cal hazard and faulty behavior
5. to achieve and maintain a minimum frequency rate 
it is advantageous to minimize the physical 
hazards, and to promote the development and 
maintenance of safe practice and safety minded-' 
ness among management and the workers.^
The implementation of this last conclusion is the primary
task of a safety director and his staff.
U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Standards, 
Safety Subjects (Bulletin No. 67, Washington, D. C.* U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 33.
7Lewis A. DeBlois, Industrial Safety Organization for 
Executives and Engineers (London: McGraw-Hill Book company, 
Inc., 1926), pp. 251-264.
B&lake, op. clt., pp. 9-10.
9U. S. Department of Labor, op. cit.. p. 10.
Development of Safety Management .
Initial Interest in Engineering
It was only natural that in the initial stages of the 
safety movement emphasis was on engineering. The industrial 
environment was conspicuously unsafe so the obvious first 
step was to clean house, or to do an engineering job. This 
task included such things as improving machine safety guards 
and plant layout. As time passed, there was increased 
development, growth, and application of engineering to 
accident prevention. Consequently the individuals engaged 
in the safety profession focused their attention on the term 
engineering and were usually called safety engineers.
After World War II, questions were raised concerning 
the validity and value of an engineering orientation to 
safety management and accident prevention. In 1950 Heinrich 
pr€ 'iented a study in his book, Industrial Accident Pre­
vention,3-* which indicated that 88 percent of all industrial 
accidents are caused primarily by the unsafe acts of persons, 
10 percent by mechanical conditions, and 2 percent due to an
*°H. W. Heinrich, "Can Safety Stand on Its Own Feet," 
National Safety News (November, 1955), pp. 20-21, 90-94.
^Hebert W. Heinrich, Industrial Accident Prevention 
(third edition. New Yorkt McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 
1950).
12act of God. ‘ The study and its conclusions have been 
criticized and discounted to some extent,*5 but other 
studies and numerous articles have pointed out the import­
ance of the human element in accident prevention.*4
The Engineer/Nonengineer Debate
The issue of an engineering orientation to accident 
prevention grew into a clear engineer/nonengineer debate 
in the fifties. In his classic article H. W. Heinrich*5 
examined the basis of establishing the safety profession 
as a branch of engineering. He pointed out that while
12Ibid.f pp. 16-19.
*5Blake, op. cit., pp. 60-62; DeReamer, 0£. cit., pp. 
17-18.
*4The following sources are indicative of other author1 
comments: John C. Larson, et al., The Human Element in In­
dustrial Accident Prevention (New York: New York University, 
1955); Leon Brody, Human Factors Research in Occupational 
Accident Prevention: Its Status and Needs (New York: Ameri­
can Society of Safety Engineers and Center of Safety Educa­
tion at New York University, 1967); U. S. Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare, The Human Factor in Accidents 
(Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967)
P. Glivinick, at slL., "A Study of Accidents in 147 Factories 
Personnel Psychology (Spring, 1957), pp. 43-51; Francis 
McGlade, "Psychology in Safety Management," Journal of the 
American Society of Safety Engineers (November, 1967), pp. 
20-26.
15K«inrlch, lgc. cit
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engineering had been good to safety* safety could stand on 
its own feet and would profit by doing so. In his opinion 
a good engineering job had been done and the more direct 
cause of accidents was a . . form of man failures* a 
personal act.**16 His article was followed by others17 
using the same opinion as a basis of questioning the em­
phasis on an engineering background. Additionally* it was 
pointed out that few companies required an engineering de­
gree for safety work and that a degree's main advantage to 
the safety worker was prestige.18 This is not to indicate 
that there was a desire to do away with engineering. Rather* 
the desire was to have the emphasis on safety using both 
engineering and behavioral knowledge.
By 1960* the discontent and questioning had grown 
stronger. C. Russell DeReamer's article* "Our society Must 
Prepare Today for Tomorrow"*9 pointed out "officially" that
16Ibld.* p. 93.
17H. E. Packard* "Let's Not Sell the Safety Engineering 
Profession Short*" National Safety News (October, 1958), pp. 
187-189; Walter A. Cutter and Thomas H. Wilkenson, "Toward 
the Profession of Safety Program Management," National Safety 
News (October, 1959), pp. 96-97+; "The Congress Story:
People Problems," National Safety News (December, 1967)* pp. 
32-36.
*8Cutter and Wilkenson* op. cit.* pp. 228-229.
19C. Russell DeReamer, "Our Society Must Prepare Today 
for Tomorrow," Journal of the American Society of Safety 
Engineers (May* I960)* pp. 21-24.
11
the American Society of Safety Engineers was " . . .  em­
broiled in a lively debatei *Should we remain an engineering 
society or become a safety society?'"2® His judgment was 
that "Safety personnel, by concentrating on safety and 
leaving the engineering for the engineers, would create a 
better opportunity to gain greater skill and competence in 
the field of safety."2!- ne further pointed out the following 
facts:
A large percentage of Society members are not engineers.
About 80 percent of all safety specialists report to 
personnel, less than 2 percent report to engineering.
Not a single "safety engineering" book has been 
written in the long history of industrial safety.
Few employers require their safety personnel to have 
engineering degrees.
A review of the job descriptions of many safety man­
agers and safety directors reveals few and in most 
cases no engineering duties.
The title, "safety engineer," is being used much less 
by industry; titles such as "safety manager " or "safety 
director" apparently are preferred.
The Society is not presently recognized as an engin­
eering society by engineering groups, by the Joint 
Engineering Council or by employers.
20Ibid., p. 21.
21Ibld., p. 22.
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The term, "safety engineering," lacks a clear defini­
tion— it could be either mechanical, electrical or 
chemical engineering, or perhaps all three.22
Later in I960, the American Society of Safety Engineers 
conducted a survey that validated most of the above com­
ments.23 Other research also substantiates the comments.24
To resolve some of the differences of opinions as to 
the future trends of safety practitioners, the American 
Society of Safety Engineers decided in 1965 to sponsor a 
study to ". . . identify the safety engineering task and 
to establish guidelines for the professional development and 
growth of the safety engineering field*"25 There are three 
stages to the project.25
22Ibid., p. 23.
23Peter E. Marconi, "Today's Safety Engineer in Indus­
try, Business, and Government," Journal of the American 
Society of Safety Engineers (August, 1960) , pp. 33-49.
24william E. Tarrants, "Training Safety Engineerst 
Practice and Predictions," National Safety News (January, 
1965), pp. 22-24; Walter A. Cutter, Organisation and Func­
tion of the Safety Department (New York; American Management 
Association, 1951).
25Ibid., Tarrants, p. 23.
26This project was drafted by Dr. W. E. Tarrants, and 
endorsed by a project review committee of the American 
Society of Safety Engineers. It originally appeared as 
William E. Tarrants1 "The Professional Development of the 
Safety Engineering Field," Journal of the American Society 
of Safety Engineers (February, 1965), pp. 5-10.
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Phase One defines the nature, scope, and specific 
functions of the safety engineering position in in­
dustry.
Phase Two identifies and standardizes the educational 
preparation necessary for effectively pursuing the 
safety engineering task defined in Phase One. . . .
Phase Three involves the legal recognition of safety 
engineering as a professional field through the de­
velopment and sponsorship of state registration laws. 27
In a 1965 article. Dr. Tarrants, who is heading up the 
American Society of Safety Engineers study, pointed out 
that the safety engineer " . . .  should serve as a unifying 
force in bringing together the knowledge and talents of the 
various scientific, behavioral, managerial, and engineering 
disciplines. . . . "28
Articles r:i4 arguments followed the ones cited above.28
2Warrants, "Training Safety Engineers: Practice and 
Predictions," op. cit., p. 24.
28Loc. cit.
29For supplementary opinions on the issue see: Lawrence 
S. Hill, "Hybrid Engineers," National Safety News (December, 
1952), p. 36; Robert J. McCullough, "What is a Safety Engin­
eer, " Journal of the American Society of Safety Engineers 
(February, 1959), pp. 2-4; George W. Harper, "The Safety 
Engineer," Journal of the American Society of Safety Engineers 
(February, 1962), pp. 13-16; Thomas H. Rockwell, "The Safety 
Engineer Part II,” Journal of the American Society of Safety 
Engineers (February, 1962), pp. 16-19; John Morris, "Engin­
eers or Administrators," National Safety News (June, 1965), 
pp. 22-24+; Tohn V. Grimaldi, "Management and Industrial 
Safety Achievement," Journal of the American Society of 
Safety Engineers (November, 1965), pp. 9-14; P. W. Logan, 
"Engineering Tomorrow's Basic Component for Accident Preven­
tion," Journal of the American Society of Safety Engineers 
(November, 196677 PP* 7-11.
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Nary Parker Follett's concept of Integration was suggested?0 
but appears to have been ignored in preparing the first 
formal article on Phase One. In an article the American 
Society of Safety Engineers' committee working on Phase One 
presented "A Tentative Description of the Functions of the 
Safety Position in Industry.” The committee proposed that 
the accident prevention field be separated into three cate­
gories of service as illustrated in Figure 1-3: the techni­
cian level, the professional level; and the administrative 
level. To get into the professional level, one could take 
two paths: safety engineering or safety specialist.22
This separation recognizes the divergence of view 
among current safety practitioners concerning the 
requirement for a technical or applied science back­
ground versus a non-technics1 , human behavioral- 
educational orientation as a prerequisite for pro­
fessional accomplishment. 2
But at that time, they limited Phase One M. . . t o  the identi 
fication of the nature, scope, and functions of the
30Russell C. DeReamer, “Maximizing Safety Effectiveness, 
Journal of the American society of Safety Engineers (August, 
1965), pp. 6-7.
31"A Tentative Description of the Functions of the 
Safety Position in Industry," Journal of the American Society 
of Safety Engineers (October, 1965), pp. 10-15.
32Ibid., p. 10.
33Loc. cit
IS
FIGURE 1-3
HIERARCHY OF SAFETY POSITIONS IN INDUSTRY
Certification
|SAFETY ENGINEER
SAFETY 
TECHNICIAN 
Entry Level
SAFETY
PROFESSIONAL
Experlence 
end/or Degree 
Preparation
Experience Flue 
Adninlatrstlvu 
Abi’Ity
SAFETY
ADMINISTRATOR
Supervieory
Level
INPUT
1. Non-Degree Univereity 
Training Program.
2. Two-Year Technical 
School a.
3. In-Plant Formal Training 
Program.
4. Short Coureee.
5. On-the-Job Training.
INPUT
1. Professional Safety Engineer­
ing Undergraduate Degree.
2. Univereity Degreae In Other 
Engineering and/or Phyelcal 
Science Fielde.
3. Master'a Degree Prograne In 
Industrial Safety,
4. Other Degree Prograne with 
Additional Safety Engineering 
Educational Preparation.
INPUT
1. Undergraduate Degree In 
Other Field* with Addi­
tional Educational Prep­
aration in Accident Pre­
vention Subjects.
2. Master'■ Degree Program 
in Industrial Safety.
3. Experience and Training 
in Accident Prevention
Sourcei "A Tentetive Description of the Functions of the Safety Poaltion 
in Industry," Journal of jhj Amrtcan Society of Safety Engineers {October, IMS),
p. 11.
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professional-level safety engineering position in industry"3* 
and ignored the individual who might take the safety 
specialist route to safety professional, i.e., the behavi­
oral is t. Similarly, Phase Two and Phase Three were limited 
to the engineer.
After much comment and criticism, the tentative des­
cription of Phase One was changed in 1966 from that of a 
safety engineer to that of the safety professional. An 
attempt was made to use integration and it is this researcher's 
opinion that they were successful. It was established that 
"The safety professional in performing these functions will 
draw upon specialized knowledge in both the physical and 
social sciences."35 But this does not settle the engineer/ 
nonengineer debate. One of the most important issues, and 
the one that should ultimately settle the debate, is which 
factors influence the effectiveness of safety personnel.
Once this is established, the answer to the debate will be 
clear.
34lbid., pp. 10-11.
35“Scope and Functions of the Professional Safety Posi­
tion," Journal of the American Society of Safety Engineers 
(December, 1966), p. 7.
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Need for Managerial Effectiveness 
The engineer/nonengineer debate and other issues in 
safety are important to industry and the safety professional. 
Today occupational accidents kill around 14,000 workers 
annually in the United States and cause over 200,000 dis­
abling injuries. These accidents cost industry approximately 
$6 billion each year.36 Certainly, there are factors that 
influence the effectiveness of safety professionals or 
safety directors.3? His orientation and background, as well 
as other factors, may have an influence on the accident 
statistics. But the direct question of how these factors 
affect the safety director's effectiveness has not been em­
pirically studied. The objective of this study is to 
empirically test certain hypotheses that may help establish 
those factors that influence the safety director's effective­
ness.
^Accident Facts, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
37The description of the safety professional by the 
American Society of Safety Engineers and the discussion in­
cluded in this paper apply to those people in the top safety 
position in a plant. This study is limited to those safety 
professionals who are the top safety managers in plants; 
therefore the term "safety director" was used in place of 
safety professional so as to indicate this fact.
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Statement of the Hypotheses 
The major hypothesis of this study 1st 
Hypothesis One: Safety directors who are more effec­
tive have attitudes about certain organizational, technical 
and behavioral concepts that are different from the attitudes 
of the less effective safety directors. Also, the more 
effective safety directors tend to have stronger convictions 
about the technical and behavioral concepts than do the less 
effective safety directors.
A supplementary hypothesis logically evolves from the 
major hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis Two; Safety directors with nonengineering 
backgrounds have different attitudes about certain technical 
and behavioral concepts than those with engineering back­
grounds. Those with nonengineering backgrounds value and 
have stronger convictions about the behavioral concepts than 
those with engineering backgrounds, and engineers value and 
have stronger convictions about the technical concepts than 
nonengineers. Additionally, there is a relationship between 
the college degree held and managerial effectiveness.
But since experience, especially management experience, 
may affect one's orientation, another hypothesis evolves as 
follows:
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Hypothesis Three; Experience affects attitudes to­
ward behavioral and technical concepts and/or the effec­
tiveness of the safety directors.
Another important variable that may relate to the 
safety director's effectiveness and one that has received 
little attention is that of organizational position and its 
relationship to power. While it is accepted that a safety 
director needs the support of top management, a clearer 
picture of the influence of his organizational position on 
his power and effectiveness would be useful. Thus, the 
following hypothesis will also be incorporated into the 
study;
Hypothesis Four; The organizational position of the 
safety director affects the amount of power he possesses. 
Also, the amount of power and the position of the safety 
director have an influence on his effectiveness.
Purpose of this Research
There are four areas that this research may benefit - 
humanitarian, educational, managerial effectiveness, and 
productivity.
Humanitarian
One objective of accident prevention work is humani­
tarian since it involves the prevention of personal injuries
20
and deaths. Accident prevention efforts reduce suffering, 
the possibility of permanent impairment, and the economic 
effects of injuries on the workers and their families.
This researcher thinks this study will benefit the humani­
tarian objective by helping to find what factors may influ­
ence the safety director's effectiveness, or at least to 
find those things that do not influence his effectiveness.
In any case, the results should benefit the humanitarian 
objective of the safety movement by reducing suffering, 
permanent impairment, and economic consequences of injuries.
Educational
This study should help the American Society of Safety 
Engineers in accomplishing Phase Two of its three-phase 
program, since it will investigate certain educational 
factors. The results of the study may help determine the 
basis for offering safety courses in colleges of business 
administration and/or engineering. Hopefully, the research 
will provide companies some insight into the educational 
qualifications of safety directors.
Managerial Effectiveness 
The researcher thinks that the results of this study 
will be beneficial to managers in capacities other than a
21
safety director, because what is true of the safety director 
may also apply to other positions. It is also hoped that 
the research will be a contribution to the field of manage­
ment by bringing to light certain aspects of present 
managerial philosophies and teachings.
Productivity
Increased productivity is the ultimate test of the re­
searcher's efforts. By testing the hypotheses empirically, 
there may be new knowledge developed that will serve as the 
basis of managerial decisions and these decisions may lead 
to higher productivity. The extent to which this is true is 
the extent to which this research has value.
Methods of Research 
To perform the study it was necessary to do secondary 
and primary research. A discussion of the research methods 
follows t
Secondary Research 
A thorough research of secondary resources was made and 
served as a basis for developing the hypotheses and for 
substantiating the analysis where ever possible. The second­
ary research was included where it was pertinent for back­
ground material, or where it added depth to the analysis of 
the hypotheses being tested.
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Primary Research 
Since this study is primarily concerned with hypothe­
ses testing, a sophisticated primary research project was 
undertaken. The project involved the following stepst
1. Sample selection.
2. Questionnaire design.
3. Analysis of the data.
Initially, the sample selection, questionnaire design and 
the methods of analysis will be explained. Subsequent 
chapters will cover the analysis of the data and formulation 
of conclusions.
Sample and Response
The universe for the study was the mailing list of the 
American Society of Safety Engineers, which contains ap­
proximately 9,000 names.38 The writer obtained permission 
to use the list from Mr. A. C. Blackman, Managing Director 
and Secretary of the American Society of Safety Engineers.
Based on a priori reasoning and the advice of Mr. 
Blackman, it was decided that very similar plants and physi­
cal environments could be found in each of four industries, 
and that these four industries would be satisfactory for the
38Audit Report * Journal of the American Society of 
Safety Engineers (Chicagot Audit Bureau of Circulation, 
December 31, 1967), p. 2.
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study. The industries chosen were Petroleum Refining 
(Standard Industrial Classification Code 28), Chemical (SIC 
Code 29), Electrical Manufacturing (SIC Code 36) and Trans­
portation Equipment (SIC Code 37). Each of these industries 
was handled separately in the statistical analysis where 
appropriate and they were combined when possible.
It was decided that only safety directors with res­
ponsibility in a single plant would be considered for the 
majority of the study. Therefore, the researcher went through 
the mailing list and picked out the addresses that appeared 
to be those of safety directors in single plants of the 
chosen industries. In cases where there was only a home 
address, the address was excluded. Where there was more 
than one name for the same plant address, the only one chosen 
was the person with an appropriate title. If the proper 
individual could not be determined, a questionnaire was 
mailed to the plant address with "Attention: Safety Director." 
A total of 583 addresses were chosen. The distribution for 
each region and industry is shown in Table 1-1. Figure 1-4 
indicates the total mailout and return by geographical region.
The questionnaire was placed in the mail on October 18, 
1968, and no returns were included if they were received 
after November 20, 1968. Of the 583 forma mailed out, 248
TABLE 1-1 
Geographical Dispersion Of Mail-Out 
By Industry Group
Region Chem, Petro.
Elect, 
Mfg.
Trans,
Equip,
Total
By
Region
" jTof 
Total By 
Region
Eastern 60 12 41 16 149 25.6
North Central 34 13 26 56 133 22.6
Southeast 70 16 11 6 103 17.7
Central 52 36 11 15 114 19.5
Western 17 32 10 25 64 14.4
TOTAL 253 109 101 120 583
Percent of 
Total by 
Industry 43.4 16.7 17.3 20.6 100.0
in
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or 42.5 percent were returned. Forty questionnaires were 
not usable for the following reasons:
1. Part-time safety director (16)
2. Not part of the population due mainly to errors 
in the mailing list (19)
3. incomplete answers (6)
4. Returned too late to be included in the analysis 
(9)
After reducing the sample size by those returned ques­
tionnaires that were not a part of the sample (19), the 
usable net percentage return was 36.8 percent. The return 
of usable questionnaires by region and industry are shown 
in Table 1-2.39
Questionnaire
The design of the questionnaire (see Appendix A) was 
based on primary and secondary research, a priori reasoning, 
advice of knowledgeable persons, and the needs of the study. 
The first portion of the questionnaire made use of the 
semantic differential40 test while the last portion was
39For a presentation of response averages by industry, 
see Appendix B.
A A
The portion of the questionnaire will be given further 
treatment in Chapter II. The main source is Charles E. 
Osgood, George J. Suci and Percy U. Tannenbaum, The Measure­
ment of Meaning (urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois
Press, 1957).
TABLE 1-2
Geographical Return Of Usable Questionnaires 
By Industry Group
Region Chem, Petro.
Elect.
Mfg.
Trans. 
Equip,
Total
By
Region
% of 
Total By 
Region
% of 
Mail-out 
By
Region
Eastern 24 5 12 11 52 25.0 35.0
North Central 11 2 8 21 42 20.2 31.6
Southeast 34 2 2 1 39 18.7 38.0
Central 26 17 5 0 48 23.1 42.0
Western 9 5 6 7 27 13.0 32.2
TOTAL 104 31 33 40 208
Percent 50.0 14.9 15.8 19.3 100.0
Percent of 
Mail-out by 
Industry 41.1 28.4 32.8 33.3
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designed primarily to collect objective data.
Pilot Test
Semantic Differential. To develop the semantic dif­
ferential portion of the test, a pilot test was conducted in 
the summer of 1968 by giving an initial test to fifty upper­
classmen who were majoring in science or engineering and 
fifty upperclassmen majoring in education or psychology.
Based on an analysis of the pilot test, the semantic dif­
ferential portion of the questionnaire was altered and then 
pretested in industry on a limited scale.
Statistical Portion. The last part of the question­
naire was developed with the advice and counsel of knowledge­
able people. An initial questionnaire was pretested in local 
industry during September, 1968. A copy of the questionnaire 
was mailed to safety directors in the petroleum and chemical 
industries who agreed to cooperate in the pretest. The ques­
tionnaires were picked up by the researcher and at that time 
a personal interview was conducted relative to the clarity 
and improvement of the questionnaire. Adjustments and im­
provements were made on the questionnaire after each inter­
view. Additionally, Mr. Blackman of the American Society of 
Safety Engineers reviewed it to see that it was in a form 
that, in his judgment, would benefit the engineer/nonengineer
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debate.
The complete questionnaire consisted of eleven pages. 
Seven pages were used for semantic differential testing, 
one page was instructions, and three pages were for the 
purpose of gathering statistical data. Each questionnaire 
was accompanied by a cover letter from the writer, an en­
dorsement letter from w. E. Stuffing, President of the 
American Society of Safety Engineers, and a return envelope 
to be mailed under a business reply permit.
Methods of Analysis
The analysis of the data was facilitated by using 
such commonly accepted statistical procedures as regression 
and correlation analysis. Other techniques were used to 
analyze the semantic differential. The analysis was per­
formed on an IBM 7040 at the L. s. U. Computer Research 
Center.
Limitations of the Study 
Financial
Due to financial limitations, the questionnaire method 
of inquiry was the only method used to collect empirical 
data. This limitation also influenced the number of indus­
tries chosen and the number of returns from those industries 
that were chosen, since no follow-up mailing was performed.
Industries
The results of the study are limited to the industries 
chosen. Any extrapolation'is questionable; thus this 
limits the applicability of the results.
Statistical
As always, there is a question of randomness in any 
survey. This researcher thinks the returns are representa­
tive of the total universe of the chosen industries and of 
the industrial universe. No formal tests of representa­
tiveness or randomness were employed because of practical 
considerations and expense. From the analysis of the ques­
tionnaires returned completed and uncompleted, the re­
searcher thinks that the response was sufficiently random 
to satisfy the randomness assumption of sampling theory.
Preview
The hypotheses serve as the logical basis for the 
order of research and analysis.
The safety directors are classified as effective and 
ineffective in Chapter II and analysed to test Hypothesis 
One. Conclusions are drawn in that Chapter that puts added 
emphasis on attitudes.
Attention is given to the engineer/nonengineer debate
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In Chapter III by analyzing education, attitudes, and ac- 
cident records. This is followed by an analysis of experi­
ence in Chapter IV to test Hypothesis Three.
In Chapter V, the issues of organization position and 
power are discussed with respect to the attitudes and 
effectiveness of the safety directors. To conclude the 
analysis. Chapter VI reveals a thorough multiple correla­
tion of all the variables considered in the study; and, 
of course, the last Chapter provides a summary along with 
conclusions and recommendations.
\CHAPTER XI
EVALUATION OF THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL TEST BASED ON 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SAFETY DIRECTOR
One of the primary objectives of this en$>irical study 
was to analyze the attitudes of safety directors. A special 
' measuring technique, the semantic differential, was used to 
accomplish this goal.1
This Chapter is concerned with an analysis of the at­
titudes of effective and ineffective safety directors. The 
analysis will serve as a basis for testing the first 
hypothesis.
But first, a fundamental explanation of the semantic 
differential is in order.
Construction of the Semantic Differential Test
Logic of the Semantic Differential
Osgood, et al., postulate there is a semantic space, 
" . . .  a region of some unknown dimensionality and Euclidian
^This technique was developed and illustrated in Charles 
E. Osgood, George J. Suci, and Percy H. Tannenbaum, The 
Measurement of Meaning (Urbane, Illinoisi University of 
Illinois Press, 1957).
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2
in character." The semantic differential test defines a 
concept as a point in this space. Thus, the test enables 
one to differentiate the connotative meanings of concepts 
among two or more groups or individuals by analyzing the 
position of various points in the semantic space.3
An example will serve to illustrate the above. First, 
the dimensions of the semantic space must be determined.*
For the concepts chosen in this study it was determined that 
two dimensions define this semantic space. The dimensions 
are called POTENCY and EVALUATIVE.5 The EVALUATIVE dimension 
signifies whether a concept is considered "good" or "bad" 
while the POTENCY dimension is concerned with the degree or 
intensity of "goodness" or "badness." Once the dimensions 
are determined, two dimensional in this case, the semantic 
space can be visualized or illustrated as followsi
2Ibid., p. 25.
3Ibid., pp. 25-30.
*See Fred N. Kerlinger. Foundations of Behavioral Re­
search (New Yorkt Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1964), 
pp. 564-566, for a more detailed example and explanation.
c
''These are names given to two possible dimensions of 
the semantic space. They are the results of a great deal 
of factor analysis by Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum.
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P
8
7 (me)
6 (employees)
5
4
3 (unions)
2 Legend: E-Evaluative scale
P«Potency scale
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Specific concepts can be placed in this space via the 
semantic differential. For example, suppose there is a 
desire to place specific concepts, such as "me," "employees," 
and "union,” in this semantic space from a group of college 
students. To do this, a semantic differential test would 
be given to a sample of college students to gather scores 
on the concepts "me," "employees," and "unions." The 
semantic differential test would yield an ordered pair of 
numbers indicating the coordinates of the concepts within the 
space. Assume the results were "me" ■ (6,7), 6 units on X 
and 7 units on Y, "employees" ■ (5,6) and "unions" ■ (2,3). 
These ordered pairs of numbers would enable one to position 
the concepts in the semantic space as illustrated. The
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position would give an indication of the concepts' "abso­
lute meaning" and from this "relative meaning" could be 
established. In the example, the concepts "me" and 
"employees1* were similar in meaning while "employee" and 
"union" had different connotative meanings. Further, the 
concepts "me" and "employee" were perceived as "good and 
"strong", while "union" was low on both "goodness" aid 
"strength."
It follows that the same test could be administered 
to a different group, say industrial workers, and the re­
sults of the test compared to those of the college students 
in order to see if the concepts have any different connota­
tive meanings among the two groups. Consequently, the 
semantic differential is appropriate in testing hypotheses 
on connotative meanings and attitudes relative to specific 
concepts. The selection of the specific concepts for this 
study is covered next.
Concept Selection
The selection of the concepts, which were to be evalu­
ated on a series of scales, was the first step in designing 
the actual semantic differential test. The determination 
of the concepts was based on the nature of the hypotheses, 
needs of the study, and, finally, the industry pilot study 
mentioned in Chapter I.
A total of seven concepts was chosen. Two of the 
concepts ("MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS" and 
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN ACCIDENT 
•* PREVENTION") were concerned with technical aspects of 
accident prevention and are referred to as T-l and T-2 
respectively. Two concepts ".(EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION , 
PLACEMENT, TRAINING, AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION11 
and "EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS") were concerned 
with behavioral aspects of accident prevention and are re­
ferred to as B-l and B-2. The three remaining concepts 
were relative to the safety director's organisational 
position, management support for him, and his power, and are 
similarily referred to as 0-1, 0-2, and 0-3. They are 
worded as follows: "YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION," "MAN­
AGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT," and "YOUR 
POWER AND AUTHORITY." These concepts were used as stimuli 
for responses.
In order to eliminate bias and interdependency among 
the concepts, three steps were taken. First, each concept 
was put on an individual sheet. Secondly, the concepts 
were arranged so that no two concepts of the three categories 
were back to back. Third, in order to gain uniformity the 
comment "Please mark the series of descriptive scales ac­
cording to what the following concept means to you" was 
placed at the top of each page containing a concept.
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Once the concepts were selected and arranged, the 
next step was to determine the bipolar adjective scales 
that were used to obtain responses to the stimuli.
Scale Selection
Osgood, et al., have done a great deal of factor 
analysis on bipolar adjective scales to measure the potency 
and evaluative dimensions. Based on lists^ provided by 
Osgood, et al.,several evaluative and potency bipolar ad­
jectives were chosen to be used in a pilot study. Two 
primary criteria played a part in their selection. First, 
the scales were chosen based on their relevance to the 
concepts. It was necessary to compromise and select a 
couple of scales relevant to some concepts and not others. 
Once this group of scales was determined, the selections 
for the pilot study were chosen on the criteria that they 
were maximally loaded on the evaluative or potency factor 
and minimally loaded on other factors.^ The list was 
eventually narrowed down to six evaluative and six potency 
scales.
Using the twelve scales, and concepts similar to the
^Osgood, Suci, and Tannanbaum, op. cit., pp. 35-61.
7A more detailed explanation can be found in ibid., 
pp. 78-80.
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ones actually used in the questionnaire, a pilot test was 
given to 100 undergraduates at Louisiana State University 
in Baton Rouge. Fifty were engineering or science majors 
and fifty were psychology or education majors. Based on 
the pilot study of undergraduates and a later industry pilot 
study, the final ten bipolar adjective scales were chosen. 
The five evaluative scales chosen were:
Bad - Good
Unimportant - Important 
Unsuccessful - Successful 
False - True 
Foolish - Wise
The five potency scales chosen were:
Shallow - Deep 
Weak - Strong 
Lenient - Severe 
Light - Heavy 
Soft - Hard
To eliminate systems or patterns of replying, it is 
recommended that the scales be rotated vertically and 
horizontally. Consequently a random number table was used 
to determine both the order in which each scale would appear 
in the evaluative or potency set of scales and whether the 
"positive" end would be to the right or left.
Once all of the above had been accomplished, the sub­
jects were asked to evaluate the concepts against the set 
of scales as specified in a detailed set of instructions
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(see Appendix A). The responses by the parties served to 
locate the concepts in the semantic space for purposes of 
comparisons and analysis. A discussion of the statistical 
techniques used in the analysis follows.
Methods of Analysis
There were primarily two statistical tools used re­
lative to the analysis of the semantic differential— the 
"t" test and the D statistic.
"t" test
The "t" test8 was used to test hypotheses dealing with 
statistical significant differences in the meaning of 
concepts between groups. The procedure involved calculating
8The "t" test was used to test for statistical signifi­
cant Jfference in means, it involved estimating the 
standard deviation of universe, setting up the null hypothe­
ses X2 and calculating the "t" value according to the 
following formula1
The best source for more information on situations where it 
is necessary to use the weighted average of individual sample 
estimates of the standard deviations of the population based 
on each sample is Samuel B. Richmond, Statistical Analysis 
(second edition, New Yorki The Ronald Press, 1964}, pp. 190- 
193.
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the means, standard deviations, and variances for the 70 
possible responses (7 concepts X 10 responses) for each 
group used in the comparison. To establish any statistical 
significant difference in any one scale relative to a concept, 
the 111" statistic was calculated and the scale was determined 
to be different or not different at some level of significance.
To compare any two groups, based on the 140 means and 
standard deviations, 70 MtN statistics were calculated and 
each was analyzed for significance. If one scale for either 
of the factors {evaluative or potency) was statistically 
significantly different, the meaning of the whole concept 
was considered different between the compared groups. This 
followed since either one of the dimensions could position 
the concept in the semantic space significantly different 
from the other concept, or the same concept for a different 
group. Based on this explanation, the decision criterion 
was derived.
Decision Criteria
A level of significance of .05 was used throughout 
the study to test for significant differences in the meaning 
of concepts between groups. Thus, if any one scale differed 
at the .05 level of significance, the connotative meaning or 
attitude of that group was considered different from the 
other group. This level of significance seemed sufficient 
since it required that one out of five, or twenty out of one
hundred scales, must be statistically significantly different 
to consider the connotative meaning of the concept different 
among the groups. At the .05 level of significance it would 
be expected that only five out of one hundred scales would 
differ due to chance.
D Statistic
The "D" statistic is a measure of the Eucledian distance
between two points in the semantic space. Since the semantic
space was two dimensional, the NDN statistic was merely the
generalized geometric linear distance between two concepts.^ 
This statistic was used in conjunction with the "t" test to
9
Where E - the coordinate measuring the evaluative 
dimension
P * the coordinate measuring the potency 
dimension
D2xy - 2 <Ex “ Ey>2 + 2 <PX ~ Py>2 
Dxy ^(Ex - Ey)2 + - Py)2
or
i
Where the D value for evaluative and potency scales 
of two groups are desired separately for
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determine the amount of distance between the concepts that 
differed in order to determine the concepts that had the 
greatest linear separation. To provide a clearer picture 
of the factors that differentiated the concepts, the eval­
uative and potency factors were calculated separately.
The stage has now been set for the following numerical 
analysis.
Analysis of Effective Versus Ineffective Safety Directors 
The purpose of this section is to confirm or refute the 
first hypothesis. To reiterate, the first hypothesis was 
stated as follows:
Safety directors who are more effective have at­
titudes about certain organizational, technical 
and behavioral concepts that are different from 
the attitudes of the less effective safety 
directors. Also, the more effective safety 
directors tend to have stronger convictions 
about the technical and behavioral concepts than 
do the less effective safety directors.
The first step in testing the hypothesis was to divide the 
safety directors into two groups, effective and ineffective* 
Once this was done, standard statistical techniques were 
applied to the semantic differential test. If there were
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significant differences between the two groups in the 
selected concepts, the hypothesis was confirmed. The re­
mainder of the chapter is concerned with the classification 
and analysis of the safety directors.
Basis of Selecting the Groups 
It was first decided that only full-time safety 
directors who were over a single plant or several plants in 
a single city would be used in the analysis. Also, it was 
necessary that the accident statistics be provided by the 
respondents. These qualifications eliminated 53 of the 
safety directors from this particular analysis.
The one-year and three-year accident frequency rates 
were the criteria selected for the classification of safety 
directors. The figure is generally accepted as the best 
available measure of performance.^0 Other measures have
Roland P. Blake, Industrial Safety (third edition, 
Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 45;
Russell DeReamer, Modern Safety Practices (New York: John
Wiley t Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 297; Herbert W. Heinrich, 
Industrial Accident Prevention (third edition. New York; 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), p. 191; Rollin H. 
Simonds and John V. Grimaldi, Safety Management (revised 
edition, Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963),
p. 36; U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Standards, 
Safety Subjects (Bulletin No. 67, Washington, D. C.t 0. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 58.
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been suggested^, and this one is not foolproof. But out 
of the available measures of safety performance, it is one 
that is recorded by a standardized technique^*2 and generally 
felt to be indicative of effectiveness.
After the above decisions ware made, it was necessary 
to consider the effects of other variables on the frequency 
rate so as to eliminate their influence on the classification 
procedure.
The Influence of Related Variables 
The variables selected for analysis of their effect 
on accident frequency rates were plant age, number of em­
ployees, budget of the safety department, and the type of 
industry. Regression and correlation analysis of plant age 
and number of employees indicated that these factors had no 
significant influence (r2 < .06) on the frequency rate.
Henry G. Gatterwhite and Robert M. LaPorge, "A Com­
parison of Three Measures of Safety Performance," Journal 
of the American Society of Safety Engineers (March, 1966), 
pp. 9-15; William E. Tarrants, "Applying Measurement Con­
cepts to the Appraisal of Safety Performance," Journal of 
the American Society of Safety Engineers (May, 1965), pp. 
15-22.
12The standard technique of recording accident statis­
tics for purposes of reporting and insurance is contained in 
American Standard Method of Recording and Measuring Work 
Injury Experience (revised edition. New York: American
Standards Association, Inc., 1954) and American Standard 
Method of Recording Basic Facts Relating to the Nature and 
Occurrence of work Injuries (New York: American Standards
Association, Inc., 1963).
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This could be the result of the industries chosen since the 
data gathered indicated low variance on these factors.
The data gathered on the budget of the safety depart­
ment was judged by the writer to be too incomplete and 
inaccurate for purposes of analysis, This was indicated by 
some of the comments found on the returned questionnaires. 
The poor quality of responses on the budget was attributed 
to the faulty design of that question.
The remaining factor, type of industry, was a variable 
that needed attention in the classification of safety 
directors. The average frequency rates for the four indus­
tries were different as shown in Table 2-1. Consequently, 
each industry was handled separately when the safety direc­
tors were divided into effective and ineffective classifica­
tions .
It is interesting to note the similarity in the figures 
reported by this study and the NSC figures in Table 2-1.
It is thought that any differences were a result of how 
respondents classified their industry. For example, the 
researcher noticed that some safety directors in petroleum 
plants classified themselves in the chemical industry, which 
may have raised the average for the chemical industry and 
lowered the petroleum industry's average. This classifica­
tion problem also showed up in the return analysis on page 27
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TABLE 2-1
Comparison of Survey Results To Figures Reported By The 
National Safety Council On One-Year and Three-Year
Average Frequency Rates
Industry
Survey
1967
Results
1964-66
National
1967
Safety Council* 
1965-67
Chemical 3.61 4.47 3.55 3.57
Petroleum 5.26 7.20 7.11 7.37
Electrical 2.35 2.10 2.52 2.25
Transportation 5.06 5.71 6.284- 7.09+
+Estimated by averaging the National Safety Council's 
figures for the Automotive* Shipbuilding* and Railroad 
Equipment.
*Source: Accident Facts (Chicago: National Safety
Council, 1968), pp. 26-35.
where the return figures indicate that more people in the 
chemical industry replied. The researcher also attributes 
this to safety directors misclassifying themselves.
The results of considering the variables plant age* 
number of employees* and type of industry was that each in­
dustry had to be considered separately for purposes of 
classifying the safety directors as effective or ineffective.
The Actual Classification 
Once it was decided that each industry had to be dealt 
with separately for purposes of classifying the safety
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directors, the task could proceed. Initially it was decided 
that the distribution of frequency rates for each industry 
would be divided into two groups with the arithmetic mean 
as the dividing point. A Chi-Square test was performed for 
each of the four arithmetic distributions of frequency rates 
to check for normality. The results were as follows;
1. The chemical industry was not significant at any 
level of significance.
2. The petroleum industry was significant at the .1 
level of significance and not significant at the 
.2 level based on the one-year frequency rate.
The three-year rate was significant at the .005 
level.
3. The electrical industry's one-year distribution 
of rates was significant at the .005 level, but 
the three-year distribution was not significant at 
any level.
4. The transportation equipment's distribution of one- 
year rates was significant at the .001 level, but 
again the three-year rates were not significant at 
any level.
It became obvious that the distribution of one-year and 
three-year accident frequency rates was not arithmetically 
normal. Some transformation of the rates was needed. Since
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the values were "rates,” It was decided to transform the 
rates into a logarithmic value. Again, the Chi-Square test 
was performed with the results indicated below:
1. The chemical industry's distribution of one-year 
rates was significant at the .001 level of signifi­
cance and the three-year distribution was signifi­
cant at the .025 level.
2. The petroleum industry was significant at the .025 
level for the one-year rates and significant at 
tne .3 level for the three-year rates.
3. The electrical manufacturing industry's distribu­
tions of rates for one-year and three-years were 
significant at the .7 and .4 levels respectively.
4. The transportation equipment industry's distribu­
tion was significant for one-year and three-year 
rates at the .4 and .5 levels respectively.
Consequently, the distribution of logarithms was a 
much better approximation of the normal distribution. Based 
on this conclusion, it was decided that each distribution 
of logarithmically transformed rates would be divided into 
two groups about the geometric mean13 or the anti-log of log
n
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G . T h e s e  two groups were defined as the effective and 
ineffective safety directors.
The next step was to find the geometric mean of the 
accident frequency rates for each industry, which are shown 
in Table 2-2. Once these were found, it was possible to 
divide the four industry distributions into two groups each 
and then combine each effective and ineffective with the 
others who were classified as effective and ineffective.
TABLE 2-2
Geometric Means Of The One-Year And Three-Year Average 
Frequency Rates For The Sampled Industries
Industry
Geometric Mean 
For One-Year Average
Geometric Mean 
For Three-Year Average
Chemical 1.19 1.69
Petroleum 3.26 3.85
Electrical 1.10 1.18
Transportation 1.91 2.30
It is the Nth root of the product of the values
log G - logX1 + log Xj t log Xj ,,,, log X^
N
log G ■ log X
N
For further explanation see Frederick E. Croxton and Dudley 
J. Crowden, Applied General Statistics (second edition, Engle­
wood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955), pp. 198-203.
^4Since the log of zero is undefined, it was necessary 
to give those safety directors who had an accident frequency
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The effective and ineffective in this case were defined as 
indicated in Table 2-3. After the safety directors were 
classified the two resulting groups could then be compared.
TABLE 2-3
Accident Frequency Rates Used To Divide The Safety Directors 
Into Effective and Ineffective Classifications
Effective ineffective
Industry 1967 1964-66 1967 1964-66
(Below) (Below) (Above) (Above)
Chemical 1.3 1.8 1.2 1.7
Petroleum 3.4 3.9 3.3 3.8
Electrical 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.2
Transportation 2.0 2.4 1.9 2.3
The writer thought that the study would be enhanced by 
additional analysis of effective and ineffective safety 
directors based on a further classification procedure. The 
initial distributions of rates for the four industries con­
tained people in the middle or "gray" area about the mean. 
To block out this gray area, the middle 25 percent of the 
safety directors were eliminated by going approximately .32 
sigma log G on each side of the mean and discarding those 
who fell in this area. Thus, the effective and ineffective 
were also defined as indicated in Table 2-4.
rate of zero a numerical value. The value assigned was .1 
for both the one-year and three-year figures. This bias, 
was necessary so that the log G could be computed.
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TABLE 2-4
Accident Frequency Rates Used To Divide The Safety Directors 
Remaining After The 25% Deletion Into Effective 
And Ineffective Classifications
Effective Ineffective
Industry 1967 1964-66 1967 1964-66
(Below) (Below) (Above) (Above)
Chemical .8 1.1 2.0 2.7
Petroleum 2.3 2.6 4.7 5.9
Electrical .8 .9 1.6 1.6
Trans porta tion 1.3 1.6 2.2 3.5
The safety directors had to meet one final criteria 
before they were included in the analysis. The three-year 
frequency rate had to fall into the specified limits. For 
example, where a one-year rate would qualify a safety direc­
tor for analysis in the second classification, but the three- 
year rate would indicate exclusion, the safety director was 
not used in the analysis in any way. Also, if the one-year 
rate indicated ineffectiveness but the three-year rate indi­
cated effectiveness, the safety director was classified as 
effective. This procedure resulted in the distributions 
shown in Tables 2-5 and 2-6.
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TABLE 2-5
Distribution Of Effective And Ineffective Safety Directors,
Before Deletion, By Industry
Industry Effective Ineffective
Chemical 38 42
Petroleum 7 11
Electrical 13 10
Transportation 14 12
Total 72 75
TABLE 2-6
Distribution Of Effective And Ineffective Safety Directors,
After Deletion, By Industry
Industry Effective Ineffective
Chemical 20 32
Petroleum 6 8
Electrical 8 9
Transpor tation 11 10
Total 45 59
53
Chi-Square Test Of Classification 
A question existed as to whether the classification 
technique resulted in two distributions with significant 
differences in their means. Thus, some investigation was 
in order relative to this matter.
The first thought was to apply a "t" test, but again 
the writer was concerned with normality. Therefore a Chi- 
Square test was performed on each of the four distributions 
(two effective and two ineffective) to check for normality 
on the arithmetic and logarithmic scales of the one-year 
and three-year accident frequency rates. The levels at 
which the test for normality was found to be significant is 
illustrated in Table 2-7. it was clear that the first two 
distributions, all the effective and all the ineffective, 
were more logarithmic normal. Also, it appeared that the 
distributions at .32 sigma log G away from the mean were 
more logarithmic normal than arithmetic normal. Conse­
quently, the "t" test was performed to test for a significant 
difference in the log G's.
The "t" test on the one-year frequency rate of the 
effective and ineffective safety directors, when all were 
included, indicated significant difference at the .12 level 
of significance, but more importantly the three-year fre­
quency rate was significant at the .02 level of significance.
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TABLE 2-7
Levels Of Significance Based On A Chi-Square Test For 
Normality Of Arithmetic And Logarithmic Accident 
Frequency Rates Of The Effective And Ineffective
Safety Director
1967
Classification Arithmetic Logarithmic Arithmetic Logarith­
mic
Before Deletion
Effective .1 .025 .4 .001
Ineffective None . 1 None .7
After Deletion
Effective .025 .05 .025 .5
Ineffective .025 .01 .005 .025
When the safety directors who were in .32 sigma log G area 
around the mean were eliminated, the differences became more 
significant, as would be expected. The one-year frequency 
rates were significant at the .06 level of significance and 
more importantly, the three-year frequency rates were 
significant at the .001 level of significance.1^
15The characteristics of the safety directors in each 
distribution were analyzed to see if there were any other 
statistically significant differences in the responses given
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The classification procedure has resulted in groups 
of safety directors who have mean frequency rates statis- 
tically significantly different from ones in other 
classifications. The next step was to analyze the semantic 
differential test in order to confirm or nullify the major 
hypothesis.
Semantic Differential Analysis 
Once the safety directors were classified, the analy­
sis of the semantic differential involved the previously 
discussed "t" test and D statistic. Each of these statis­
tics were computed for the distributions where all the 
safety directors were classified as effective and ineffec­
tive, and then the values were calculated for the distribu­
tions where those safety directors with accident frequency 
rates within .32 sigma log G of the geometric mean of the 
frequency rates were excluded from the analysis.
Test For Differences
The first step in the analysis of significant differ­
ences in attitudes concerned the effective and ineffective
in each case. The responses for each distribution is given 
in Appendix C. There were no characteristics found to be 
significantly different between the compared distributors 
except the accident frequency rate.
safety directors where all were included in the distribu­
tions. The "tM scores for concepts that showed significant 
differences between the two groups appears in Table 2-8.16 
A positive "t" value represents a stronger score on the 
semantic differential test for the effective safety direc­
tors. This is the result of subtracting the scores of the 
ineffective safety directors from the effective, in which 
case a positive value can only result from the selection of 
more extreme spaces toward the positive bipolar adjectives 
by the effective safety directors.
At the .05 level of significance with 145 degrees of 
freedom, the critical ”t” values are +1.96 and -1.96. Those 
scores over or under the critical "tM value are underlined, 
and indicate a significant difference in attitudes of the 
two groups relative to that concept. Thus, the effective 
safety directors had different (indicated by ”t" values) 
and stronger (indicated by a positive Mt" value) attitudes 
about the following concepts:
l^in case the reader would prefer to use some level of 
significance other than .05, a complete list of "tN values 
that relate to the partial tables shown in the chapter are 
illustrated in Appendix D.
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TABLE 2-8
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts 
By Effective And Ineffective Safety Directors
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 -0,604 1.774 1.174 1.089 1.360 2.917 1.340 0.933 0.045 1.269
T-l
tft
1.916 1.410 3.4.10 2.297 0.630 1.844 2.093 1.514 1.190 1.841
&B-1
®
1.860 1.843 3.058 2.812 0.983 2.562 1.715 1.5S4 1.736 0.832
O
gT-2o 0.453 1.327 2.119 0.475 -0.220 0.798 1.020 -0.046 0.513 0.520o
B-2 0.695 1.220 2.900 1.261 0.177 2.213 3.520 3.642 1.742 1.692
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (Effective - Ineffective).
Degrees of Freedom: 145
Critical tttn values: +1.96 and -1.96
A complete list of nt” values can be found in Appendix D, Table D-l.
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"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
“MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN 
ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPLOYEES ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
A glance at the visual semantic p r o f i l e s ^  shown in 
Exhibits 2-1 through 2-7 will reveal more about the attitudes 
of the two groups. It is evident that both the effective 
and ineffective groups had stronger attitudes about all the 
concepts except one, "Management Support For You and Your 
Department." Also of interest is the consistency of higher 
scores on the part of effective safety directors on those 
concepts that differed. These points lead to the conclusion 
that both the effective and ineffective safety directors 
reacted strongly toward all the behavioral and technical 
concepts, but the effective ones consistently had stronger 
attitudes or convictions about the behavioral and technical 
concepts. This does not indicate that these attitudes lead 
to lower accident frequency rates. It may be that the low 
accident record results in the strong attitudes. Neither 
the data nor the statistics used reveal the line of causa­
tion, but further analysis in later chapters does, in the
17Notice that the bipolar adjectives have been rotated 
such that the positive adjectives are on the right.
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EXHIBIT 2-1
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful
GoodBad
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
HardSoft
Legend: " Effective Safety Directors
— — —  Ineffective Safety Directors
EXHIBIT 2-2
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
StrongWeak
Soft Hard
Legend: —  Effective Safety Directors
— —  Ineffective Safety Directors
EXHIBIT 2-3
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING, 
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION”
ImportantUnimportant
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad
False . True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
StrongWeak
HardSoft
Legend: ~ Effective Safety Directors
— — —  Ineffective Safety Directors
EXHIBIT 2-4
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: —  Effective Safety Directors
— —  —  Ineffective Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 2-5
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT 
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow . ^ Deep
Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: ™  Effective Safety Directors
— — —  Ineffective Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 2-6
Behavioral Profile Two
"EMPLOYEES1 ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: ■' Effective Safety Directors
  Ineffective Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 2-7
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: ~ Effective Safety Directors
  Ineffective Safety Directors
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judgment of the researcher, give some hint that attitudes 
may influence accident rates.
It was puzzling as to why there was a difference in 
the attitudes about the concept "Your Organizational Posi­
tion." Correlation analysis was performed to see if there 
was a significant difference in the organizational posi­
tions of the effective and ineffective safety directors and 
no difference was indicated. The researcher can only render 
the opinion that the more effective directors saw themselves 
in a better position and that their good accident record 
enforced their attitude on this matter. In any case, both 
groups seemed to value their position, but the effective 
safety directors valued theirs more than the ineffective.
Another point of interest was the apparent neutrality 
of attitudes relative to the concept "Management Support 
For You and Your Department." Neither group conceived the 
support as "good" nor did they have "strong" convictions 
about it. Does this mean ineffective safety directors do 
not get the support of management, but don't think its 
"bad" while the effective get the support, but due to their 
greater concern for technical and behavioral aspects of 
accident prevention don't see the support as "good?" Or 
does the management of firms in which accident rates are
low give the same support as those in which rates are high? 
The data does not allow a statistical answer to these ques­
tions, but in the judgment of the researcher the effective 
safety directors had neutral attitudes about the management 
support because of their concern about accident prevention. 
While they may have had good support relative to other firms, 
it still was not enough support to make them think it was 
"good" or to make them have strong convictions about its 
"goodness."
As previously indicated, after the analysis of the 
classifications where all safety directors were included, 
the gray area around the mean would be deleted and then the 
same analysis made of the remaining directors. The resulting 
“t" values for concepts that showed significant differences 
between the remaining directors appear in Table 2-9. The 
only additional concept that showed significant difference 
was "Your Power and Authority." However, the "t" values 
were higher for the other concepts that differed, indicating 
a larger separation of mean values. Again the positive "t* 
values indicate higher scores for the effective safety 
directors and a glance at Exhibits 2-8 through 2-14 illus­
trate the consistency of the stronger attitudes of the 
effective safety directors. Thus, it seems that as one 
moves towards the extremes of effectiveness and
Co
nc
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TABLE 2-9
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts 
By Effective And Ineffective Safety Directors After 
Deleting .32 Sigma Log G About The Mean 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 10
0-1 -0.626 1.937 1.341 1.692 1.929 2,306 1.361 0.082 0.481 2.066
T-l 1.691 1.352 2.793 1.717 1.675 2.770 2.700 2.301 2.006 2.666
” B-1
tx
S t -2
(5
0.706 1.741 2.616 2.561 0.702 3.148 1.490 1.191 1.500 0.853
0.502 1.103 2.489 0.449 0,184 1.280 1.722 -0.013 1.333 0.343
o B-2 0.770 0.331 2.683 1.290 0.804 2.990 2*3.31 3.226 1.297 1.81?
0-3 -0,626 -0.531 0.210 -0.023 -2.627 0.406 0.534 0.526 1.143 -0.407
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the ,05 level
of significance (Effective - Ineffective),
Degrees of Freedom: 102
Critical ntn values: +1.93 and -1.93
A complete list of "t” values can be found in Appendix D, Table D-2.
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EXHIBIT 2-S
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful
Bad . Good
False . True
Lenient . Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak . Strong
Soft Hard
Legend:— —  Effective Safety Directors After Deletion
Process
— —  —  Ineffective Safety Directors After Deletion
Process
EXHIBIT 2-9
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant .
Foolish .
Wise
Unsuccessful ,
i Successful
Bad .
• Good
False ,
J t J  • True
Lenient .
. Severe
Shallow .
i Deep
Light .
i Heavy
Weak .
i Strong
Soft .
* Hard
Legend: —«—  Effective Safety Directors After Deletion
Process
— —  —  Ineffective Safety Directors After DeletionProe«s**
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EXHIBIT 2-10
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING, 
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy-
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: Effective Safety Directors After Deletion
Process
— —  —  Ineffective Safety Directors After Deletion
Process
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EXHIBIT 2-11
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad
False . True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: Effective Safety Directors After Deletion
Process
— —  —  Ineffective Safety Directors After Deletion
Process
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EXHIBIT 2-12
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT 
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: ~  Effective Safety Directors After Deletion
Process
— — —  Ineffective Safety Directors After Deletion
Process
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EXHIBIT 2-13
Behavioral Profile Two
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant . Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Deep
Heavy
Weak . Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: ■■ Effective Safety Directors After Deletion
Process
—  Ineffective Safety Directors After Deletion
Process
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EXHIBIT 2-14
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Unimportant Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful .
Bad . Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow . Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft . Hard
Legend: ■ Effective Safety Directors After Deletion
Process
—  —  —  Ineffective Safety Directors After Deletion
Process
ineffectiveness the attitudes become even more differenti­
ated. This increased differentiation seems logical, but 
why were the attitudes of the ineffective safety directors 
better toward their power and authority at the extremes?
As before, the researcher can only speculate that the less 
effective safety directors were in a more satisfied state 
about their power, while the effective safety directors, 
who were more "concerned" about safety, were less satisfied 
with their state of power and authority.
Test For Linear Separation
To further analyze the semantic differential tests, the 
D scores were calculated and are shown in Tables 2-10 and
2-11. The largest separation in the semantic space when all 
safety directors were included occurred with respect to the 
concept B - 2. After the deletion process was performed 
the D scores became larger for all concepts, but the largest 
separation occurred with respect to T - 1 with.B - 2 follow­
ing in rank of separation. These observations substantiate 
the previous statement that the differentiation of concepts, 
becomes greater as the extremes of effectiveness and inef­
fectiveness are reached.
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TABLE 2-10
Potency And Evaluative D Scores Of Effective And 
Ineffective Safety Directors Before Deletion
D Score
Concept Evaluative Potency
0-1 .59 .69
T-l .92 .88
B-l 1.12 .83
0-2 .15 .23
T-2 .47 .30
B-2 .69 1.21
0-3 .60 .20
TABLE 2-11
Potency And Evaluative D Scores Of 
effective Safety Directors After A
Effective And In- 
Deletion Process
D Score
Concept Evaluative Potency
0-1 .99 1.00
T-l 1.02 1.57
B-l 1.21 1.01
0-2 .44 .31
T-2 .62 .64
B-2 .86 1.33
0-3 .49 .40
Conclusions
No basis was found to refute the major hypothesis.
Thus, the following was accepted:
Safety directors who are more effective have at­
titudes about certain organizational, technical 
and behavioral concepts that are different from 
the attitudes of the less effective safety 
directors. Also, the more effective safety 
directors tend to have stronger convictions 
about the technical and behavioral concepts 
than do the less effective safety directors.
The more effective safety directors clearly valued and 
had stronger connotations about the technical and behavioral 
concepts than did the less effective. The line of causation 
between effectiveness and attitudes was hard to ascertain, 
but it is the judgment of the researcher that the more ef­
fective safety directors were acutely concerned about the 
behavioral and technical aspects of accident prevention, and 
this resulted in lower accident frequency rates.
CHAPTER III
RELATIONSHIP OP EDUCATION TO THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL 
TEST AND MANAGERIAL EFFECTIVENESS
The role of education in determining the effectiveness 
of safety directors is a hotly contested subject today that 
centers around the engineer/nonengineer debate. To help 
resolve this debate, this chapter will be concerned with the 
testing of the second hypothesis, which was stated as follows 
Safety directors with nonengineering backgrounds 
have different attitudes about certain technical 
and behavioral concepts than those with engineer­
ing backgrounds. Those with nonengineering back­
grounds value and have stronger convictions about 
the behavioral concepts than those with engineering 
backgrounds, and engineers value and have stronger 
convictions about the technical concepts than non­
engineers. Additionally, there is a relationship 
between the college degree held and managerial 
effectiveness.
In addition to testing the second hypothesis, other facets 
of education, such as supplementary courses dealing with
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safety, and the level of education, will be investigated to 
determine any relationship between these variables and ef­
fectiveness.
Analysis of the Semantic Differential for Safety 
Directors With Engineer and Nonengineer Degrees
This section will be limited to those safety directors 
who hold a college degree in order that the second hypothesis 
may be investigated. It should be noted that the hypothesis 
is not unique to the safety field. It has been established 
that engineers are more technically oriented than nonengi­
neers,1 and that this orientation may influence engineers
2
ability to manage.
For specific studies on this matter see: Max Freyd,
"The Personalities of the Socially and the Mechanically In­
clined," Psychological Monographs, Vol. 33 (No. 4, 1924), 
pp. 1-101; Charles H. Goodman, "A Comparison of The Inter­
ests and Personality Traits of Engineers and Liberal Arts 
Students," The Journal of Applied Psychology (December, 
1942) , pp. 721-737; Ross Harrison, Winslow Hur t, and Theo­
dore A. Jackson, "Profile of the Mechanical Engineer: II
Interest," Personnel Psychology (Autumn, 1955), pp. 315- 
330; Carroll E. Izard, "Personality Characteristics of En­
gineers as Measured By The Edwards Personal Preference 
Schedule," Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 44 (No. 3,
1960), pp. 332-335; H. B. Moore and S. J. Levey, "Artful 
Contrivers: A Study of Engineers," Personnel (September, 
1951), pp. 148-153; Edward K. Strong, "Nineteen-Year Fol­
low-up of Engineer Interests," Journal of Applied Psy­
chology (April, 1952), pp. 65-74.
2For varied discussion on the merits of engineers as 
managers and on managing engineers, the following selected
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In view of the above facts and the conclusions of 
Chapter II relative to the attitudes or orientation of the 
safety directors, the second hypothesis takes on added 
significance,
The statistical procedures used to test the hypothesis 
were the techniques previously employed relative to the 
semantic differential, and the additional technique of cor­
relation analysis. The first step was to see if there were 
any significant differences in the attitudes of the engineers 
and nonengineers.
Classification of the Safety Directors 
The procedure for separating the safety directors into
articles are representative of numerous other articles on 
these subjects:
AMA Management Report No. 58, "Optimum Use of Engineer­
ing Talent" (New York: American Management Association,
1961); Robert D. Best, "The Scientific Mind Vs. the Manage­
ment Mind," Management Review (November, 1963), pp. 23-26; 
James William Caldwell, "Management Skills For Scientist in 
Supervision," Advanced Management (April, 1959), pp. 22-26; 
Basil J. Candela, and Frederick J. Gandet, "Do Engineers 
Make Good Managers," Factory (March, 1964), pp. 82-83;
Clinton J. Chamberlain, "Coming Era in Engineering Manage- 
ment," Harvard Business Review (September-October. 1961), pp. 
87-94; "Coming to the Defense of the Scientist," Iron Age 
(July 27, 1967), p. 25; William B. Given, "The Engineer 
Goes Into Management," Harvard Business Review (January- 
February, 1955), pp. 43-52; Herbert E. Krugman, "What Kind 
of Managers will Scientist Make?," The Management Review 
(May, 1958), pp. 22-28; George S. Odiorne, "Making Managers 
Out of Engineers," Personnel (November, 1956), pp. 259-266;
V. Donald Schoeller, "Pioneers of Management: The Engineer­
ing Function," Advanced Management-Office Executive (Nov­
ember, 1962), pp. 14-17.
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the engineer/nonengineer groups was straightforward. All of 
the safety directors with college degrees were sorted into 
either the group with engineer or science degrees, or the 
group with' some other college degree. Where the safety 
director held a graduate degree, the classification was 
based on the major of that degree. Since some argument 
might result from the classification of those with science 
degrees into the engineer group, the two groups were also 
analyzed with the scientist excluded. These classification 
procedures resulted in the following distribution of safety 
directors:
Engineers Nonengineers
Engineer Degree 53 (42%) Business Degree 40 (31%)
Science Degree 18 (14%) Other 16 (13%)
Total 71 (56%) 56 (44%)
The analysis of the semantic differential test for each group
is reported next.
Test for Differences 
The "t” scores for the concepts that differed between 
the engineers, scientists included, and nonengineers are 
shown in Table 3-1. A positive value indicates a higher 
score on the part of the nonengineers, thus, the nonengineers 
had "better" and "stronger" convictions about the conceptsi
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TABLE 3-1
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts 
By Engineers, Including Scientists, And Nonengineers
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 ‘ 5 6 7 6 9 10
T-l 1.240 0.660 2.310 0.742 2.627 1.922 2.219 1.660 1.314 1.236
B-l 2.900 2.094 1.305 1.416 3.223 1.942 2.261 2.539 2.506 1.906
0-3 0.321 1.233 1.761 0.177 1.716 1.157 1.244 2.216 0.926 1.320
Note: Underlined values indicate significant difference at the .05 level
of significance. (Nonengineers - Engineers)
Degrees of Freedom: 125
Critical nt" values: +1.96 and -1.96
A complete list of "t" values can be found in Appendix E, Table E-l.
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"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
A glance at the visual profiles in Exhibits 3-1 through
3-7 illustrates that both groups of safety directors had 
high means on both the evaluative and potency scales about 
all the concepts except 0-2. Any significant difference in 
attitudes was the result of stronger convictions on the part 
of nonengineers. An interesting fact is that of the techni­
cal and behavioral concepts that differed— the nonengineers 
had the strongest convictions about both.
The exclusion of the scientists from the analysis did 
not lead to any surprisingly different results as shown in 
Table 3-2. The only concept that changed was "Your Power 
and Authority" which no longer showed significant difference. 
The visual semantic profiles for this comparison are also 
shown in Exhibits 3-1 through 3-7.
The visual profiles on two of the organizational con­
cepts, "Management Support For You and Your Department" and 
"Your Power and Position," were of interest. It appears 
that none of the safety directors used in the analysis had 
"good" attitudes about management support. Possibly manage­
ment was not giving appropriate support for accident 
prevention activities as far as the engineers and nonengineers 
were concerned. In an attempt to decipher why the concept
EXHIBIT 3-1
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
ImportantUnimportant
WiseFoolish
SuccessfulUnsuccessful
GoodBad
. TrueFalse
SevereLenient
DeepShallow
HeavyLight
StrongWeak
HardSoft ,
Legend: - - - Engineers and Scientists
.......... Engineers With Scientists Excluded
 Nonengine ers
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EXHIBIT 3-2
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: — ■ Engineers and Scientists
  Engineers with Scientists Excluded
  Nonengineers
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EXHIBIT 3-3
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING, 
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
ImportantUnimportant
WiseFoolish
SuccessfulUnsuccessful
GoodBad
TrueFalse
SevereLenient
DeepShallow
HeavyLight
StrongWeak
HardSoft
—  - ■ Engineers and Scientists
 *.. Engineers with Scientists Excluded
  Nonengineers
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EXHIBIT 3-4
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Hard
Legend: —  Engineers and Scientists
  Engineers with Scientists Excluded
— —  —  Nonengineers
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EXHIBIT 3-5
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT 
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow . i Deep
Light Heavy
Weak . Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: — 1 Engineers and Scientists
  Engineers with Scientists Excluded
— — —  Nonengineers
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EXHIBIT 3-6
Behavioral Profile Two
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant
Foolish
Unsuccessful
Bad
False
Lenient
Shallow
Light
Weak
Soft
Legend:
Important
Wise
Successful
Good
True
Severe
Deep
Heavy
Strong
Hard
Engineers and Scientists
Engineers with Scientists Excluded
  Nonengineers
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EXHIBIT 3-7
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow . Deep
Light . Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: ~ Engineers and Scientists
  Engineers with Scientists Excluded
  Nonengineers
TABLE 3-2
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts
By Engineers, Excluding Scientist, and Nonengineers
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
to
g.T-1 0.888 0.606 2.015 0.375 2.376 1.484 1.846 0.950 1.253 0.957
gB-1 3.198 2.509 1.376 1.240 2.678 1.639 2.028 2.38$ 2.149 1.869
o
Note: Underlined values indicate significant difference at the ,05 level
of significance {Nonengineers - Engineers).
Degrees of Freedom: 107
Critical "t" values: +1.98 and -1,98
A complete list of ntn values can be found in Appendix E, Table E-2.
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"Your Power and Authority" differed, correlation analysis 
was performed on power and education, but no correlation was 
found. Since the concept differed only when the scientists 
were included, it is the opinion of the writer that the 
scientists to a large extent, and the engineers to some ex­
tent, were not as tolerant of lack of authority, and 
consequently did not have as high of an opinion of the 
authority they possessed as compared to the nonengineers.
It became quite clear that the engineers placed no more 
value than the nonengineers on the technical concepts. The 
next step was to determine the degree of linear separation.
Test for Linear Separation 
The D scores in Tables 3-3 and 3-4 point out the large 
separation on the evaluative and potency scales between the 
concepts on which there was a difference in attitudes. The 
D scores on the concepts that differed increased when the 
scientists were excluded, which suggest that they lowered 
the mean values of the bipolar adjectives on those concepts. 
This further suggests that the scientists did not value as 
strongly the concepts that differed. Thus when they were 
excluded, the mean values on the scales were increased and 
the concept "Your Power and Authority" no longer showed 
any difference.
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TABLE 3-3
Evaluative And Potency D Scores For Engineers, 
Including Scientists, And Nonengineers
D Score
Concept Evaluative Potency
0-1 .57 .64
T-l .78 .93
E-l 1.21 1.11
0-2 ■J .64 .38
T-2 .34 .46
B-2 .20 .47
0-3 .64 .80
Evaluative And 
Excluding
TABLE 3-4
Potency D Scores For Engineers, 
Scientsts, And Nonengineers
D Score
Concept Evaluative Potency
0-1 .55 .63
T-l .72 .81
B-l 1.25 1.08
0-2 .72 .45
T-2 .42 .51
B-2 .25 .40
0-3 .51 .60
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The following analysis of education and effectiveness 
was necessary in order to complete the testing of the 
second hypothesis.
Correlation of Educational Variables To Accident
Frequency Rates
It was decided that several variables relating to edu­
cation should be correlated with accident frequency rates 
in order to thoroughly test the second hypothesis/ and to 
fully resolve the engineer/nonengineer debate. The vari­
ables were, highest degree held, years beyond the highest 
degree, college major, college degree major, hours of speci­
al courses dealing with the technical or non-human aspects
4
of accident prevention, the sponsor of the courses, hours 
of special courses dealing with the behavioral or human 
aspects of accident prevention, and the sponsors of those 
courses. These variables were correlated with the one-year 
and three-year accident frequency rates of those safety 
directors over a single plant, or several plants in a single 
city. Additionally, each industry was treated separately
4The sponsors were grouped under National Safety 
Council, American Society Safety Engineers, company, trade 
groups, government, and college.
'’For averages of these variables by industry, see 
Appendix B.
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in the correlation analysis. Since the frequency rates were 
logarithmically normal, the rates were correlated arith­
metically, then a logarithmic transformation was performed 
on the rates, and they were again correlated.
The results of correlating all the variables with the 
frequency rates, the logarithms of the frequency rates, and 
with one another was clear. None of the variables were 
correlated with accident frequency rates since the highest 
coefficient of determination (r2) was less than .10. In 
fact, most r2 values were less than .04. Also, there were 
insignificant intercorrelations (r2 < 10) among the variables 
themselves, with the exception that major in college cor­
related with degree major. No correlation matrices are 
presented- here since the matrices would add no value to the 
statements made above.
Conclusions
The hypothesis being tested indicated that engineers 
had stronger convictions about the technical concepts, but 
they did not. Also, it stated that nonengineers had stronger 
convictions about the behavioral concepts, but this occurred 
with respect to only one of the behavioral concepts. The 
last point of the hypothesis was that some relationship 
existed between the college degree and accident rates, but
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it was found that no such relationship existed, nor did any 
of the other educational variables correlate with accident 
frequency rates. Clearly, the second hypothesis must be 
rejected.
A subtle but significant result can be derived from 
the previous analysis and conclusions. Remembering that the 
more effective safety directors had stronger convictions on 
the behavioral and technical concepts, it would be of in­
terest to know what factors might influence a difference in 
attitudes independent of the accident rates. Since the 
college degree of the safety directors did not correlate 
with accident frequency rates, it can be said that the engi­
neers and nonengineers were randomly disbursed in the ef­
fective and ineffective classifications; thus, each group 
was influenced by both the high and low accident rates. In 
view of the fact that nonengineers had significantly differ­
ent scores on the concepts T-l and B-l, it can be said that 
the college degree was, to some extent, a factor that 
accounted for a difference in attitudes irrespective of ef­
fectiveness. However, it is the researchers opinion that 
the education variable plays a minor role in causing dif­
ferences in attitudes when compared to other variables 
studied in future chapters.
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The engineer/nonengineer debate seems to have fallen 
into the "either/or" trap. The analysis covered in this 
chapter and the resulting conclusions seem to indicate that 
both groups make equally good (or bad) safety directors.
CHAPTER IV
RELATIONSHIP OF EXPERIENCE TO THE SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL 
TEST AND MANAGERIAL EFFECTIVENESS
Writers in the field of safety management have not 
ignored experience and its importance to the effectiveness 
of safety directors.^" They have suggested that it adds to 
the qualifications of a man for the safety directors job.
I
The American Society of Safety Engineers even found a posi­
tive relationship in experience and accident frequency rates 
in a survey of all their members, however, they did not take 
into account other variables that may have influenced their 
findings, such as the age of the plants, and types of in­
dustry.2
^The authors either point out specifically that experi­
ence is useful or their comments on the qualifications of 
safety directors makes it evident that the writers favor the 
experienced. See; Roland p. Blake, Industrial Safety (third 
edition, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), 
pp. 249-250; Lewis A. DeBlois, Industrial Safety Organization 
for Executives and Engineers (London; McGraw-Hill Book Com­
pany, Inc., 1926), p. 95; Russell DeReamer, Modern Safety 
Practices (New York: John Wiley 6 Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 319- 
321; Rollin H. Simonds and John V. Grimaldi, Safety Manage- 
mant (revised edition, Homewood, Illinoisi Richard D . Irwin, 
Inc., 1963), pp. 64-67.
2Peter E. Marconi, "Today's Safety Engineer in Industry,
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This chapter addresses the question "Does experience 
have any relationship to the attitudes of safety directors 
and their effectiveness?" The vehicle used to answer the 
question is a test of the third hypothesis which was stated 
as follows:
Experience affects attitudes on behavioral and 
technical concepts and/or the effectiveness of 
safety directors.
To test the hypothesis it was necessary to analyze the data 
based on six classifications of experience, which were as 
follows:
Total years of work experience
Total years engaged in a supervisory capacity over
any activity
Total years engaged in safety work full-time
Total years engaged in supervising safety personnel
Years as safety director at the present facility
Age
Each experience classification was divided, according to its 
median, into the more experienced and the less experienced. 
This was necessary to facilitate the semantic differential 
analysis for attitude differences. To check for any relation 
ship of experience and effectiveness, simple correlation
Business, and Government," Journal of the American Society 
of Safety Engineers (August, 1960), p. 48.
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analysis was performed on the classifications of experience 
and accident frequency rates.
The evaluation of attitudes by experience classifica­
tion is covered next.
Analysis of the Semantic Differential 
Total Years of Work Experience 
The more experienced safety directors were considered 
to have over 21 years of work experience in the chemical 
and electrical industries and over 28 years in the other two 
industries. Those with fewer years of experience were of 
course classified as less experienced. This resulted in a 
total of 105 safety directors being classified as more ex­
perienced and 103 as less experienced. The "t" values for 
concepts that differed are shown in Table 4-1 and indicate 
the more experienced had stronger attitudes on the following 
concepts:
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN 
ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPLOYEE'S ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
The concepts were not separated by any great difference as
shown by the D scores in Table 4-2.
C
o
n
c
e
p
t
s
0-1
T-2
B-2
0-3
Note:
TABLE 4-1
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings 
Of Concepts By Total Work Experience 
Bi-Polar Scales 
2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10
>.497 1.765 1.751 1.621 1.573 -0.100 2.217 1.430 1.314 1.303
3.701 -0.174 0.661 0.951 1.359 0.000 1,71? 1.251 2.115 1.176
L.635 0.650 1.526 1.363 1.500 0.626 1.643 2.534 1.227 0.925
3.679 0.004 0.230 -1.053 0.609 0.646 2.102 1.566 1.577 1.156
Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level 
of significance (More experience - Less experience)
Degrees of Freedom: 206
Critical "t" values: +1.96 and -1.96
A complete list of "t" values can be found in Appendix F, Table F-l,
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TABLE 4-2
Evaluative And Potency D Scores 
For Total Work Experience
D Score
Concept Evaluative Potency
0-1 .64 .57
T-l .26 .42
B-l .44 .40
0-2 ■ .46 .25
T-2 .34 .59
B-2 .57 .64
0-3 .35 .69
All the safety directors had "good" attitudes about the 
concepts that differed as shown in Exhibits 4-1 through 4-7, 
but the degree of "goodness" was stronger for those with more 
work experience since the high "t“ values were on the potency 
scales.
Total work experience does appear to influence the at­
titudes of safety directors for those with more experience 
did think the concepts 0-1, T-2, B-2, and 0-3 were "good" 
and they thought "stronger*1 about this goodness than the less 
experienced.
It appears that possibly the more total work experience 
the safety directors had the more concerned they became about
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EXHIBIT 4-1
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
Unimportant Important
WiseFoolish
Unsuccessful
GoodBad
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
StrongWeak
HardSoft
Legend: High Total Work Experience
  Low Total Work Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-2
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: —  High Total Work Experience
— —  Low Total Work Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-3
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING, 
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
HeavyLight
Weak Strong
HardSoft
Legend: — High Total Work Experience 
  Low Total Work Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-4
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
GoodBad
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light A Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: — ■ —  High Total Work Experience
— — - Low Total Work Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-5
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT 
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad . Good
False True
Lenient . Severe
Shallow x Deep
Light Heavy
Weak . i Strong
Soft . Hard
Legend: — —  High Total Work Experience
—  Low Total Work Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-6
Behavioral Profile Two
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS”
ImportantUnimportant
WiseFoolish .
Unsuccessful .
GoodBad .
. TrueFalse
SevereLenient
DeepShallow .
. HeavyLight
StrongWeak .
HardSoft
Legend: - - High Total Work Experience
— —  Low Total Work Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-7
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Unimportant Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: 1 —  High Total Work Experience
— —  —  Low Total Work Experience
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the behavioral and technical aspects of accident prevention. 
The only explanation for the difference in attitudes of the 
safety directors on the organizational concepts 0-1 and 0-3 
is that the more experienced safety directors acquired the 
stronger convictions on position and power solely on the 
basis of their experience, for no correlation was found in 
experience and these variables.
Total Supervisory Experience 
The safety directors with fewer than 15 years of super­
visory experience were classified as less experienced (92) 
and all others as more experienced (116). The concepts found 
to be different among the two groups were:
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
-EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN ACCIDENT 
PREVENTION"
-EMPLOYEE'S ACTS' CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
The "tM values are shown in Table 4-3 and the D scores appear
in Table 4-4. Those safety directors with more supervisory
experience had stronger attitudes about all the concepts
that differed except the first one.
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TABLE 4-3
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings 
Of Concepts By Total Supervisory Experience 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 3 6 7 3 9 10
B-l -1.933 -0.005 0.127 0.230 0.620 0.456 0.250 0.773 0.367 0.763
T-2 0.226 -0.119 -0.143 0.669 0.944 0.992 2.556 1.661 1.859 2.125
B-2 2.132 1.144 -0.033 0.164 1.369 2.885 2.814 3.344 1.457 3.223
0-3 -0.192 -0.226 -0.537 -0.255 -0.874 0.908 0.342 1.129 1.042 2.055
Note: Underlined Values indicate significant difference at the .05 level
of significance. (More experienced - Less experienced)
Degrees of Freedom: 206
Critical "t" Values: +1.96 and -1.96
A complete list of "tir values can be found in Appendix F, Table F-2.
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TABLE 4-4
Evaluative And Potency D Scores For 
Total Supervisory Experience
D Score
Concept Evaluative Potency
0-1 .48 .59
T-l .12 .43
B-l .40 .22
0-2 .50 .18
T-2 .21 .77
B—2 .48 1.08
0-3 .18 .52
It is interesting to note the large separation on the 
concept "Employees1 Acts Cause Host Accidents." Apparently 
the more experienced, in terms of work and supervisory ex­
perience, had stronger attitudes about the. human element in 
accident prevention. On the other concepts that differed, 
all the safety directors had strong attitudes, but the more 
experienced were slightly stronger, with the one exception 
noted above. The semantic profiles for this and later 
classifications are included in Appendix G since they are 
all somewhat similar to the first set in Exhibit 4-1 through 
4-7. The semantic profiles for this classification are 
shown in Exhibits 4-8 through 4-14 in Appendix G.
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Full-Time Safety Work
Safety directors with over 14 years of full-time safety
work were classified as more experienced (80) and those with
less than 15 years of experience were classified as less
experienced (128). The "t" values in Table 4-5 indicate
the more experienced had stronger attitudes on the following
concepts:
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN 
ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPLOYEES* ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
The D scores in Table 4-6 and the semantic profiles in Ap­
pendix G, Exhibits 4-15 through 4-21, are indicative of the 
consistency of the stronger attitudes the more experienced 
safety directors had toward the concepts that differed.
The full-time safety experience seemed to have a signifi­
cant influence on attitudes. The longer a safety director 
had been involved in full-time safety work, the stronger 
were his convictions about the importance of the behavioral 
and technical aspects of accident prevention. The more ex­
perienced safety directors also had stronger convictions 
about their position and power, but no correlation existed
TABLE 4-5
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts 
By Total Full-Time Safety Experience 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 10
0-1 0.426 0.699 1.591 1.153 1.043 1.660 2.037 2.264 0.754 1.046
T-l 1.552 1.432 1.256 1.332 2.431 1.930 1.731 2.005 1.660 2.343
W B-1
■P
-1.253 0.357 1.296 1.109 1.595 0.309 1.231 2.065 1.364 0.421
S'T-2o 0.134 0.132 1,114 1.321 2.061 1.257 1.253 2.007 1.100 1.449
c
OB-2 2.765 2.052 1.250 1.330 2.723 2.643 2.470 1.346 1.554 3,606
0-3 0.339 -0.617 -0.054 0.477 -2.039 1.497 -0.399 0.697 0.997 0.932
Note : Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More experience - Less experience).
Degrees of Freedom: 206
Critical "t" values: +1,96 and -1.96
A Complete list of nt" values can be found in Appendix F, Table F-3.
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between these variables and experience, so the difference 
in attitudes is attributed to the experience. The role of 
experience and attitudes on power and positions is admitted­
ly puzzling, but the researcher's opinion is that the more 
experienced safety directors got more "involved*1 with all 
aspects of their job and their strong convictions about their 
power and position was indicative of this.
TABLE 4-6
Evaluative And Potency D Scores For 
Total Full-Time Safety Experience
D Score
Concept Evaluative Potency
0-1 .49 .74
T-l .62 .83
B-l .54 .56
0-2 .31 .24
T-2 .34 .52
B-2 ' .78 .83
0-3 .32 .30
Total Experience in Supervising Safety Personnel
All safety directors, regardless of industry, with less 
than eight years of supervisory experience were put in the 
low experience group (99) and the others put in the high
i
experience group (109). As noted in Table 4-7 the more
TABLE 4-7
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts 
By Total Experience In Supervising Safety Personnel
Bi-Polar Scales
1 .2 3 __5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 0.916 -0.213 1.464 2.107 0.485 0.195 2.516 2.284 2.294 0.975
o.T-1 1.637 0.653 1.026 2 ^97 2._003 1.694 1.625 1.357 2.042 2.605
a>
cB-1 0.144 1.240 1.396 1.536 1.430 0.306 0.961 1.906 1.986 0.956o ----
°B-2 2.858 1.946 1.583 2.463 1.570 1.959 1.858 2.012 2.021 2.563
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More experience - Less experience).
Degrees of Freedom: 20o
Critical "t" values: +1.96 and -1.96
A complete list of "tM values can be found in Appendix F, Table F-4.
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experienced safety directors had higher scores on the follow­
ing concepts:
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
The D scores in Table 4-8 and the semantic profiles in Ap- 
pendis G, Exhibits 4-22 through 4-28, reveal similar 
differences as noted in the previous sections. But the 
attitudes seemed to be more influenced by full-time safety 
experience than by experience in supervising safety person­
nel.
TABLE 4-8
Evaluative And Potency D Scores For 
Total Supervisory Experience 
Over Safety Personnel
D Score
Concept Evaluative Potency
0-1 .49 .74
T-l .62 .83
B-l .54 .56
0-2 .31 .24
T-2 .34 .52
B-2 .78 .83
0-3 .32 .30
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Safety Director at Plant
Safety directors with less than 8 years experience as
safety director of the plant at which they worked were
classified as low experienced (129) while the others were
considered as safety directors with more experience (79).
As shown in Table 4-9, the more experienced had stronger
convictions with respect to the following conceptss
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
"EMPHASIS IN LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN 
ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS”
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Again, the D scores in Table 4-10 and the semantic profiles 
in Appendix G, Exhibits 4-29 through 4-35, show the con­
sistency of the more experienced having stronger convictions 
on the concepts that differed.
Age
In the chemical, electrical, and transportation industries 
the safety directors in the petroleum industry under 43 were 
considered young giving a total of 117 young safety directors, 
and 91 old safety directors.
The only concepts that differed were*
TABLE 4-9
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts 
By Years As Safety Director At Present Facility
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 0.958 2.251 1.713 2.092 0.609 0.131 2.163 1.822 1.701 0.082
T-i
CO
2.534 1.285 1.593 0.761 0.811 0.080 0.746 1.271 1.316 1.643
d.T-2® 0.129 0.629 1.421 2.104 1.792 1.909 2.561 1.788 1.657 1.351o
gB-2 2.798 2.834 1.852 1.961 1.377 1.971 1.167 2.544 1.877 3.001
0-3 1.766 0.157 0.587 -0.712 -0.757 1.918 0.994 1.024 1.490 2.384
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More experienced - Less experienced).
Degrees of Freedom: 206
Critical ntn values: +1.96 and -1.96
A complete list of nt’| values can be found in Appendix F, Table F-5.
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"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING, 
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN 
ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
TABLE 4-10
Evaluative And Potency D Scores For Total
Time As Safety Director At Present Facility
D Score
Concept Evaluative Potency
0-1 .69 .62
T-l .51 .52
B-l .47 .57
0-2 .40 .36
T-2 .56 .77
B-2 .82 .86
0-3 .40 .75
But notice the "t" values in Table 4-11 indicate that the 
younger had stronger convictions about the first concept 
(B-l). Possibly the stronger convictions on this concept 
were more influenced by experience in certain capacities, 
such as full-time safety, than by age alone.
The D scores in Table 4-12 and the semantic profiles in 
Appendix G, Exhibits 4-36 through 4-42, indicate little 
separation of concepts in the semantic space. Thus, age did 
not account for much difference in the attitudes of safety 
directors.
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TABLE 4-11 
Significant Differences In Connotative 
Meanings Of Concepts By Age 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3 9 10
B“2 -2*°95 -0.474 0.230 0.925 -1.091 -0.255 -0.077 -0.635 0.006
T-2 0.075 0.431 -1.444 1.437 2.091 -0.359 1.509 0.735 1.061 1.030
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (Old - Young).
Degrees of Freedom: 206
Critical ntn values: +1.96 and -1.96
A complete list of "t" values can be found in Appendix F, Table F-6.
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TABLE 4-12
Evaluative And Potency D Scores 
By Age
0 Score
Concept Evaluative Potency
0-1 .32 .40
T-l .29 .31
B-l .47 .23
0-2 .47 .22
T-2 .51 .42
B-2 .46 .47
0-3 .33 .35
Now that the semantic differential test for the various 
groups have been analyzed, the remainder of the chapter will 
deal with the correlation analysis and conclusions.
Correlation of Experience To Accident Frequency Rates 
The correlation analysis involved correlating each of 
the experience classifications to the arithmetic and logarith 
mic one-year and three-year accident frequency rates by in­
dustry. There was no significant correlation (r^< .10) in 
experience and managerial effectiveness as measured by the 
accident frequency rates.
The lack of correlation between accident frequency rates 
and the amount of experience indicates that the safety
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directors, based on the experience classifications, were 
randomly distributed in the ineffective and effective 
classifications. Thus, both the high and low experienced 
were influenced by the high and low accident records. This 
point is important because now it is possible to draw con­
clusions about the differences in attitudes based on the 
fact that the differences were a result of experience, not 
effectiveness.
Conclusions
Based on the analysis in this chapter, the following hy­
pothesis is accepted:
Experience affects attitudes on behavioral and 
technical concepts and/or the effectiveness of 
safety directors.
The amount of experience did affect the attitudes of the 
safety directors on the behavioral and technical concepts. 
Further, the difference in attitudes among the more experi­
enced and less experienced was evidently highly influenced 
by the amount of full-time safety work. But no relationship 
was found between experience and effectiveness.
Since the safety directors were randomly distributed in 
the effective and ineffective classifications, based on 
experiences, an important point arises. There were
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differences in the attitudes of those with high and low ex­
perience, especially with respect to full-time safety work, 
so high experience was a factor that accounted for stronger 
attitudes bn the part of all safety directors. Assuming 
that the strong attitudes are favorable, then a person with 
high experience may be more desirable than one with low ex­
perience because of his possible stronger convictions about 
the technical and behavioral aspects of accident prevention.
While this chapter was limited to a specific analysis 
of the behavioral and technical concepts, any differences in 
the attitudes relative to the organizational concepts were 
revealed, and some differences were found. Further analysis 
of these differences is made in Chapter V, but suffice it 
to say the data indicated at this time that differences in 
attitudes were a function of experience. It is the judgment 
of the writer that the more experienced safety directors were 
more concerned about safety, and consequently saw their or­
ganizational position and power as more important and they 
had stronger convictions about this than the less experienced.
CHAPTER V
THE INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION AND POWER ON 
MANAGERIAL EFFECTIVENESS AND ATTITUDES
Power and organizational position are considered to 
be among the variables that upper management has perogative 
over and that may influence the effectiveness of safety 
directors.^ But there is little agreement among writers as 
to what the proper level of each should be to attain the best 
results. This lack of agreement is due mainly to either 
the lack of empirical research on the subject or to the con­
flicting and incomplete results of the research that has been 
performed.
A survey by the American Society of Safety Engineers in
1953 indicated that it was preferable for the safety director
2
to occupy a high organizational position, but a similar
3
survey in 1958 revealed the opposite conclusion. However,
^Roland P. Blake, Industrial Safety (third edition, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 
249.
2"The Safety Engineer in Industry: A Survey," The 
Management Review (August, 1955), p. 57.
3E. Peter Marconi, "Today's Safety Engineer in Industry
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the prevailing opinion that is voiced by most writers is 
that the ". . . safety engineer or director should report 
to someone high enough up in the organization to be respected 
and of great influence throughout the company. . . ."4
Similar confusion also exist with respect to authority 
and power because the safety director's position is consider­
ed a staff position, consequently safety directors are not 
directly responsible for the safety record. But safety 
directors do have indirect authority since they are respon­
sible for providing advice and other services to the line 
organization.5 It is also recognized that the staff officials
Business, and Government," Journal of the American Society 
of Safety Engineers (August, 1960) , p. 40.
^Rollin H. Simonds and John V. Grimaldi, Safety Manage­
ment (revised edition, Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 
IncT, 1963), p. 62; For other comments see: Russell DeReamer, 
Modern Safety Practices (New York: John Wiley 6 Sons, Inc., 
1958) , pp. 325-328, and U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Standards, Safety Subjects (Bulletin No. 67, Washington, 
D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 88-94.
5Robert c. Sampson, The Staff Role in Management (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, l9$!>)V This fact is well recog- 
nized by the writers in the safety field as noted in: Blake, 
op. clt., p. 246; Lewis A. DeBlois, Industrial Safety Or­
ganization For Executive And Engineer (London, England: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1926), p. 59-65; DeReamer, 
o p . cit., p. 13; Herbert W. Heinrich, Industrial Accident 
Prevention (third edition, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
Inc., 1950), p. 45-49; Simonds and Grimaldi, op. cit.. pp. 
43-55.
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do issue orders to the line in some cases,6 and that when 
the staff’s suggestions and advice are good, they do become
decisions over a period of time. So, the safety director
does have power, but there ", . . is no agreement as to 
precisely what specific powers the safety engineer should 
have."8
The objective of this chapter is to help clarify the 
position and power issues discussed above by investigating 
the fourth hypothesis which was stated as followst 
The organizational position of the safety 
director affects the amount of power he 
possesses. Also, the amount of power and 
the position of the safety director have
an influence on his effectiveness.
The next section will focus on the relationship of 
position and power, and will be followed by a section re­
lating these variables to accident frequency rates. 
Additionally, a final section will be concerned with any 
relationship that might exist between position, power, and
^Earnest Dale, Planning and Developing the Company Or­
ganization Structure {New York: American Management Associa­
tion, 1952) , pp. 71-76.
7
J ames Mooney, The Principles of Organization (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 34.
O
Simonds and Grimaldi, op. cit., p. 64.
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attitudes. This final section is included for two reasons. 
The first is that two of the concepts that were tested relate 
to organizational position and power. The second reason, and 
perhaps the more important, is that the analysis in previous 
chapters, particularly Chapter II, have indicated some rela­
tionship in effectiveness and ineffectiveness, and a differ­
ence in attitudes. In view of that, the final section takes 
on added significance and will receive thorough attention.
The Relationship Between Organizational 
Position and Power
This section is concerned with the question "Is there 
any relationship in the organizational position of the safety 
director and his power?" The answer to this question will 
serve as a basis for either accepting or rejecting the first 
part of the fourth hypothesis. But before looking directly 
at this question, it is necessary to describe the techniques 
used in the study to quantify power and organizational 
position.
Measurement of Power
9Power is defined as . . the ability to do something.”
^Herbert G. Hicks, The Management Of Organizations (New 
Yorki McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1967), p. 222.
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Certainly there are other definitions,^ but this definition 
provides a useful framework for designing a technique to 
measure or quantify power.
The first step in developing the measuring tool was 
to devise some questions that would reveal the amount of 
power a safety director possessed, as he saw it. Several 
techniques were tried or considered with the result being 
the final four questions of the questionnaire in Appendix A. 
The reader will notice that the questions do not use the 
word "power", but rather used the word "right." The in­
dustry interviews performed in the pre-testing stage of the 
questionnaire construction made it clear to the writer that
For other definitions and discussions the following 
sources are excellenti Peter M. Blew and W. Richard Scott, 
Formal Organizations (San Franciscoi Chandler Publishing 
Company, 1962), pp. 27-40; Dorwin Cartwright (ed.), Studies 
In Social Power (Ann Arbor, Michigani The University of Michi­
gan, 1959); Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Engle­
wood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965); John R.
P. French and Bertram Raven, "The Bases of Social Power," in 
Dorwin Cartwright and A. F. Zander (eds.). Group Dynamics 
(second edition, Evanston; Row, Peterson and Company, 1960), 
pp. 607-623; Robert L. Kahn and Elise Boulding, Power and 
Conflict in Organizations (New York: Basic Books, Inc.); 
william G. Scott, Organization Theory; A Behavioral Analy­
sis For Management (Homewood, Illinois; Richard D. Irwin,
Inc., 1967), pp. 200-207; Max Weber, The Theory of Social 
and Economic Organization, translated by A. M. Henderson 
and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe, Illinois; Free Press and 
Faloon's Wing Press, 1947), p. 152.
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the safety directors did not like the word "power."11 It was 
found that when the word "power" was used, the safety direc­
tor simply would not respond in such a manner that the 
researcher could establish what they were actually able to 
do. Each director interviewed suggested using the word 
"right" and admitted that it would evoke a Response that was 
indicative of what they were able to do. In further pre­
testing when the word "right" was substituted, it did, in 
fact, stimulate a response that was indicative of the defini­
tion of power used in the study.
It was necessary to have four questions with each ques­
tion having four alternatives in order to evaluate the power 
of the safety directors. The subjects covered by the four
questions were chosen because they were considered to be
major areas over which upper management has wide discretion 
in granting or allowing the safety director power. The four 
alternative answers for each question were designed to place 
the safety director on a continuum with very powerful on one
end and no power on the other end.
Once the questions and alternative answers were con­
structed, it was possible to determine a numerical value for
^This phenomenon is not unique to safety directors, as 
recognized by other writers. Seer Bertram M. Gross, Or­
ganizations and Their Managing (New York: The Free Press,
1968), p. 76i Cartwright, o£. cit., p. 2.
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any responding safety director that was a "measure" of his 
power. The procedure was to assign a value of one to four 
for each response according to the following scheme:
1 - ho right at all
2 - the right to advise and recommend
3 - the right to advise and recommend, but my re­
commendations are actually carried out a 
large majority of the time
4 - the right to require actions.
Thus, the highest summed power value w s b  sixteen (4 question 
X power value 4) and the lowest four. Based on this techni­
que the power values for the 208 usable respondents were
calculated. The values varied from sixteen to five and were 
logarithmically normal in shape with a geometric mean of 
12.75.
Measurement of Organizational Position 
The measurement of organizational position was more 
objective. The safety directors used in the study gave 
responses to questions four and five in section B of the 
questionnaire which revealed their organizational position 
and the total levels in the plant organization structure 
respectively. Thus, a safety director could be classified 
according to the level he occupied in the plant organization, 
and he could be classified according to the total number of
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levels In the plant organization in which he worked. A 
notation system was used such that 5/3 meant the safety 
director worked in a plant that had 5 levels in its organi­
zation structure and he occupied a level two steps below 
the top man, or the third level.
Once the measurement techniques were established and 
the data gathered it was possible to study the relationship 
in power and position. The next section covers that analysis.
Interaction of Power and Position 
To determine the relationship in position and power 
it was necessary to correlate the two variables, perform a 
logarithmic transformation of power, and perform the corre­
lation analysis again. This operation treated the safety 
directors as a group, but it was thought that thoroughness 
required that the safety directors should be separated ac­
cording to the levels in their plant organization and corre­
lation analysis performed on each group. This provided a 
study of position both absolutely and relatively. Few of 
the plants had less than four levels in the organization 
and few had more than six; consequently, when the safety 
directors were separated according to levels in the plant 
the classes were (a) four levels or less (64), (b) five 
levels (85), (c) and six levels or more (59).
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Based on the classification procedure and the loga­
rithmic transformations/ a total of eight correlation solu­
tions were necessary to analyze the relationship in power 
and organizational position. The highest coefficient of 
determination (r2) yielded by the analysis was .10. No 
relationship was found between the levels in the plant, the 
level of the safety director, and the amount of power the 
safety director possessed. That part of the fourth hypo­
thesis which stated such a relationship is clearly rejected.
A possible explanation for the lack of correlation 
between position and power may be that the plants with fewer 
levels had more decentralized management. To check this 
out, the plant levels were correlated with plant size and 
no correlation was found (r2 < .10). This may be an indica­
tion of decentralization and this phenomenon might counter­
act any difference in position and power, thus leading to 
no correlation between the two.
A discussion of the remainder of the fourth hypothesis, 
which is concerned with the influence of position and power 
on accident rates, is covered next.
Correlation of Organizational Position and Power to
Accident Records
To correlate organizational position and power to 
accident frequency rates, it was necessary to deal with each 
industry separately. Also, the power function and the
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one-year and three-year accident frequency rates were log­
arithmically transformed in conjunction with one another 
and independently. The resulting sixteen correlation 
solutions yielded no coefficient of determination that was 
significant. There appears to be no relationship among the 
variables of position, power, and accident frequency rates.
The remaining question is "Do attitudes differ among 
safety directors with varying power and organizational 
position?" This question is the subject of the next section.
The Influence of Position and Power on Attitudes 
Since there was no apparent relationship between posi­
tion and power, these variables were treated separately in 
the analysis of attitudes. The first portion of this sec­
tion will deal with position and the latter with power.
Analysis of Organizational Position 
Attitudes seem to be a significant variable that relates 
to the effectiveness of safety directors, so the analysis of 
position with respect to attitudes was more exhaustive than 
was originally expected. A study of attitudes was made by 
comparing semantic differential scores of those safety 
directors who occupied different levels in plants that had 
the same number of levels in the organization and by
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comparing the scores of safety directors who occupied a high
or low position in a plant classification with those who had
a high or low position in a plant with a different total
organizational level classification.
When the safety directors in plants with the same number
of levels in the organizational structure were treated
separately, the following comparisons were made:
Four Levels or Less Five Levels Six Levels or More 
4/2 - 4/3 5/2 - 5/3 6/3 - 6/4
4/3 - 4/4 5/3 - 5/4 6/4 - 6/5
4/2 - 4/4 5/2 - 5/4 6/3 - 6/5
When the safety directors in high and low positions were 
analyzed regardless of the levels in the organization struc­
ture , the following comparisons were made:
Low - Low Low - High High - High
4/4 - 5/4 4/4 - 5/2 4/2 - 5/2
4/4 - 6/5 6/5 - 5/2 4/2 - 6/3
5/2 - 6/5 5/4 - 6/3 5/2 - 6/3
4/4 - 6/3 
6/5 - 4/2 
5/4 - 4/2
Table 5-1 is a concise summary of the results of the various 
comparisons. Only the codes for the concepts that differed 
are presented in Table 5-1, but the MtN scores for all the 
concepts for each comparison appear in Appendix H.
There were obviously some differences in attitudes, but 
the reader may notice, after studying Table 5-1, that any 
consistency of the differences among the high and low
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TABLE 5-1
Concepts That Showed Significant Differences Based On A 
Comparison Of Organizational Positions
Groups Compared
Four Levels Or
Less 4/2 - 4/3 
0-1* 
B-2 
0-3
4/3 -
T-2 -
4/4 4/2 - 4/4
B-l
0-3
Five Levels 5/2 - 5/3 
0-1
5/3 - 
0-1 
T-2
5/4
0-2
B-2
5/2 - 
0-1 
T-2
5/4
Six Levels
Or More 6/3 - 6/4
B-2
6/4 - 
0-1 
T-l
6/5 6/3 -
0-1
T-l
6/5
Low To Low 4/4
0-3
- 5/4 4/4 - 6/5 
None
5/4 -
0-2
6/5
Low to High 4/4 6/3 
None
6/5 - 
0-1 
0-3
4/2
0-1+
5/4 -
T-l
0-3
4/2
High To High 4/2 - 5/2 
T-l 
T-2
4/2 - 6/3
T-l
0-3
5/2 - 6/3
0-3
*Concepts listed under a group indicate that the group had 
stronger attitudes relative to those concepts.
+The group in 4/2 thought their organizational position was 
"good", but didn't feel strong about it while those in 6/5 
did not think their position was very good but felt strong­
ly about it.
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organizational level comparisons is hard to determine. This 
same problem exists among the attitude differences when the 
safety directors in organizations with different levels were 
compared. To help solve the problem all those in high posi­
tions (4/2, 5/2, 6/3) and all those in low positions (4/4, 
5/4, 6/5) were compared. By referring to Tables 5-2 and 
5-3, and Exhibits 5-1 through 5-7 it becomes obvious that 
those safety directors in the high and low positions thought 
the concept "Your Organizational Position" was "good", but 
the ones in the high position thought "stronger" about the 
"goodness." Neither group thought the concept "Management 
Support For You And Your Department" was "good" or "strong," 
but the safety directors in the low positions placed higher 
value on the concept than those in high positions.
After analyzing Table 5-1 and 5-2 the conclusion was 
that the attitudes of safety directors on the technical and 
behavioral concepts were independent of the level in the or­
ganization they occupied, and independent of the number of 
levels in the organization. However, the organizational 
positions and total levels did influence the attitudes of the 
safety directors on the organizational concepts 0-1 and 0-2.
With this path covered, the remainder of the chapter is 
concerned with power and attitudes.
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TABLE 5-2
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts 
According To High And Low Organizational Position
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 1.203 -0.539 1.573 1.684 -0.700 -1.435 0.225 -0.035 2.126 -0.689
0-2 0.808 -2.464 -1.124 -1.062 -0.348 0.800 0.643 0.138 0.634 -0.081
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (High - Low).
Degrees of Freedom: 114
Critical "t" values: +1.98 and -1.98
A complete list of "t" values can be found in Appendix H, Table H-22,
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EXHIBIT 5-1
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak . Strong
Soft . Hard
Legend: "■ Safety Directors In High Organizational
Positions
—  —  —  Safety Directors In Low Organizational
Positions
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EXHIBIT 5-2
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
ImportantUnimportant
WiseFoolish .
SuccessfulUnsuccessful «
GoodBad .
TrueFalse .
SevereLenient .
DeepShallow
HeavyLight
StrongWeak
HardSoft
■ Safety Directors In High Organizational
Positions
— —  Safety Directors In Low Organizational
Positions
EXHIBIT 5-3
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING, 
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient . . Severe
Shallow . Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: ■—  ■ Safety Directors In High Organizational
Positions
— — —  Safety Directors In Low Organizational
Positions
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EXHIBIT 5-4
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad . . Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow . Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend; Safety Directors In High Organizational
Positions
—  —  —  Safety Directors In Low Organizational
Positions
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EXHIBIT 5-5
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT 
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
± ImportantUnimportant
WiseFoolish
SuccessfulUnsuccessful
, GoodBad
TrueFalse
. SevereLenient .
DeepShallow
HeavyLight
StrongWeak
HardSoft
Legend: Safety Directors In.High Organizational 
Positions
— —  Safety Directors In Low Organizational
Positions
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EXHIBIT 5-6
Behavioral Profile Two
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: — ■ Safety Directors In High Organizational
Positions
— — —  Safety Directors In Low Organizational
Positions
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EXHIBIT 5-7
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Unimportant Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad . Good
x
False . True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: —  Safety Directors In High Organizational
Positions
— —  —  Safety Directors In Low Organizational
Positions
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TABLE 5-3
Evaluative And Potency D Scores For The 
Safety Directors In High And Low 
Organizational Positions
D Score
Concept Evaluative Potency
0-1 0.64 0.65
T-l 0.29 0.42
B-l 0.43 0.54
0-2 0.85 0.29
T-2 0.47 0.42
B-2 0.26 0.39
0-3 0.68 0.66
Analysis of Power 
To compare safety directors that had different amounts 
of power, it was necessary to divide them into two groups, 
those with more power and those with less power. The geo­
metric mean of the power value served as the basis for 
dividing the safety directors since the power values were 
logarithmically normal. Therefore, those with a value of 
12 or less were classified as having less power (92) while 
those with a power value of 13 or more were classified as 
having more power (116). After classifying the safety 
directors, the means and standard deviations were calculated 
for each group and then a "t" test was performed. According 
to the decision criteria used in the study, the following
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concepts were found to have higher value and potency to
those safety directors classified as more powerful:
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT" 
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT IN 
ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
The "t" values for concepts that differed are shown in Table
5-4, while the D statistic for all the concepts appear in
Table 5-5.
The semantic profiles in Exhibits 5-8 through 5-14 in­
dicate a consistency among the concepts that differed. The 
profiles also reveal the fact that both groups had strong 
convictions on all the concepts, except 0-2. It is inter­
esting that there was no statistical significant difference 
in the safety directors' attitudes on the concept "Your 
Authority and Power." Doth apparently placed high value on 
their power, but the mean values on the potency Beales in­
dicated neither group thought very strongly about the value 
it had.
It is evident there was a relationship in power and 
strong attitudes, but power did not correlate with accident 
frequency rates. It may be that since the safety directors 
were in a staff position their personal ability to influence
TABLE 5-4
Significant Differences In Connotative Meanings Of Concepts 
According To Power Held By The Safety Directors
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 1.465 1.750 2.759 2*3.69 1.835 2.778 1.842 1.725 3.343 2.177
T-l
m
1.563 1.373 4.039 2.930 3.158 2.791 3.479 2.462 4.714 1.790
&B-1
«
2.706 1.257 2.652 2.316 3.070 2-A?i 2»572 3.984 4.045 2.852
c 0-2 
o 0.259 1.057 0.3S3 0.616 2.670 0.017 1.015 1.872 1.180 0.742o
T-2 0.613 0.233 2.967 0.345 0.912 1.579 0.897 0.483 0.792 -0.602
B-2 1.365 1.070 2*014 1.798 2.195 0.932 1.671 1.987 2.836 2.422
Note: Underlined values show significant difference at the .05 level
of significance (More powerful - Less powerful).
Degrees of Freedom: 206
Critical ntn values: +1.96 and -1.96
A complete list of "tn values can be found in Appendix H, Table H-23
150
TABLE 5-5
Evaluative and Potency D Scores For More And Less 
Powerful Safety Directors
D Score
Concept Evaluative Potency
0-1 .094 .096
T-l 1.08 1.39
B-l 1.20 1.39
0-2 .78 .45
T-2 .56 .37
B-2 .81 .85
0-3 .30 .64
others was more important than the power they had relative 
to the areas considered in the questionnaire. And it is the 
researcher's opinion that the strong attitudes associated 
with the effective safety directors was beneficial to their 
ability to influence others. Therefore, giving the safety 
director power may have value because it strengthens at­
titudes.
Conclusions 
The following hypothesis is rejectedi 
The organisational position of the safety director 
affects the amount of power he possesses. Also, 
the amount of power and the position of the safety 
director have an influence on his effectiveness.
There was no apparent relationship in power, position, and
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EXHIBIT 5-6
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION1'
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad . . Good
False . True
Lenient . . Severe
Shallow i Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft . Hard
Legend: — More Powerful Safety Directors
— — —  Less Powerful Safety Directors
EXHIBIT 5-9
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Legend:
, Important
Unimportant
Wise
Foolish
Unsuccessful *.
, Good
. True
False .
. Severe
Lenient
. Deep
Shallow ^
, Heavy
Light ..
Strong
Weak .
Hard
Soft .
  More Powerful Safety Directors
— Less Powerful Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 5-10
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING, 
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant ^ Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False . True
Lenient . Severe
Shallow . Deep
Light Heavy-
Weak . Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: ■■ More Powerful Safety Directors
— — —  Less Powerful Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 5-11
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad . Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: "* — 1 More Powerful Safety Directors
— - Less Powerful Safety Directors
EXHIBIT 5-12
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT 
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant ,
• j. Important
Foolish .
Wise
Unsuccessful ,
i Successful
Bad .
j\ Good
False .
. True
Lenient .
•, Severe
Shallow .
i Deep
Light .
i Heavy-
Weak *
i Strong
Soft .
. Hard
Legend:
More Powerful Safety- Directors
-  Less Powerful Safety Directors
EXHIBIT 5-13
Behavioral Profile Two
‘"EMPLOYEES* ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant . Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad Good
False . True
Lenient . Severe
Shallow . i Deep
Light x Heavy
Weak . Strong
Soft . Hard
Legend: ~,M ~ More Powerful Safety Directors
— — *  Less Powerful Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 5-14
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Unimportant Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad Good
False . True
Lenient . Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak . Strong
Soft . Hard
Legend: More Powerful Safety Directors
— Less Powerful Safety Directors
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effectiveness. However, a study of the semantic differen­
tial test did show a relationship in position, power, and 
attitudes.
There was a relationship in the attitudes on the con­
cepts 0-1 and 0-2 and organizational position of the safety 
directors. The safety directors in high positions had 
stronger convictions about the value of their organizational 
position, but did not have scores as strong as the safety 
directors in low positions on the concept HManagement Sup­
port for You and Your Department." It may be that the 
safety directors who were high in the organization were 
more desirous of management support or they were aware of 
how little support they actually did have.
There was a definite relationship in power and atti­
tudes. The more powerful safety directors had stronger 
convictions about the behavioral and technical concepts.
Since power and effectiveness did not correlate, the differ­
ences in the attitudes occurred irrespective of the 
accident records of the safety directors. Thus, it appears 
that the more power the safety directors thought they 
possessed, the stronger were their convictions on the techni­
cal and behavioral aspects of accident prevention. However, 
it is recognized it may be that as the safety directors 
became more personally committed to their job of accident
prevention they assumed more power than their less committed 
coharts. The analytical techniques used do not indicate 
the casual relationship, but it is the opinion of the re­
searcher that the power a safety director thinks he has and 
his attitudes are interdependent; and his attitudes can be 
strengthened on concepts by increasing the power of the 
safety director. The value of strengthening the attitudes 
may be that it will ultimately increase the safety directors 
ability to influence others.
CHAPTER VI
CORRELATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS
Purpose of the Analysis 
One of the concerns of this study was the relationship 
of selected variables and accident records. In previous 
chapters certain variables were correlated with accident 
frequency rates with the result that no meaningful relation­
ship was found to exist. The questionnaire gathered data
that has not been related to the accident records, thus,
the purpose of this chapter is to consider all the variables 
covered in the questionnaire in relation to the accident 
records of the responding companies. The technique used to 
study the relationship was simple and multiple correlation 
analysis.
Due to the large number of correlation problems that
were necessary to perform the analysis, the format of the
chapter will be to present a concise summary of the variables 
that were related, followed by the results and conclusions.
Summary of Correlated Variables 
All the variables listed below were intercorrelated,
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that is, correlated with one another, and multiply corre­
lated with the one-year and three-year accident frequency 
and severity rates. Additionally, it was necessary to per­
form logarithmic transformations on the power value, and 
the frequency and severity rates due to their logarithmic 
normality. The industries (chemical, petroleum, electrical 
manufacturing, and transportation) were treated as a group 
and dealt with separately in the correlation analysis.
The variables were as follows:
(1) age of plant
(2) number of employees
(3) number of engineers working in the safety depart­
ment under the safety director
(4) total number of subordinates to the safety 
director
(5) organizational position of the safety director
(6) total organizational levels in the plant
(7) total work experience
(8) total supervisory experience
(9) total full-time safety work experience
(10) total experience as supervisor over safety
(11) years as safety director at present plant
(12) age of safety director
(13) highest academic degree held by the safety
director
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(14) years beyond highest academic degree held by the 
safety director
(15) major in college
(16) power to initiate safety programs and campaigns
(17) number of levels above the safety director where 
actions can be required in initiating safety 
programs and campaigns
(18) power to discipline employees outside of safety 
director's department
(19) number of levels above the safety director where 
actions can be required in disciplining employees 
outside of the safety director's department
(20) power to stop a job or any phase of a job outside 
of safety director's department
(21) number of levels above the safety director where 
action can be required relative to stopping a job 
or any phase of a job outside of the safety 
director's department
(22) power to set safety specifications and/or pro­
cedures on such things as plant layout, new 
processes, job specifications, and machinery 
specifications
(23) number of levels above the safety director where 
actions can be required relative to safety 
specifications, and/or procedures on such things 
as plant layout, new processes, job specifications 
and machinery specifications
(24) college degree major
(25) college curriculum the safety director thought 
would be most useful for his position
(26) hours of special courses dealing with the 
technical or non-human aspects of accident pre­
vention
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(27) sponsor of the technical courses
(28) hours of special courses dealing with the be­
havioral or human aspects of accident prevention
(29) sponsor of the behavioral courses
(30) 1967 accident frequency rate
(31) 1964-1966 accident frequency rate
(32) 1967 accident severity rate
(33) 1964-1966 accident severity rate
(34) total power value
(35) organizational position considering both the 
total levels in the organization and the level 
of the safety director
Results and Conclusions
The more than 50 (thirty-one by thirty-one) intercorre­
lation tables did not yield anything but the obvious. The 
only variables that had high coefficients of determination 
(r2 > .50) were major in college and college degree major, 
the experience classifications and the power values for the 
four power areas. The other variables had intercorrelation 
values that were insignificant (r2 < .20). The multiple 
correlation analysis did not result in a coefficient of 
determination greater than .31.
It is apparent that no important intercorrelations 
existed among the variables considered in this study, and no 
significant multiple correlations existed among the considered
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variables and accident records. If any phenomenon or re­
lationship exist relative to the effectiveness of safety 
directors, it must be, as far as this study is concerned, 
the differences in attitudes.
This completes the analysis of the data which serves 
as the basis for the summary, conclusion, and recommendation 
presented in the next and final chapter.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
And the end is that the workman shall live to enjoy the 
fruits of his labor; that his mother shall have the comfort 
of his arm in her age; that his wife shall not be untimely 
a widow; that his children shall have a father, and that 
cripples and helpless wrecks who were once strong men shall 
not longer be a by-product of industry.
P. B. Juhnke
Summary and Conclusions 
Due to the interest in engineering in the initial 
phases of the safety movement, and the divergent backgrounds 
of safety directors1 today, writers and practitioners in the 
safety field are engaged in a lively debate which centers 
around the question "What characteristics should a person
^The description of the safety professional by the Ameri­
can Society of Safety Engineers and discussion included in 
this paper apply to those people in the top safety position 
in a plant. This study is limited to those safety profession­
als who are the top safety managers in plants; therefore the 
term "safety director" was used in place of safety profession­
al so as to indicate this fact.
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have to make the best safety director?" The primary issue 
is whether the safety director should be an engineer or a 
nonengineer. But a study of the literature made it evident 
to the researcher that empirical research was needed in 
order to evaluate many variables that may influence the ef­
fectiveness of safety directors. This was indicated by the 
serious consequences of industrial accidents today (14,000 
deaths, and 200,000 disabling injuries annually at a cost of 
$6 billion) and the lack of empirical research in the area. 
Consequently, a primary research project was undertaken to 
test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis One: Safety directors who are more effec­
tive have attitudes about certain organizational, technical 
and behavioral concepts that are different from the attitudes 
of the less effective safety directors. Also, the more 
effective safety directors tend to have stronger convictions 
about the technical and behavioral concepts than do the less 
effective safety directors.
Hypothesis Two: Safety directors with nonengineering
backgrounds have different attitudes about certain technical 
and behavioral concepts than those with engineering back­
grounds. Those with nonengineering backgrounds value and 
have stronger convictions about the behavioral concepts than 
those with engineering backgrounds, and engineers value and
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have stronger convictions about the technical concepts than 
nonengineers. Additionally, there is a relationship between 
the college degree held and managerial effectiveness.
Hypothesis Three: Experience affects attitudes toward
behavioral and technical concepts and/or the effectiveness 
of the safety directors.
Hypothesis Four; The organizational position of the 
safety director affects the amount of power he possesses. 
Also, the amount of power and the position of the safety 
director have an influence on his effectiveness.
The data used to test the above hypotheses was gathered 
by sending 583 questionnaires to safety directors in four 
industries - Petroleum Refining (SIC Code 28), Chemical (SIC 
Code 29),-Electrical Manufacturing (SIC Code 36), and Trans­
portation Equipment (SIC Code 37). The questionnaires asked 
the safety directors to take a semantic differential test by 
evaluating the following organizational, technical, and be­
havioral concepts against ten bipolar adjective scales:
CODE CONCEPTS
0-1 "YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION?
T-l "MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST
ACCIDENTS
B-l "EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION,
PLACEMENT, TRAINING, AND COUNSELING 
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
0-2 "MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR
DEPARTMENT"
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CODE CONCEPTS
T-2 "EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF
EQUIPMENT IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
B-2 "EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
0-3 "YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Additionally, the questionnaire gathered detailed information 
on organization characteristics, educational data, experi­
ence of the safety director, and accident statistics. Of 
the questionnaires mailed out, 42.5 percent were returned 
and 85+ percent of the returned forms were usable for analy­
sis. The summary and conclusions of the empirical research 
follows.
Effective Safety Directors Did Have Different 
And Stronger Attitudes
The first step in the analysis of variables was to see 
if the attitudes of the safety directors differed on the se­
lected organizational, technical and behavioral concepts in 
order to test the first hypothesis. The sampled safety 
directors were divided into effective and ineffective classi- 
fications based on the geometric mean of the one-year and 
three-year accident frequency rates of each industry. Then
^The one-year and three-year accident frequency rates 
were found to be logarithmically normal.
^The variables age of plant and number of employees 
were considered as further basis of division, but it was not 
necessary to do so since these variables did not correlate
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the means of the semantic differential scores were tested 
for significant difference at the .05 level of significance. 
The more effective safety directors had stronger convictions 
on the concepts 0-1, T-l, B-l, T-2, and B-2. The first 
hypothesis was clearly accepted. The more effective safety 
directors did have different and stronger attitudes on the 
organizational, technical, and behavioral concepts. Also, 
an investigation of the mean scores showed that both groups 
had strong convictions on all the concepts except 0-2 .
Thus the difference in attitudes was due to the more effec­
tive safety directors having stronger convictions.
It is the researcher's opinion that the strength of 
the convictions by the effective safety directors is an 
indication that they were both behaviorally and technically 
oriented; and this joint orientation added to the safety 
directors* effectiveness. More basically, the researcher 
thinks that the strong attitudes relative to the behavioral 
and technical concepts were an indication of the dedication 
and commitment of the effective safety directors to their 
job. As the safety directors became more dedicated to or 
concerned about accident prevention, the accident rates were
with the accident records. This was attributed to the low 
variance of these variables in the sampled population.
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favorably influenced. It is recognized that more favorable 
accident rates probably influence attitudes, that is acci­
dent rates and attitudes were interdependent. The point is, 
however, that safety directors may have to be extremely 
enthusiastic about their job before the safety records will 
be noticeably influenced. As they become more dedicated 
the accident records may be influenced, and then the atti­
tudes may be reinforced leading to a spiraling effect on 
both attitudes and accident rates.
The researcher could be wrong about the causal relation­
ship since the analysis does not necessarily imply causation; 
however, it does not preclude causation either. Therefore, 
why should industry take a chance and be passive in influ­
encing the attitudes of their safety directors. It is the 
value judgment of the researcher that the companies who desire 
better accident records (hopefully all do) should do all 
they can to strengthen the attitudes and commitments of the 
safety directors toward accident prevention. The lack of 
high mean scores on the concept 0-2 may be an indication 
that management was not giving support to the safety direc­
tors. Even if management was giving support, they had not 
convinced the safety directors in the study that it was 
"good" and "strong."
The analysis of the data in Chapter II raised a ques­
tion that went one step beyond the hypothesis to be tested
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in future chapters* What factors might influence or streng­
then attitudes on the tested concepts? Some possible answers 
were revealed in later chapters.
Education Did Not Have A Significant Relationship 
To Attitudes Or Effectiveness
Chapter III was concerned with testing the second hy­
pothesis which concerned the influence of education on the 
attitudes and managerial effectiveness of the safety direc­
tors. In addition to testing the second hypothesis, other 
facets of education# such as supplementary courses dealing 
with safety# and the level of education# were investigated 
to determine any relationship between those variables and 
effectivenes s.
The first step in the analysis was to divide the safety 
directors into two groups# those with engineering and science 
degrees and those with other college degrees. Then a "t" 
test was performed on the mean values of the semantic dif­
ferential test for the two groups of safety directors to see 
if they had any significantly different attitudes. The 
nonengineers had stronger convictions about the concept T-l# 
B—1# and 0-3. In case of objections about the scientists 
being included in the engineer group# the scientists were 
excluded from the analysis and the *t” test performed again. 
The only concepts that differed then were T-l and B-l and
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the nonengineers had stronger convictions on those two 
concepts again, since the concept 0-3 no longer differed, 
this might indicate that the scientists were not as tolerant 
of lack of'authority as the engineers, and consequently did 
not have as high of an opinion of the authority they did 
possess. This conjecture was enhanced by the fact that no 
difference was found in the amount of power among the groups.
An investigation of the mean values on the semantic 
differential tests indicated that the groups tested had 
good attitudes on all the concepts except 0-2 . Thus, it 
appeared that neither the engineers nor nonengineers thought 
the management support for them or their department was 
"good."
The next step in testing the hypothesis was to correlate 
certain educational variables to effectiveness. The vari­
ables were hjhest degree held, years beyond the highest 
degree, college major, college degree major, hours of 
special courses dealing with the technical or non-human
4
aspects of accident prevention, the sponsor of the courses, 
hours of special courses dealing with the behavioral or 
human aspects of accident prevention, and the sponsors of
4The sponsors were grouped under National Safety Council, 
American Society of Safety Engineers, Company, trade groups, 
government, and college.
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those courses. These variables were correlated with the 
one-year and three-year accident frequency rates of those 
safety directors over a single plant, or several plants in 
a single city. Additionally, each industry was treated 
separately in the correlation analysis, and the frequency 
rates were correlated both arithmetically and logarithmical­
ly. The results of correlating all the variables and the
logarithms of the frequency rates was that no significant
2
correlation was found (r < .10).
Clearly the second hypothesis was rejected. There 
appeared to be no relationship in the college degree, such 
as engineer versus nonengineer, and other educational 
variables to effectiveness. The nonengineers did have 
stronger attitudes on two concepts, thus they might have a 
slight edge in their degree of concern for accident preven­
tion. But it was the researcher's opinion that the educa­
tion variable plays a minor role in causing differences in 
attitudes when compared to other variables. The analysis 
and conclusions of Chapter III seemed to indicate that 
engineers and nonengineers make equally good (or bad) safety 
directors.
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Experience Did Influence Attitudes
In order to test the third hypothesis data was gather­
ed on the experience of the safety directors based on the 
following six classifications:
1. Total years of work experience
2. Total years engaged in a supervisory capacity
over any activity
3. Total years engaged in safety work full-time
4. Total years engaged in supervising safety
personnel
5. Years as safety director at the present facility
6. Age
The attitudes of the safety directors were analyzed by 
dividing them into the more and less experienced based on 
the six classifications. The median value of experience by 
industry was the criteria for division. The more experienced 
safety directors had stronger convictions on the concepts 
indicated in the following summary:
Experience Classification Concepts On Which Attitudes
Differed
1. Work 0-1, T-2, B-2, 0-3
2. Supervisory B-l, T-2, B-2, 0-3
3. Safety Full-Time 0-1, T-l, B-l, T-2, B-2
4. Supervising Safety 0-1, T-l, B-l, B-2
5. Safety Director 0-1, T-l, T-2, B-2, 0-3
6. Age B-l, T-2
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It was evident that experience influenced attitudes and a 
check of the mean scores and linear separation of the 
concepts lead the researcher to conclude that the amount of 
full-time safety work was the most influential of the 
experience variables.
To complete the testing of the third hypothesis it was 
necessary to correlate each experience classification to the 
arithmetic and logarithmic accident frequency rates. There 
was no significant correlation in experience and managerial 
effectiveness as measured by the frequency rates (r^ < .10).
That portion of the hypothesis tested dealing with ex­
perience and attitudes was accepted while the portion con­
cerning experience and effectiveness was rejected. Since 
there was no correlation in effectiveness and experience, 
the experience classifications were equally affected by the 
high and low accident frequency rates in the effective and 
ineffective classifications used in Chapter II. Since the 
attitudes of the more experienced were better toward the con­
cepts irrespective of the accident rates, it was safe to say 
that experience, especially full-time safety experience, 
favorably affects attitudes. This was not to say that safety 
directors with more experience were more effective, for they 
were not, but rather it indicated that if strong convictions 
are desired that actual, or possibly simulated, full-time
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safety experience is favorable. So as not to over-emphasize 
the full-time safety experience classification, it is repeat­
ed that the other experience classifications also had an 
influence on attitudes.
Power, Position, And Effectiveness Were Not Related
Chapter V was concerned with the role of power and 
position in determining the effectiveness of safety directors. 
The determination of the relationship was necessary to test 
hypothesis four. The chapter also included an analysis of 
any differences in attitudes based on power and position.
The analysis of attitudes was included because of the im­
portance they assumed as a result of previous conclusions.
The position classification was based on the level of 
the safety director in the plant organization and/or the 
total levels in the plant organization.5 Power was defined 
as ". . . the ability to do something"** and was quantified 
by assigning numerical values to the responses given on the 
last four pages of the questionnaire.7
5For a listing of the classifications see Table 5-1.
^Herbert G. Hicks, The Management of Organizations,
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19(17), p. 222.
7For a full explanation of how power was classified, 
see pages 126 through 159.
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After position and power were quantified, it was pos­
sible to correlate the two variables. The power value was 
found to be logarithmically normal, therefore, it was neces­
sary to perform a logarithmic transformation on the power 
values. Also, it was necessary to consider position both 
from a relative and absolute standpoint. This was done by 
treating the safety directors as a group and also classify­
ing them according to the total levels in the plant organi­
zation in which they worked. The resulting correlation 
analysis yielded no coefficient of determination above .01.
No apparent relationship was found between the levels in the 
plant, the level of the safety directors, and the amount of 
power the safety director possessed. That part of the fourth 
hypothesis which stated such a relationship was clearly re­
jected.
The remaining correlation analysis that had to be per­
formed dealt with power and position and their relationship 
to effectiveness. Thus, position, power, and the logarithms 
of power, were tested for correlated with the accident fre­
quency rates and the logarithms of the rates by industry.
No significant correlation was indicated by the analysis.
The fourth hypothesis was rejected in total.
But the question of a difference in attitudes among
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the safety directors in different positions and with differ­
ent power still needed exploration. Position was analyzed 
first by classifying the safety directors according to their 
organizational position and by the total number of levels 
in the organization in which they worked. Twenty-one compar­
isons were made between the various classifications with no 
clear results. As a final comparison all the safety direc­
tors in very high and very low organizational positions were 
compared and the only concepts on which they differed were 
0-1 and 0-2. And again, the groups of safety directors all 
had high means on all the concepts except 0-2. The con­
clusion was that the attitudes of the safety directors ap­
peared to be independent of the level in the organisation 
that they occupied, and independent of the number of levels 
in the organization.
The safety directors were divided into two groups 
around the geometric mean of their power values so that a 
comparison of the more and less powerful safety directors 
could be compared. The more powerful safety directors placed 
more value on and thought stronger about the value of the 
concepts 0-1, T-l, B-l, 0-2, T-2, and B-2. Both groups had 
strong attitudes on all the concepts, except 0-2, but the 
more powerful had much stronger convictions on the concepts
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that differed. Since power did not correlate with effective­
ness, the conclusion was that power influenced attitudes 
irrespective of accident frequency rates. Thus, if stronger 
convictions are desired, then it may be possible to streng­
then them by giving the safety director more power and 
convincing him that he does have more power. Since power 
did not correlate with the accident records, the researcher's 
opinion was that personal ability to influence, on matters 
other than the areas covered by the questionnaire, was more 
important than the power measured in the study. Also, it 
was felt that the attitudes of the effective safety direc­
tors might affect their ability to influence, and the value 
of giving more power would be to strengthen the attitudes of 
safety directors.
Attitudes Evolve As The Important Variable 
The last analysis chapter. Chapter VI, completed the 
study by performing a simple, multiple and intercorrelation 
analysis of thirty-one variables and the one-year and three-
g
year accident frequency and severity rates. Each industry 
was handled separately, and combined with others where ap­
propriate. Logarithmic transformations were formed on power
SSee Chapter VI for a complete list of the variables.
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and the accident statistics. The highest multiple corre­
lation value (r^) was .31, thus, there was no correlation 
in the variables tested and accident frequency and severity 
rates. It was obvious that of the variables analyzed, the 
attitudes of the safety directors was the most significant. 
This conclusion served as a basis for formulating the 
recommendations in the next section.
Recommendations 
The recommendations of the researcher are aimed at 
four groups - the American Society of Safety Engineers, the 
upper-level management of companies, individual safety 
directors, and other researchers. The recommendations, 
which are judgments of the writer based on research and ob­
servation, for each group will be handled in the order given. 
It should be recognized that recommendations concerning any 
one group has implications for the others.
The American Society of Safety Engineers, which can 
be equated with those in the safety field, is given prior 
treatment because the research performed in this study is 
of direct concern to its members. First, the writer recom­
mends that the Society determine whether it is a "safety" 
society or an "engineering" society and base the decision,
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not on what persons would make the best safety profession­
als, but on what those in the organization want the Society 
to represent. If they chose to be a safety organization, 
then they should truly represent the safety professional by 
dropping any differentiation in engineers and nonengineers. 
For example, the first step would be to discontinue any work 
on Phase Three in which an attempt will be made to register 
safety engineers. After all, this will only serve to put 
more emphasis on engineering in safety at the expense of the 
behavioral aspects of accident prevention, and to divide the 
present membership into the elite group who would qualify for 
professionalization and a subordinate group who would not.
By the same token, if the members want an engineering organ* 
ization they are responsible for recognizing that they are 
serving only a small part of the safety workers, and only 
dealing with one aspect of accident prevention. There is 
an advantage to being an engineering group in that the mem­
bers can be more specialized and concentrate on the techni­
cal aspects of accident prevention. While it is recommended
here that the Society1s aims be determined by its members,
which is only realistic, the researcher sees a safety society 
as having more value to the industrial community in light of
the heavy toll of accidents today.
The second recommendation to the American Society of
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Safety Engineers concerns the educational program being 
developed in Phase Two of their research project. Two con­
clusions of this study were that attitudes may influence 
effectiveness and experience influences attitudes irrespec­
tive of accident rates. Would it be possible to simulate 
experience in the classroom? Only more research could 
answer that question with high certainty, but the researcher 
thinks that experience can be simulated. It should be 
possible to do so through the use of the case method, but 
using realistic cases. Consequently, it is thought that it 
would be beneficial for the committee in charge of develop­
ing an educational program for safety professionals to not 
only design a list of courses, but also to be concerned 
about the subject content of certain courses, such as speci­
fic safety courses. Also, it seems obvious that the courses, 
recommended should deal with both technical and behavioral 
subjects. However, it is important that the committee move 
in some direction rather than have a stalemate over details. 
After all, the study indicated that persons with any college 
degree make equally good or bad safety directors, so the 
most important thing is to get some curriculum instituted 
in colleges in order to accomplish the objectives of Phase 
Two. At least a person who is interested in safety can 
receive his education in a recognized area by industry and 
his profession.
183
A final recommendation is for the American Society 
of Safety Engineers to encourage more research on the human 
element both on a micro and macro basis. Some suggestions 
on specific studies the writer thinks are important are 
mentioned'later in this section.
The upper line management of companies have the 
responsibility for safety, thus some recommendations are 
directed toward them. It is generally accepted that upper 
management should do all they can to make it possible for 
the safety directors to advise and assist line management. 
No doubt management thinks they are doing this, but the 
safety directors in the study did not have "good" attitudes 
about the management support. Thus, it is recommended that 
the upper management investigate why this is true and take 
feasible action to develop better attitudes on this matter. 
The first step might be simply to listen to the safety 
director in order to discover the reason for his poor at­
titude on management support. In any case, there should be 
something done by management. Management should be active 
in initiating action to strengthen the attitudes of the 
safety directors on management support.
A second recommendation to upper management is to 
always have people in training for the safety director's 
position. This is suggested because of the role that
184
full-time safety experience plays in influencing attitudes. 
Too often the safety director is cast into the job right out 
of line management without the benefit of safety experience.
Power was another variable that apparently influenced 
attitudes favorably, consequently, the third recommendation 
is for management to overtly give the safety director as 
much power as possible. This is not to indicate that power 
will lower the accident rate directly, but it is believed 
that it will strengthen the attitudes of the safety direc­
tor, and this may be a prerequisite to better accident re­
cords. It must be remembered that the attitudes were dif­
ferent when power was evaluated on the basis of what power 
the safety director thought he possessed. Therefore, the 
managers must be sure that safety directors are aware of 
any change in his power and management's actions must re­
flect the change.
A filial and obvious suggestion to roanagament is to 
place someone who is concerned about accident prevention in 
the safety director's position. In fact, this should be one 
of the first requirements for the job. However, in view of 
the shortage of people seeking positions in safety, the 
first thing to do to get persons to think about safety may 
be to give the job certain characteristics as status.
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importance, power, etc.
The advice given to safety directors is to recognize 
the fact that attitudes seem to be associated with effec­
tiveness, thus a technical and behavioral orientation is 
beneficial. If the safety director is weak in one of the 
areas, he should take action formally through courses or 
informally through self study to strengthen himself. It is 
recognized however that this is a personal thing on which 
future study is needed to see what would change attitudes. 
But the safety director being aware of the influence of at­
titudes should be beneficial if for no other reason than 
his becoming concerned about the attitudes of his subor­
dinates, and hopefully his own.
It is recommended that researchers perform empirical 
studies concerning the following problem areas:
(1) Do attitudes of safety directors differ among 
the highly technical firms and less technical or 
service oriented firms? To explore this question 
it would be necessary to sample industries, such 
as the ones used in this study, and other 
industries, such as telephone companies, and 
other utilities.
(2) What influence does technical and behavioral 
courses have on changes in attitudes? The 
answer to this question could be facilitated
1-16
with a series of tests and control groups.
(3) What are some other important variables that 
influence attitudes? How influential are the 
variables? How long does their effect last?
The use of depth interviewing and testing 
should prove valuable in studying these issues.
(4) Why do safety directors have weak attitudes 
relative to management support for them and 
their department? What influence does the 
attitudes of upper management have on the 
attitudes of safety directors? Does the 
philosophy of upper management filter down to 
the safety director and below?
(5) What are the sources of power of safety direc­
tors? Can the safety director change his 
power and if so, why doesn't he do so? What 
effect does an increase in power of the safety 
director have on line management and workers?
The list of recommendations could, no doubt, continue, 
but the above issues are considered to be worthwhile.
Most of them revolve around the puzzling area of "from 
where do attitudes come?," thus, a logical next step is 
depth interviews in industry to help answer this question.
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The researcher believes answers to the above questions will 
result in reduced accident rates. It is hoped that the 
findings given in this study will ultimately reduce indus- 
trial accidents.
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QUESTIONNAIRE
L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y 201
A N D  A G R I C U L T U R A L  A N D  M E C H A N I C A L  C O L L E O K
B A T O N  R O U C E  • L O U I S I A N A  • 7OS0J
C ollege  o f  Business A d m in is tra t io n
d e p a r t m e n t  o p  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  M A R K E T I N G
September 2 7 , 1968
Dear Sir
What factors Influence the effectiveness of a safety director in 
accident prevention? Is one's university degree, organizational position, 
or orientation to problem solving important?
1 am attempting to answer these types of questions in my doctoral 
dissertation research at Louisiana State University and I need your help. 
Basically, 1 am trying to relate certain factors in a safety director's 
background and environment to accident statistics.
Enclosed is a questionnaire designed to provide data for my research. 
Will you please take fifteen minutes of your time to complete this form 
and return it to me? I can assure you that my analysis of the data will 
be completely statistical and there will be no attempt to identify any 
respondent. Also, 1 will gladly share my results with you upon request.
Perhaps, with your help, I will be able to make a positive contribution 
to the field of safety management. Your prompt reply will certainly be ap­
preciated.
HJB/jem 
Enclosure
A M E R IC A N  S O C I E T Y  O F  S A F E T Y  E N G I N E E R S
• to  ftustfc «i<iN*fcv ■ f a s s  m uG i. t tu ia o i t  w o M  * t i l c  pho*< l i t  j )  M j t j f \
October 14, 196 8
Dear Fellow Member;
Your Society is and has been concerned with the development and 
promotion of the Safety Profession. As part of a carefully 
planned project, work has been started on the development of 
educational materials that will assist each of us to increase 
our competence.
Mr. Hyler Bracey is working on a dissertation which includes an 
investigation of certain factors that may influence the safety 
professional's effectiveness. This information should be a good 
contribution to the work of the Society. It is our opinion this 
is a worthwhile undertaking and hope you will assist Mr. Bracey 
by providing the data requested.
Sincerely,
w
President
WES/re
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INSTRUCTIONS
One purpose of this study Is to measure the meaning of certain concepts to 
safety directors. In order to accomplish this objective you are asked to judge 
these concepts'against a series of descriptive scales. In taking this test, please 
make your Judgments on the basis of what these things mean to you. On each page 
you will find a different concept to be Judged and beneath it a set of scales.
Here is how you are to use these scales:
If you think the concept at the top of the page is very c 1osely related to 
one end of the scale, place your mark in the following manner:
Cood X : : : : :______ :_____  Bad
or
Cood _____ ; : ;______;______: : X Bad
If you think the concept is quite closely rela ted to one end of the scale 
(but not extremely), mark as follows:
Good  : X :______:_____ :______ :______:______ Bad
or
Cood ______:_______:______:_____ : : X ;_____  Bad
If the concept seems only slightly rela ted to one side (but is not neutral), 
mark as illustrated below:
Good :______ : X : : t : Bad
or
Cood ______:_______:______ : :__ X : : Bad
The extreme toward vhich you mark depends upon which extreme seems the moat 
characteristic of the proposition being Judged, If you think the concept is neutra 1 
with respect to a particular scale or that a given scale is completely irrelevant, 
place your mark in the middle space.
Good : : : X : : : Bad
IMPORTANT: Please mark in the center of the apace.
T h i s ______ :______ :_____ : X :______ :______ :_____
Not T h i s  :_______:_____ :______ : X :_____
None of the concepts will be repeated, so please do not look back and forth 
through the items and do not try to remember how you marked associated items in 
the questionnaire. Make each item _* separate and independent judgment.
You are encouraged to work at a fairly high rate of speed. Do not be puzzled 
over individual Items; it is your first impression that is important. On the other 
hand, please work carefully so that the true impressions may be revealed.
The concluding pages of the questionnaire are designed to obtain some extremely 
important data.
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Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to what the
following concept means to you.
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
Unimportant
Wise
Unsuccessful
Good
True
Severe
Shallow
Light
Strong
Soft
Important
Foolish
Successful
Bad
False
Lenient
Deep
Heavy
Weak
Hard
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Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to what the
following concept means to you.
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
U n i m p o r t a n t  
Wi s e
Unsuccessful
Good
True
Severe
Shallow
Light
Strong
Soft
Impor tant
Foolish
Success ful
Bad
False
Lenient
Deep
Heavy
Weak
Hard
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Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to what the
following concept means to you.
"EMPHASIS OH EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING, AND COUNSELING
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimpor tant 
Wise
Unsuccessful 
Good 
True 
Severe 
Shallow 
Light 
Strong 
Soft
Xmpor tant
Foolish
Successful
Bad
False
Lenient
Deep
Heavy
Weak
Hard
Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to what the
following concept means to you.
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU 
Unimportant ____
Wise
Unsuccessful
Good
True
Severe
Shallow
Light
Strong
Soft
AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
  Important
— __ Fooliah
  Successful
  Bad
  False
Lenient
Deep
Heavy
Weak
Hard
Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to what the
following concept means to you.
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN
Unimportant______ :_____:______
Wise ______:_____ :______
Unsuccessful______ :_____:
Good ______:_____ :______
True :_____:______
Severe______ :_____:
Shallow______ :_____:______
Light ______:_____ :______
Strong______ :_____:______
Soft :
OF EQUIPMENT IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
 : :_____:______  Important
 :_______: :______  Foolish
 :______ :_____:______  Successful
 :_______:_____:______  Bad
 :_______:_____:______  False
; :_____:______  Lenient
 :______ :_____:______  Deep
 :______ :_____:______  Heavy
 : ;_____:______  Weak
: : : Hard
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Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to whac the
following concept means to you.
♦'EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant
Vise
Unsuccessful
Good
True
Severe
Shallow
Light
Strong
Soft
Important
Foolish
Successful
Bad
False
Lenient
Deep
Heavy
Weak
Hard
Please mark the series of descriptive scales according to what the
following concept means to you.
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Unimportant
Wise
Unsuccessful
Good
True
Severe
Shallow
Light
Strong
Soft
Impor tant
Foolish
Successful
Bad
False
Lenient
Deep
Heavy
Weak
Hard
QUESTIONNAIRE
Industry Dsts
1. I a™ working In the following Industry; .
2. My responsibility Is exercised in: (check one)
( ) s single plant.
( ) a number of plants In s single city.
( ) other (please specify) .
3. The approximate age of the majority of fixed equipment In our plant is year
4. The total nunfcer of employees in 2 above who ere served by my safety work la I 
( ) under 200. ( ) 1001-1500. ( ) 2501-3000.
( ) 201-500. ( ) 1501-2000. ( ) 3001-3500.
( ) 501-1000. ( ) 2001-2500. ( ) 3501 or more.
Safety Department Date
1. Are you involved in safety work on a full-time basis? ( ) Yes ( ) No
2. How many people are there in your department that are engaged in safety work, 
excluding yourself?
Full-Time Part-Time
Engineers and Inspectors
Medical _________ _________
Fire __________ _________
Clerical _ _ _ _ _  _________
Oth*r■ (please specify)
3. If you had to characterize your most Influential subordinate's orientation to 
accident prevention, would you say he is concerned primarily: (check one)
( ) with technical aspects of accident prevention.
( ) with human aspects of accident prevention.
4. The titles of those above ms in the chain of command of the plant In which I 
work are: EXAMPLE
(1) ________________________________________ (1) plant manager
(2) (2) personnel director
(3 ) ________________________________________(3) me
(4) ________________________________________
(5) _______________________________________
(6) __________________________
(7) ________________________________
5. How many levels of msnageiMnt era there from ths top executive to the foremen 
in your plant?
EXAMPLE: (1) Top Executive
/--- 1-- 7
(2) Production 
Manager
/
(3) Supervisors
H — i
(4) Heed of 
Processing
 L__
/ /
(5) Foreman Example Answer: 5_____
6. The annual expenee budget of my department that relates to the safety function 
la approximately i
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C. Your Experience
Tot.il yc.irs of work experience: years,
Total years cng.-igvd in a supervisory capacity over any activity:
Total years engaged tn safety work full-time: ___________  years.
Total years engaged in supervising safety personnel:
years.
years.
How long have you been safety director at the facility at which you now
work? ___________ years.
b. Your age: ___________ years,
0. Education and Training
J.
My highest degree held is: (check one)
( ) elementary school.
( ) high school,
( ) college.
( ) graduate school.
In add it ion to the degree indicated above, 1 have completed: 
years of collage beyond my high school diploma.
___________  years of college or graduate school beyond roy bachelors degree.
years of graduate school beyond my masters dsgree.
If you attended college at any time, what was your major; and if you graduated, 
what degree did you receive?
Major in College Degree (if received)
4. Do you feel that for your position a collage degree la: (check one)
( ) necessary?
( ) useful?
( ) not needed?
5. Do you feel that for your position an engineering degree is: (check one)
( ) necessary?
( ) useful?
( ) not needed?
6. What college curriculum would be most useful for your position? ___________________
7. Have you had any special courses dealing with the technical or non-human aspecta
of accident prevention? ( ) Yes ( ) ho
If yes, how many hours of instruction? __________ hours.
Who was the sponsor?
How would you rate the training? (check one)
( ) very beneficial to my Job
( ) beneficial to my job
( ) slightly beneficial to my Job
( ) s waste of time
8. .Have you had any special courses dealing with the behavioral or human aspects of
accident prevention? ( ) Yes ( ) Ho
If yes, how many hours of instruction? _ _ _ _ _  hours.
Who was the sponsor?
How would you rate the training? (check one)
( ) very beneficial to my job
( ) beneficial to my Job
( ) slightly beneficial to my Job
( ) e waste of tlsM
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E. My Plant's Accident Record
Disabling injury experience computed according to USAS1 Standard Z16.1
For Calendar Average Reported for
1967 Year* 1966, 1963, and 1966
1. Dlsabltrg Injury frequency rate: ____________
2. Dleabling Injury aeverity rate: ^ _
3. Average daye loet per dleabling
Injury: _______________
F . Your Authority
1. Whet right do you have in Initiating tafaty program* and campaigne7 (check one)
( ) the right to require actions
( ) the right to advlac and recommend, but my recommendation* ere actually
carried out a large mo tor 1ty of the time 
( ) the right to adviee and recommend
( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require ectiona, which of your auperior* ha* 
thla right? .
2. What right do you have relative to the dlaciplina of employaea outeld* of your 
department? (check one)
( ) the right to require action*
( ) the right to advice and recommend, but my recommendation* are actually
carried out a large me1ority of the time 
( ) the right to adviee and reconmend
( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your auperiora hai 
thla right? .
3. What right do you have to stop a Job or any phase of a job outaide of your
department that you consider hazardous? (chack one)
( ) the right to require actlona
( ) the right to advise and recommend, but my recommendations are actually
carried out a large majorltv of the time 
( ) the right to advise and recommend
( ) no right at *11
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superIots has 
this right? .
6 . Wist right do you have to sat safety apeclflcationa and/or procedures on such
thing* *a plant layout, new process**, job specifications, end machinery
specifications? (check one)
( ) the right to require action*
( ) th* right to advise end recommend, but my recomawndationa are actually
carried out a large re*lority of the 11dm 
( ) the right to advise and reconand
( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
thla right? .
C. Homographlc Data
Name__
Titl# _  
Address
APPENDIX B
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES BY INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION
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QUESTIONNAIRE
A, Industry Oats
1. I an working in the following industry: Transportation Equipment
2, My responsibllity is exercised in; (check one)
j'"-  ( ) a single plant.
V?2■ 5( ) a number of plants in a single city.
27. 5( / other (please specify) _____
3. The approximate age of the majority of fixed equipment in our plant 1* _ _ _ _  yaars. 
A. The total number of employees in 2 above who are served by sty safety work is:
0.0( ) under 200. 5.0< > 1001-1500. 2 . 5( ) 2501-3000.
0.0. ) 201-500. 10.0( ) 1501-2000. 5.0( ) 3001-3500.
7.5( ) 501-1000. 10.0( ) 2001-2500. 60.0( ) 3501 or more.
Average Number of employees - 3000
B. Safety Department Data
100. 0
1. Are you Involved in safety work on a full-time basis? ( ) Yes ( ) No
2. How many people are there in your department that are engaged in safety work. 
excludinn yourself?
Full-Time Part-Time
Engineers and Inspectors 3. 9
Medical _ _ _ _ _ _  _________
F i r s  _____________  _____________
Clerical _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Others (plaase specify) 6.8
Total 10-7
3. If you had to characterise your most influential subordinate’s orientation to 
*NR15. Oaccidsnt prevention, would you say he is concerned primarily: (check one)
32. 5{ ) with technical aspects of accident prevention.
52. 5( ) with human aspects of accident prevention.
4. The titles of those above me In the chain of command of the plant in which 1 
work are: EXAMPLE
(1) (1) plant manager
(2) 7.5 (2) personnel director
(3)_____ 47.5______________________________  (3) me
(4) 30.0 Mean - 36_______________
(5)_____ 10.0______________________________
(6) 2.5
(7) 2.5
5, Bow many levels of management ere there from the top executive to the foreman 
in your plant? __________
EXAMPLE: (1) Top Executive
3 5.0 /
4 - 17.5 / 7
5 32.5 <2) Production
6 25.0 Manager
7 7.5 /
8 5.0 / 7
9 5.0 (3) Supervisors
r - 1— !
(4) Head of 
Processing
/ {— j
(3) Foremen Kxampla Answer: 3
6. The annuel expense budget of my department chat relates to the safety function 
is approximately
*K R - No Response
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C. Your Experience
1. Total years of work experience: year*.
2. Total years engaged in a supervisory capacity over any activity; 14.0 years.
3. Total years engaged in safety work full-time; 14 ..0 yean.
4. Total years engaged in supervising safety personnel: 10.0 years.
5. How long have you been safety director at the facility at which you now
work? 7. S year*.
6. Your age: 4 5.0 years.
0. Education and Training
1. My highest degree held is: (check one)
( ) elementary school.
42. S( ) high school,
4 7 . 5( ) college.
10.0( ) graduate school,
2. _In add 11ion to the degree indicated above, I have completed:
_ _ _______  years of college beyond my high school diploma.
year* of college or graduate school beyond my bachelors degree. 
___________ year* of graduate school beyond ray masters dsgres.
3. If you attended college at any time, what was your major; and if you graduated, 
what degree did you receive?
None 17.5 42.5
Major in College Degree (if received)
,0■ ■ ¥ --- ------
Science 10. 0 Science 5.
Nonenqineer 47.5 Nonenaineer 30.
4. Do you feel that for your position a college degree is: (check one)
35.0 ( ) necessary?
55. 0( ) useful?
10. Q( ) not needed?
5. Do you feel that for your position an engineering degrse is: (check one)
12.5 ( ) necessary? N R  - 2.5
77.5 ( ) useful? Engineer -60.0
10.0 ( ) not needed? Science - 5.0
6. What college curriculum would be most useful for your position? Nonsnaineer-3fi. Q
7. Have you had any special courses dealing with the technical or non-human aspects 
of accident prevention? 72.$ Yes 22. t ) No
If yes, how many hour* of instruction? 61 hours.
Who was the sponsor? .
How would you rate the training? (check one) College - 45.2
54.8 ( ) very beneficial to my job Trade - 6.5
39.8 ( ) beneficial to my Job NSC, ASSE - 25.8
6.4 ( ) slightly beneficial to my job Company - 19.4
0.0 ( ) a waste of time Government - 3.2
8. Have you had any special course* dealing with the behavioral or human aspects of 
accident prevent ion?57( 5 ) Ye*40.0( ) No
If yes. how many hour* of Instruction? is houra.
Who was the sponsor?
How would you rats the training? (check one) College - 39.2
56.5 < ) very beneficial to my job Trade - 0.0
34.8 ( ) beneficial to my Job NSC, ASSE - 21.8
8.7 ( ) slightly banaficlal to my job Company - 34.8
0.0 < ) a waata of time Government - 4.3
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E. My Flint1a Accident Record
Disabling Injury experience computed according to USASI Standard Z16.1
For Calendar Average Reported for
1967 Yeara 1964, 1965, and 1966
1. Diaabling Injury frequency rate: 5.06______ 5.71
2. Diaabling injury aeverity rate: 389 370 ~
3. Average daya loat per diaabling
injury:_______________________________ ____________
7. Your Authority
1. VJhat right do you have in initiating safety program* and campaign*? (check one)
50.0( ) the right to require actions
37. S( ) the right to adviae and recommend, but my recommendat Iona ere actually
can led out a larce malority of the time 
10.0( ) the right to adviae and recommend
0.0( ) no right at all
If you don1t have the right to require action*, which of your superiors ha* 
thi* right? .
2. What right do you have relative to the discipline of employees outside of your 
department? (check one)
32. 5( ) the right to require actions
40.0( ) the right to advise and recommend, but my recoenendationa are actually
carried out a large majority of the time
15.0 ( ) the right to adviae and reconmend
10.0 ( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require action*, which of your superior* ha* 
this right? .
3. What right do you have to atop a Job or any phase of a Job outside of your
department that you consider hazardous? (check one)
72.5 ( ) the right to require action*
15.0 ( ) the right to advise and recommend, but my recomendatlons are actually
carried out a large malority of the time
10.0 ( ) the right to advise and recommend
0.0 ( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right? .
4. What right do you have to set safety specifications and/or procedures on such
thing* as plant layout, new processes, Job specificstions, and machinery
specifications? (check one)
57.5 ( ) the right to require action*
17.5 ( ) the right to advise and recommend, but my recoenendatton* are actually
carried out a large melorltv of the tints
22.5 ( ) the right to adviae and reconmend
0.0 { ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right? .
C. Demographic Data
Name __ 
Title _  
AddreaT
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QUESTIONNAIRE
A. Industry Data
1.
2.
Cl-
39.
3.
4. 
3.
19.
25.
I an working In the following industry: _
My responsibility is exercised in: (check
( ) a single plant.
0 ( ) a number of plants in a single city.
0 ( ) other (please specify) ______________
one)
Petroleum_Refining
The approximate age of the majority of fixed equipment in our plant is years.
The total number of employees in 2 above who are served by ray safety work is:
2 ( 
4 ( 
8 (
) under 200. 
) 201-500.
) 501-1000.
Safety Department Data
6.5 ( ) 1001-1500. 3.2 f ) 2501-3000.
6.5 ( ) 1501-2000. 3, 2( ) 3001-3500.
9.7 ( ) 2001-2500. 22. 6 ( ) 3501 or wore.
Average Number Of Employees - 1678
100.0
1. Are you involved in safety work on a full-time basis? ( ) Yea ( ) No
2. How many people are there in your department that are engaged in safety work, 
excluding yourself?
Full-Time Part-Time 
Engineers and Inspectors ? t s _ _ _ _ _
Medical _________  _________
Fire _________ _________
Clerical _________  _________
Others (please specify) 2,36
__________ Total________ 5.10 _________
3. If you had to characterize your roost influential subordinate*s orientation to 
NR*16.1 accident prevention, would you say he is concerned primarily: (check one)
16.1 ( ) with technical aspects of accident prevention.
67,7 ( ) with human aspects of accident prevention,
4. The titles of those above me in the chain of comnsnd of the plant in which I
work are:
(1)
(2)
-
(4)
(5)
(6)O) _
22-6
.Haan. 2.37
EXAMPLE
(1) plant manager
(2) personnel director
(3) me
19-4
5. How many levels of management are there from the top executive to the fores 
in your plant?
EXAMPLE: (1) Top Executive
3
4
5
6 
7
3.2 
35. 5 
48.4
9.7
3.2
X
Mean - 4.74 (2)
7
Production
Manager
r S
(3) Supervisors
(S)
/
Foreman
/
(4) Head of 
Processing
X
1
f
Example Anawer: X
6 . The snnua1 expense budget of ay department that relates to the safety function 
la approximately • Qmit
•NR - No Ranponsm
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C. Your Experience
1. Total years of work experience: years.
2. Total years engaged in a sopcrvisory capacity over any activity: yeara,
3. Total years engaged in safety work full-time: 11.7 year*,
4. Total years engaged in supervising safety personnel: 7.6 years.
5. How long have you been safety director at the facility at which you now 
work? 7 . B year*.
6 . Your age: 46.45 year*.
D. Education and Training
1. My highest degree held is: (check one)
( ) elementary school,
2 5 . 8( ) high school.
7 1 . 0< ) college.
3.2( ) graduate school,
2. _l_n add it ion to the degree Indicated above, I have completed:
year* of college beyond my high school diploma.
___________ years of college or graduate school beyond my bachelors degree.
__________  years of graduate school beyond my master* degree.
3. If you attended college at any time, what was your major; and if you graduated, 
what degree did you receive?
None 16.1 None 25.8
Major in College Degree (if received)
Enqineer _3.5t5._ Enoineer .32.3
Science 22.6 Science 19.3
Nonenqineer 25.8 Nonenaineer 22.6
4. Do you feel that for your position a college degree fa: (check one)
54. 8( ) necessary?
38.7( ) useful?
6.5( ) not needed?
5. Do you feel that for your position an enginearing degree lei (check one)
22.6 ( ) necessary? N R  - 3.2
67.7( ) useful? Engineer - 80.6
9.7( ) not needed? Science - 0.0
6. What college curriculum would be most useful for your position?
7. Have you had any special course* dealing with the technical or non-huatan aspect* 
of accident prev»ntion?71£ 0) Yes 29.0 ) No
If /e*, how many hours or Instruction? 46 hour*.
Who was the sponsor? .
How would you rate the training? (check one) C M  lege - 36.3
59.1{ ) very beneficial to my Job Trade - 4.5
36.3 { ) beneficial to my Job NSC, ASSE - 13.6
4.5( ) slightly beneficial to my Job Company - 36.6
0.0{ ) a waste of time Government - 9.1
8. Have you had any special courses dealing with the behavioral or human aspects of 
accident prevention? 6 X  7) Yes 32. X  ) No
If yes■ how many hours of instruction? 39 houra.
How would you rate the training? (check one) College - 38.1
52. 5 ( ) very beneficial to nry Job Trade - 9.5
47.5 ( ) beneficial to my Job NSC, ASSE - 14.3
0.0 ( ) slightly beneficial to my Job Company - 36.8
0.0( ) a waate of time Government - 4.8
*
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E, My Plant'* Accident Record
Diaabling Injury experience computed according to USASI Standard Z16.1
For Calendar Average Reported for
1967 Year* 1961., 1965, and 1966
1. Diaabling Injury frequency rate: 5-26____  7,20
2, Diaabling injury aeverlty rate: 404 703~
3. Average day* loat per diaabling 
Injury:
F. Your Authority
1. What right do you have in initiating aafety program* and campaign*? (check one)
32.3( ) the right to require actions
64. 5( ) the right to advise and recommend, but my recommendations are actually
carried out a large maloritv of the time 
3.2( ) the right to adviae and recommend
0. Q( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superior* has 
thla right? .
2. What right do you have relative to the discipline of employees outside of your 
department? (check one)
22.6( ) the right to require actions
25. 8( ) the right to adviae and recoamend, but my recoenendstiona are actually
carried out a large malorltv of the time 
29, 0( ) the right to advise and recoaaaend
22. 6( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require action*, which of your superiors has 
this right? .
3. What right do you have to atop a Job or any phase of a Job outside of your
department that you consider hazardous? (check one)
48,4( ) the right to require actions
35.5( ) the right to adviae and recommend, but my recomsandatlona are actually
carried out a large malorttv of the time 
16. 1( ) the right to adviae and recommend
0.Q( ) no right stall
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right? .
4. What right do you have to set aafety specifications and/or procedures on such
thing* as plant layout, new processes. Job specifications, and machinery
apaciflest Iona? (check one)
35. 5( ) the right to require actlona
48.4( ) the right to advise and recon»end, but my recommendations are actually
carried out a large matori tv of the time 
16.1( ) the right to advise and recommend
0.0( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require act lone, which of your super lor a ha* 
this right? .
C. Demographic Data
Hama __
Titl* _
AddTeae
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QUESTIONNAIRE ■
A. Industry Data
1. I am working In the following industry: Electrical Manufacturing
2. My responsibility is exercised in: (check one)
/■—  ( ) a single plant.
l?2. 0( ) a number of plants in a single city.
28. Of ) other (please specify) .
3. The approximate age of the majority of fixed equipment in our plant is years, 
A, The total number of employees in 2 above who are served by my safety work is:
3.1( ) under 200. 12. 5( ) 1001-1500. 9.4( ) 2501-3000.
3. If ) 201-500. 9.4( ) 1501-2000. 6.3< ) 3001-3500.
0.0( ) 501-1000. 9.4( ) 2001-2500. 46.9( ) 3501 or more.
B. Safety Department Data
100.0
1. Are you involved in aafety work on a full-time basis? ( ) Yes ( ) No
2. How many people ere there in your department that are engaged in aafety work,
excludtna yourself?
Full-Time Part-Time
Engineers end Inspectors 3.25_____ _________
Medical _________ _________
Fire _________ _________
Clerical _________  _________
Other a (please specify) 3.22
__________ Total______________   6-^7 _____
3. If you had to characterize your most influential subordinate's orientation to 
NR*6.3 accident prevention, would you say he is concerned primarily: (check one)
31.3 ( ) with technical aspects of accident prevention.
62. S ( ) with human aspects of accident prevention.
A. The titles of those above me in the chain of comaand of the plant in which I 
work are: _  EXAMPLE
(1) (1) plant swnager
(2) 15.6 (2) personnel director
(3) 31.3 Mean - 3.59_____________ (3) me
<4) 37. 5________________________________
<5) 12.5________________________________
(6)  
(7) ___________________________________
5, How many levels of management are there from the top executive to the fori 
in your plant?
EXAMPLE: (1) Top Executive
3 3.1 /
4 - 21.9 / 7
5 43.8 Mean - 5.19 (2) Production
6 18.8 Manager
7 9.4 /
8 3.1 / 7
(3) Supervisors
/ 7
(A) Head of 
Processing
 L___
/ /
(5) Foreman Example Answer;  5
6. The annual expense budget of my department chat relates to the safety function 
is approximately B Omit
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C. Your Ex per iciicc
t, Tot.il years of work uxpcr i once:  23.7 year#.
2. Total years cng.iged In a supervi sorv capacity over any activity: 13.5 years.
3. Total years engaged in aafety work full-time: 12.8 year*.
4. Total years engaged in supervising safety personnel: 8. 9 years.
5. How Long have you been safety director at the facility at which you now 
work? 6 . 6____  years.
6. Your age; 4 6.6 years.
I
P. Eduration and Training
1, My highest degree held is: (check one)
( ) elementary school.
46. 9( ) high school.
28. 1( ) col lege.
21. 9( ) graduate school.
2. _In addition to the degree indicated above, 1 have completed:
years of college beyond my high school diploma.
  years of college or graduate school beyond my bachelors dagraa.
  years of graduate school beyond my masters dagraa.
]. If you attended college at any time, what was your sujor; and If you graduated, 
what degree did you receive?
None 21.9 None 46.9
Major in College Degree (if received)
Engineer 31.3 Engineer 22.1
Science 3.1 Science J.i
Nonenaineer 43.8 Nonengineer 28.2
4 . Do you feel that for your position a collage degree is: (check one)
25. (X ) necessary?
71.9( ) useful?
0.0( ) not needed?
5. Do you feci that for your position an engineering degree is: (check one)
9.4( ) necessary? N R  - 9.4
81.3( ) useful? Engineer -50.0
6 . X  ) not needed? Science - 3.1
6. What college curriculum would be most useful for your position? Nonengineer— 37.5
7. Hnve you had any special courses dealing with the technical or non-humsn aspects 
of Occident prevent ion? 8)(. 3) Yes 3 ® ’7 ) jjt,
t f yes, how many hours of instruction? hours.
Who was the sponsor? .
How would you rate the training? (check one) College - 19.2
38.X  ) very beneficial to my job Trade - 7.7
57.8( ) beneficial to my job NSC, ASSE — 26.8
3.X ) slightly beneficial to my Job Company - 30.8
0.0( ) a waste of time Government - 15.4
8. Have you had any special courses dealing with the behavioral or human eapecte of 
accident prevention?S9( g) Yea 31.X  ) No
If yes■ how many hours of instruction? hours.
Who was the sponsor? .
How vouLd you rate the training? (check one)
36.8( ) very beneficial to my Job College - 26.4
58.0( ) beneficial to my Job Trade - 5.3
O.tX ) slightly beneficial to my job NSC, ASSE - 26.4
5. X  ) e waste of time Company - 36.9
Government ■* 5.3
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E. My Plant’s Accident Record
Diaabling injury experience computed according to USAS1 Standard 216.1
For Calendar Average Reported for
1967 Year* 1964. 1965, and 1966
1, Diaabling injury frequency rate: 2.35 2.10
2. Diaabling injury severity rate: 166 102
3. Average days lost per disabling
injury: _ _ _ _ _
F. Your Authority
1. What right do you have in initiating safety programs and campaigns? (check one)
50.0( ) the right to require actlona
43. 8( ) the right to adviee and recommend, but my recommendations are actually
carried out a large malorltv of the time 
6.3( ) the right to advise and recommend
0.0( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, vhLch of your superiors has 
this right? .
2. What right do you have relative to the discipline of employees outside ot your
department? (check one)
25. 0( ) the right to require actions
34. 4( ) the right to advise and recommend, but my recommendations are actually
carried out a large malorltv of the time
37. 5( ) the right to adviae and recomnend
3.1( ) no r igh t a t a 11
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right? .
3. Whet right do you have to atop a Job or any phase of a Joh outside of your 
department that you consider hasardous? (check one)
68.8( ) the right to require actions
25,Q( ) the right to advise and recommend, but my raconmendations are actually
carried out a large malor 1 tv of the time 
3.1( ) the right to advise end recommend
3.1( ) no Tight at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right?
4. What right do you hive to aet safety spedflcatlona and/or procedures on such 
things as plant layout, new processes, Job specific*tions, and machinery 
specifications? (check one)
59.4( ) the right to require actlona
28.1( ) the right to advise and recoasscnd, but nry recommendations are actually
carried out e large maI ority of the tIsm
9,4 ( ) the right to adviae and racoon end
3.1 ( ) no right at all
If you don’t have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right? .
C . Demographic Data 
Noise
Title __
Address
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QUESTIONNAIRE
A. Industry Dots
1. I am working in the following Industry: Chr.mi r-n 1
2. My rcsponsihil ity is exercised in: (check one)
L ( ) a single plant.0.0 ( ) a number of plants in a single city.
2 0 . )  other (please specify)
3. The approximate age of the majority of fixed equipment in our plant is 1 fi. q years.
4. The total number of employees in 2 above who are served by my safety work is:
4.8( ) under 200. 16 2 < > 1001-1500. e.7( ) 2501-3000.
21.0< ) 201-500. a- 6 ( ) 1501-2000. l. 9( ) 3001-3500.
22.9 ( ) 501-1000. g . 7 ( > 2001-2500. 11.4( ) 3501 or more.
Average Number Of Employees 1390
Safety Department Data
1. Are you involved in safety work on a full-time baste? ( ) Yes ( ) No
2. How many people are there in your department that are engaged in safety work, 
excluding yourself?
Full-Time Fart-Time
Engineers and Inspectors ? n ? —
Medical___________________________ _________  _________
Fire______________________________ _________  _________
Clerical ^
Others (please specify) 3.47
Tnfal__________  __<1- do
3. If you had to characterise your most influential subordinate’s orientation-to 
NR* 6.6sccident prevention, would you aey he is concerned primarily; (check one)
31.4( ) with technical aspects of accident prevention.
60, 0( ) with human aspects of accident prevention.
4. The titles of those above me in the chain of comnand of the plant in which I 
work are: EXAMPLE
fl) (1) plant managaT
(2) 20.0 (2) personnel director
(3) 49.5 Mean - 3.2 (3) M
(4) 2d.Q
(5) 10.5
(6)
(7)
S. How many levels of management are there from the top executive to the fora 
in your plant?
EXAMPLE: (1) Top Executive
3- 7.9 /
4-25.7 / 7
5-41.0 Mean • 5.0 (2) Production
6-17.1 Manager
7 - 2 . 9  /
fl- 2.9 / 7
(3) Supervisors
/" 7
(4) Heed of 
Processingi
/  /
(5) Foreman Example Answert 5
6. The annual expense budget of my department that relates to the aafety function 
la approximately ♦ OMIT 
NR*1 No Rssponts
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C. Your Experience
1. Total years of work experience: 23.6 year*,
2. T o t a l  y e a r s  (.'iif.igi-d In a mipnrv < mi ry  c a p a c i t y  ov e r  any a c t i v i t y ;  16 • 9  y e a n .
3. Total years engaged In safety work full-time: 12.4 yean.
4. Total years engaged in gunorvising safety personnel; 10.5 year*.
5. H o u  long luve you been safety director at the facility at which you now 
wo rk? B . 1 years.
6. Your age; 47.Q years.
0, Education and Training
1. My highest degree held is: (check one)
( ) elementary school.
35. 2( ) high school.
58. 1( ) col lege.
6 . 7( ) graduate school.
2. In addition to the degree indicated above. I have completed:
__________  years of college beyond my high school diploma.
years of college or graduate school beyond s»y bachelors degree, 
years of graduate school beyond my masters degree,
3. If you attended college at any time, what was your Mjor; and if you graduated, 
what degree did you receive?
None 16.2 None 35.2
Major in College Degree (If received)
Engineer 39.0 Engineer 26.6
Sciance Science
Nonenqineer 33.5 Nonenqineer 39.0
4. Do you feel that for your position e college degree is; (check one)
44. Q( ) necessary?
53•2( ) useful?
2.8( ) not needed?
5. Do you feel that for your position an engineering degree is; (check one)
19.3( ) necessary? HR - 1.9
73.4( ) useful? Engineer - 61.0
7.3( ) not needed? Science - 6.7
6. What college curriculum would be most useful for your position? Nonengineer - 30.5,
7. Have you had any special courses dealing with the technical or non-human aspects
of accident prevention? 67.9 Yes 32.1 No
If yes, how many hours or instruction? 59.0 hours.
Who was the sponsor? .
How would you rate the training? (check one) College ~ 2b.6
48-'5( ) very beneficial to my Job Trade - 14.3
38.5( ) beneficial to ray Job NSC, ASSE ~ 18.5
12.9( ) slightly beneficial to my Job Company - 25.8
0.0( ) a waste of time Government - 8.6
B. Have you had any special courses dealing with the behavioral or human aspects of 
accident prevention? 61.8) Yes36.2( ) No
If yes, how many hours of Instruction? 48 hours.
Who was the sponsor? .
How would you rate the training? (check one) College ~ 39.0
55.5 ( ) very beneficial to ray Job Trade - 10.5
43.0 ( ) beneficial to my Job NSC, ASSE - 22,4
( ) slightly beneficial to my Job Company - 24.8
( ) a waste of time Government - 1.5
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E. My Plant's Accident Record
Disabling Injury experience computed according to USASI Standard Z16.1
For Calendar Average Reported for
1967 Year* 1966 1966. and 1966
1. Disabling injury frequency rate:  3 . 6 1 _   4-56
2. Diaabling injury severity rate: 3.63 3.62
3. Average days lost per disabling
injury;
F. Your Authority
1. What right do you have in initiating safety programs and campaigns? (check one)
40. 0( ) the right to require actions
54. 3( ) the right to adviae and recommend, but my recommendations are actually
carried out a large nu jor i tv of the time 
5.7( ) the right to advise and recommend
0. 0( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right? .
2. What right do you have relative to the discipline of employees outside of your 
department? (check one)
29.5( ) the right to require actions
33. 3( ) the right to advise and recommend, but my recommendations are actually
carried out a large ma1 ority of the time 
24,8( ) the right to advise and recommend
12. 4( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right? .
3. What right do you hava to stop a job or any phase of a Job outside of your
department that you consider hasardous? (check one)
67.6( ) the right to require actions
24.8( ) the right to advise and recommend, but my recommendations are actually
carried out a large maiorlty of the time 
3.8( ) the right to advise and recommend
3. fK ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right? _______________ .
4. What right do you have to eat safety specifications and/or procedures on such
things as plant layout, new proceaaea, Job specifications, and stachinery
Specifications? (check one)
42.9( ) the right to require actions
41, 9( } the right to advise and reconsnend, but my recomendatlons are actually
carried out a large malorltv of the time
13. 3( ) the right to advise and recommend
1. 9( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right?_________________________________________________________________ .
C, Demographic Data
Name________________________________________________________________________
Title _
Address
APPENDIX C
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES OF THE EFFECTIVE 
AND INEFFECTIVE SAFETY DIRECTORS
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Legendi Effective Safety Director*
(Ineffective Safety Directors)
A. Industry Data
1.
2.
52.S 
9.7 
18.1
I am working in (lie following industry!
My responsibility is exercised in: (check one) 
( ) a single plant.
( ) a number of plants in s single city,
( ) other (please specify)
Chemical
Petroleum
Electrical
Transportation
13-6
3. The soproximate age of the majority of fixed equipment in our plant is years,
it. The total number of employees in 2 above who are served by my safety work is:
6.9 (1.3) under 200. 16.7 (13.3) 1001-1500. 6.9 (9.3) 2501-3000.
8.3 (20.0) 201-500. 9.7 (8.0) 1501-2000. 4.2 (1.3) 3001-3500.
19.4 (16.0) 501- 1000. 2.8 (8.0) 2001-2500. 25.0 (21.3) 3501 or more.
b .  S s f c r y  be  p e r t i n e n t  Dj i h
1. Are you involved in safety work on a full-time basis? (100) Yes ( ) No
2, Ho* many people arc there in your department that are engaged in safety work, 
.kcIuding yourself?
Full-Time Part-Time
Engineers arui Inspectors 2.6 ti.D ______
Medical _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____________
Fire________________________________ __________ __________
Clerical____________________________ __________ __________
Other■ (please specify) 3.5 (4.7)
______________ TOTAL 6.1 (7.1) _________
NR 3, If you had to characterize your most influentlal subordinate's orientation to
10.6 (12.7)accident prevention, would you say he is concerned primarily: (check one)
28,0 (20.8) with technical aspects of accident prevention.
61.3 (66.7) with human aspect* of accident prevention.
A. The title* of those above me In the chain of coranand of the plant in which I
work arc:
(0
(2) 9-7 (lfl-71
(3) (tf,
(4) ■}(. A ?’ 1)
(5) 8.3 10.7J
(6)
(7) 11. 31
EXAMPLE
(1) plant manager
(2) personnel director
(3) me
How many level* of management sr* there from the top executive to the foreman
in your plant? 
3- 11.1 (2.7)
4- 22.2 (28.0)
5- 36.1 (37.3)
6- 22.2 (20.0)
7- 5.6 (6.7)
8- 2.8 (1.3)
9- 0.0 (4.4)
Mean-4.92 Hean-5.2
EXAMPLE; (1) Top Executive
±
(2) Production 
Manager
(4)
Pn
(3) Supervisors
r ^ — i
1
<S)
I
Foreman
Head of 
•cessing
J.__
Example Answer;
6. The annual expense budget of my department that relates to the aafety function 
1* approximately 8 Omit 
Nil No Response
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c. Your■ Expo r ionce
1. To t.-il you rs of wi>rV i
Tot J 1 yc.1 rs Ctlg.’god
3. TotO 1 year a C IIgaged
it. Tot.i 1 years engaged
5. Itou 1ong have y ou b e i
work? 3_5— -IS. 7) yea:
6 . Your ago:4 6 .7 (46. b :
Ed ui j t i on ,ind Trai ning
£9.6) years.
D.
1. My highest decree held Ik: (check one)
0.0 10 . 0)c1 omentury school.
40.3 (44.0)high school.
51.4 (40.0)col Ifuc.
S. 3 (8 . 0)gruduate school.
2, In add 11 Ion to the degree Indicated above, I have completed:
_ years of college beyond my high school diploma.
     years of college or graduate school beyond my bachelors degree.
years of graduate school beyond my masters degree.
3. If you attended college at any time, what was your major; and if you graduated,
what deg ice did you receive?
NONE 20.8 (16.0) 40.3 (44.0)
Major in College Degree (If received)
33.3 (33.3) 22.2
Science 11.2 (10.7) 6.9 (9.3)
Nonengineer34.7 (40.0) 30.5 (?«,7)
4. Do you feel that for your position a collage degree la: (check one)
38.9 (36.0)necessary?
55.6 (60.0)useful?
4.2 (4.'07 not needed?
5. Do you feel that for your position an engineering degree is: (check one)
18.1 (9.3)necessary? Engineer- 58.3 (65.3)
75.0 (81.3)useful? Science- 5.6 (5.3)
5.6 (9.3)not needed? Nonengineer- 33.3 (23.3)
6. What college curriculum would be most useful for your positioning- 2.B 14.01
7. Have you had any special courses dealing with the technical or non-human aspects
of accident prevention? 68.1 (76.0) Yea 
If yes. how many hours of instruction? 67 
Who was the sponsor?
37.0 (24.0) 
53 hours.
NO
How would you rate the training? (check one) College- 36.8 (29.9)
47.0 (45.6)very beneficial to my Job Trade - 14.3 (10.5)
45.0 (44 . 0) benef ic ial to my Job NSC, ASSE- 16.3 (17.5)
8.1 (10.4 slightly beneficial to my Job Company- 22.4 (31.6)
0.0 ( ) a waste of time Covernnent- 10.2 (7.0)
8. Have you had any special courses dealing with the behavioral 
t:cidant proventlon?52.8 (65.3) Yes 43.1 (34.7) No 
If yes. how many hours of Instruction? 55 (49) hours.
Who was the sponsor?
or human aspects of
How would you rate the training? (check one) College- 36.8 (38.8)
55.5 (49.0)very beneficial to my Job Trade- 10.5 (8.1)
42.0 (51.0)benefIclal to my Job NSC, ASSE- 21.0 (20.5)
2.5 ( ) slightly beneficial to my job Cosipany- 29.0 (28.6)
0.0 ( ) s waste of tlsw Govenusent- 2.6 (4.0)
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E, My Plant*■ Occident Record
Disabling Injury experience computed according to USAS1 Standard 216.1
For Calendar Avaraga Reported tor
1967 Years 1964, 1965, and 1966
1. Disabling injury frequency rate:
2. Di tab ting injury aeverlty rate: _ _ _
3. Average daya loal per disabling
injury:____________________________________________________ _______________
F. Your Authority
1, What right do you have in initiating safety programs and campaigns? (check one)
50.0 (41.3)the right to require actions
47.2 (46.7)the right to advise and recommend, but my recommendations are actually
carried out a large ira lorltv of the time 
2.0 (12.0)the right to advise and recommend
0,0 ( ) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right? .
2. Whet right do you have relative to the discipline of employees outside of your 
department? (check one)
30.9 (25.3)the right to require actions
27.0 (30.7)the right to advise end recoanend, but my recosmtendatlons are actually
carried out a large me tort tv of tha time
27.9 (20.0)the right to advise and recoanend
5.6 (16.0)no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right? .
3, What right do you have to atop a Job or any phase of a Job outside Of your
department that you consider hatardoua? (check one)
76.4 (58.7)the right to require actions
19.4 (25.3)the right to advise and recommend, but my reconseendatlona are actually
carried out e large mstoritv of the time
1.4 (13.3)£he right to advise and recommend
2.8 (2.7)n° right at all
If you don't have the Tight to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right? ■
4. What right do you have to set safety specifications and/or procedures on such
things as plant layout, new processes. Job specifications, and machinery
spec iflest ions? (check one)
56.9 (42.7)the right to require actions
34.7 (30.7)the right to advise and recoanend, but my recommendations are actually
carrlad out a .large ma 1 or 1 tv of the tls«e
6.9 (24.0)the right to edvlae and recommend
2.4 (2,7)no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right? .
C, Demographic Data
Name
Title ________________________________________________________________________
Address
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Legondi Effective Safety Directors at .32 Sigma Log C,
(Ineffective Safety Directors at .32 Sigma Log G
44.4
13. 3 
17.B
I aw wDrkiiii'. in I U.- t u ) 1 i»wi ip; i mliihi ry ; 24.4
My re s polls i lii I i I y in intn iacil mi (dii'ik unc)
( ) J i- i li); ii pi.1:11 .
( ) .i niuiln'i ill plants in .) city.
( ) utlirr (pli-asc S|>rcily)____________________
A. Industry Huts
1.
2.
54. 2
13. t
16.9
Chemical
Petroleum
electrical
Transportation
■12.0-
3, Thf .niproxi i. a t r age nt the majority of fixed e(|u i pmtn t in our plant i st13.5) year*. 
U. 'tin* ti.ijl muvher of t-iiip i oyt lh in 2 ahovc who jr.1 served hv my safety work Is:
4.4 (1.7) under ?W>. 13.3 (11. Ii) lOGI-iSuO. 4 ,4 (10. 2) 2501- 3000.
6.7 (20.3) “hit-‘.Ml. 8.9 (10.2) IMM-.'OOO. 6.7 (1.7) 3001-3500.
20.0 (15.3) 301-1 (nfU, 4.4 (8.5) 2001-2300. 31.1 (20.3) 3)01 or nor.,
Average number of employees - 20BC, (1775)
I1 .1.1 in IV l.r ;>n 1 I r iti t iljl II
A i r  v  .1 1 nv. Ici-d in >.ilf ty w o r k  o n  .j l u l l - t i m e  h u s i s 7  ( 1 0 0 )  3(es ( ) N o
1  iy i- pic j u  there in your department that ore encased In safety work,
■ t .  1 adi i; yiuraelf?
Ful 1-Time Part-Time
■ ■■• la u . d  I ..spec t nr s 2.67 (1.641_________
MxAiliiI _________________
fire   ~
Clerical_________________________________ _______
Others (please specify)
___________ TOTAL
3.42
6.09
(4.07)
(5.71)
hrt I. .1 you had to characterize your res t influential subordinate's orientation to
15.6 ccident prevention, would you say he is concerned primarily; (check one)
17.8 (27.1) with technical aspects of accident prevention.
66.7 (61.0) with human aspects of accident prevention.
TIi* titles of those above me in the chain of command of the plant in
work are: EXAMPLE
t 1 > (1) Diant manager
(2) 6.7 (11.9) (2) personnel director
O) 60.0 Mean-3.4 (49.2) Kean-3.4 (3) me
(«> 24.4 (25.4)
O) 8.9 (11.9)
in)
(7) (1.71
How many levels of management are there from the top executive to the
in your plant?
3- 8.9 (3.4) EXAMPLE; (I) Top Executive
4- 22.2 (27.1) /
5- 33.3 Maan-5.1(39.0) Mean-5..2 / /
6 - 24.4 (18.6) (2) Production
7- 8.9 (6 .8) Manager
8- 2.2 (1.7) J
9- (3.4) I /
£3) Supervisors
/
6 .
NR
(6) Head of 
Processing
 L__
/ /
(5) Foreman Example Answer: _L
TTie annual expense budget of my depsrtment that relatee to the safety function 
is approximately * Omit
Me Response
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C. Your Experience
1. Total year* of work expcriencc:21.6 (23.8)veara.
2. Total years engaged in a supervisory capacity over any activity;15.1 (15,6)years.
3. Total years engaged in safety work fuI 1-timei12.1 (11.7)ycars.
4. Total years engaged In supervising safety personnel: 9.0 (10.11 years.
5. How long have you been safety director at the facility at which you now
work? 7.6 (8.651 years.
6. Your age: 45.1 (47 . D years ■
D. Education and Training
1. My highest degree held is: (check one)
elementary school.
37.8 (39.0) high school.
53.3 (54.2) college.
8.9 (6.8) graduate school.
2. _tn add it ion to the degree indicated above, I have completed:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  years of college beyond my high school diploma.
  years of college or graduate school beyond my bachelors degree.
  years of graduate school beyond tny masters degree.
3. If you attended college at any time, what was your major; end If you graduated, 
what degree did you receive?
NONE 22.2 (11.9) 37.8 (39.0)
Major in College Degree (if received)
Engineer 35.6 (17.3) ____ 28.9 (23.7)
Science__11.1 (10.2) 6.7______ (fUS)
Nonenuineer— 1 U 1 ___(40.5) 17.8 (28.9)
4. Do you feel that for your position a college degree is: (check one)
44.4 (37.3) necessary?
46.7 (59.3) useful?
6.7 (3.4) not needed?
5. Do you feel that for your position an engineering degree is: (check one)
20.0 (10.2) necessary? Engineer- 53.3 (5.1)
71.1 (79.7) useful? Science- 6.7 (66.1)
6.7 (10.2) not needed? Noneng^neer- 37.7 (26.4)
6. What college curriculum would be most useful for your position? NR- 2.2 (5.1)
7. Have you had any special courses dealing with the technical or non'human aspects 
of accident prevention? 71.1 Yes 28.9 No
85______ hours.
Who was the sponsor?
How would you rate the training? (check one) College- 40.6 (25.0)
56.3 (52.2) very beneficial to my Job Trade- 9.4 (13.6)
34.4 (38.6) beneficial to my Job NSC, ASSE- 15.6 (20.4)
9.4 (9.1) slightly beneficial to my job Company- 25.0 (34.2)
( ) a waste of time Government- 9.4 (6.8)
• Have you had any special courses dealing with the behavioral or human aspects
accident prevention? 71.1 ( ) Yes 28.9 { ) No
If yes, how many hours of instruction? 55 (53) hours.
Uho was the sponsor? '
How would you rate the training? (check one) College- 3 4 . 8 ( 3 8 . 2 )
56.5 (51.4) very beneficial to my Job Trade- 13.0 (11.4)
39.0 (48.6) beneficial to my job NSC, ASSE- 13.0 (20.0)
4.4 ( ) slightly beneficial to my Job Company- 34.8 (28.6)
( ) a waste of time Government- 4,4 (2.8)
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E. My Plant1* Accident Record
Disabling injury experience computed according to USAS1 Standard Z16.1
For Calendar Average Reported tor
1967 Years 1964, 1965. and 1966
1. Disabling injury frequency rate:__________________________ _______________
2. Disabling injury severity rate:
3. Average days lost per disabling
injury; _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
F, Your Authority
1. Wit at right do you have in initiating safety programs and campaigns? (check one)
53.3 (44.1) the right to require actions
42.2 (42,4) the right to advise and recommend, but my recommendstions are actually
carried out a large ma jority of the time
4,4 (13.6) the right to advise and recommend
{ ) no right at all
Ii you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right? .
2. What right do you have relative to the discipline of employees outside of your 
department? (check one)
42.2 (27.1) the right to require actions
24.4 (30.S) the right to advise and recommend, but my reconaendstion* are actually
earned out a large fna 1oritv of the time
26.7 (25.4) the right to advise and recommend
6,7 (16,9) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right? .
3. What right do you have to stop a Job or any phase of a Job outside of your
department that you consider hazardous? (check one)
82.2 (62.7) the right to require actions
13.3 (20.3) the right to advise and recommend, but my recoimeendations are actually
carried out a large ma ior1 tv of the time
2.2 (13.6) the right to advise and recommend
2.2 (3.4) no right at all
If you don't have the right to require actions, which of your superiors has 
this right? .
6. What right do you have to set safety specifications and/or procedures on such
thi..gs as plant layout, new processes, Job specifications, and machinery
specifications? (check one)
62.2 (49.2) th* right to Taquire actions
26.7 (27.1) the right to advise and recommend, but tty recommend*tIona are actually
carried out a large majority of the tIds
11.1 (20.3) the right to advise and recommend
0,0 (3.4) no right at all
If you don’t have th* right to requir* actions, which of your superiors has 
this right? .
C. Demographic Data
Name
Title ________________________________________________________________________
Address
APPENDIX D 
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER II
TABLE D-l
Computed "t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of Effective And 
Ineffective Safety Directors Before Deletion 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 -0.604 1.774 1 .174 1.089 1.360 2.937 1.430 0.933 0.045 1.269
T-l 1.916 1.410 3 .410 2.297 0.630 1.844 2.093 1.514 1.191 1.841
B-l 1.860 1.843 3 .058 2.812 0.933 2.562 1.715 1.584 1.736 0.832
0-2 0.266 -0.386 -0
to1—1 ■ 0.262 -0.078 -0.319 -0.892 0.035 -0.287 0.124
T-2 0-453 1.327 2.119 0.475 -0.220 0.793 1.020 -0.046 0.513 0.520
B-2 0.695 1.220 2.900 1.261 0.177 2.213 3.519 3.641 1.742 1.692
0-3 -0.983 -0.968 -1 .194 -1.076 -1.829 0.311 -0.124 -0.181 0.413 -0.685
Note : Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (Effective-Ineffective).
Degrees of Freedom: 145
Critical "t" values: +1.96 and -1.96
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TABLE D-2
Computed T,t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of Effective And 
Ineffective Safety Directors After A Deletion Process
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 -0.626 1.937 1.841 1.692 1.929 3.306 1.361 0.082 0.481 2.066
T-l 1.691 1.352 2.798 1.717 1.675 2.770 2.699 2.301 2.006 2.666
B-l 0.706 1.741 2.616 2.561 0.702 3.148 1.489 1.191 1.500 0.853
0-2 0.650 0.397 0.111 -0.255 0.966 0.775 0.671 0.170 0.538 0.157
T-2 0.502 1.103 2.489 -0.449 0.184 1.280 1.722 -0 .013 1.333 0.343
B-2 0.770 0.831 2.683 1.290 0.804 2.990 2.351 3.226 1.297 1.817
0-3 -0.626 -0.581 0.210 -0.023 -2.627 0.406 0.535 0.526 1.143 -0.407
Note : Underlined values indicate significant differenc es at the .05 level
of significance (Effective - Ineffective).
Degrees of Freedom: 102
Critical "tTt Values:
APPENDIX E 
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER III
TABLE E-l
Computed f,t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of Engineers, 
Including Scientists, And Nonengineers 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 -0.323 0.197 1.406 -0.624 1.897 -1.260 1.514 1.228 -0.662 1.727
T-l 1.240 0.859 2.310 0.742 2.627 1.922 2.219 1.680 1.314 1.236
B-l 2.900 2.094 1.305 1.416 3.224 1.942 2.281 2.539 2.506 1.908
0-2 0.687 0.129 -0.104 0.142 -1.728 1.103 -0.282 0.224 -0.449 1.310
T-2 0.897 -0.144 1.177 -0.642 0.607 0.916 0.649 1.724 0.055 0.394
B-2 -0.463 0.103 0.540 -0.305 0.483 -0.215 1.303 1.089 0.666 0.991
0-3 0.321 1.232 1.781 0.177 1.718 1.157 1.244 2.216 0.928 1.320
Note : Underlined values indicate significant difference at the .05 level
of significance (Nonengineers - Engineers).
Degrees of Freedom: 125
Critical ntn Values: +1.93 and -1.98
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TABLE E-2
Computed "t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of Engineers, 
Excluding Scientists, and Nonengineers 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 -0.18? 0.304 1.541 -0.381 1.540 -1.904 1.161 0.613 -0.699 1.043
T-l 0.888 0.606 2.015 0.375 2.376 1.484 1.846 0.950 1.253 0.957
B-l 3.198 2.502 1.376 1.240 2.678 1.639 2.028 2.385 2.149 1.869
0-2 0.878 0.237 -0.081 0.214 -1.779 1.009 -0.034 0.305 -0.264 1.654
T-2 0.726 -0.116 1.519 -0.475 0.623 0.659 0.432 1.878 0.082 0.611
B-2 -0.159 0.451 0.827 -0.188 0.363 -0.446 0.868 0.863 0.650 0.728
0-3 0.572 0.692 1.219 -0.231 1.610 0.524 0.945 1.660 0.493 0.822
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (Nonengineers - Engineers),
Degrees of Freedom: 107
Critical ntn values: +1.93 and -1.98
APPENDIX F 
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER IV
TABLE F-l
Computed ntn Values Resulting From A Comparison 
Of More And Less Total Work Experience 
Bi-Polar Scales 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 0.497 1.765 1.751 1.621 1.573 -0.100 2.217 1.430 1.314 1.303
T-l 1.109 0.559 -0.217 0.025 1.057 1.148 0.149 0.679 0.228 1.604
B-l -0.580 0.626 1.066 0.197 1.854 1.002 0.195 1.073 1.525 0.921
0-2 -1.053 0.831 0.504 0.451 -1.141 -0.680 -0.399 1.025 -0.517 -0.335
T-2 0.701 -0.174 0.881 0.951 1.359 0.000 1.717 1.251 2.115 1.178
B-2 1.835 0.850 1.526 1.363 1.500 0.826 1.843 2.533 1.227 0.925
0-3 0.879 0.004 0.230 -1.053 0.809 O.846 2.102 1.588 1.577 1.158
Note: Underlined valued indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More experienced - Less experienced).
Degrees of Freedom: 206
Critical nt" values: +1.96 and -1.96
TABLE F-2
Computed ttt" Values Resulting From A Comparison 
Of More And Less Supervisory Experience 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 - 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 -0.273 1.814 0.731 1.765 0.164 1.284 1.776 1.658 1.524 1.348
T-l -0.302 0.290 -0.370 0.423 0.275 0.805 0.913 0.881 -0.222 1.636
B-l -1.990 -0.005 0.127 0.280 0.620 0.456 0.251 0.773 0.367 0.763
0-2 -0.460 0.162 -0.366 -0.202 -1.751 0.450 -0.410 -0.211 -0.674 -0.320
T-2 0.226 -0.119 -0.143 0.670 0.944 0.992 2.556 1.661 1.859 2.125
B-2 2.132 1.144 -0.033 0.164 1.869 2.885 2.815 3.344 1.457 3.223
0-3 -0.192 -0.226 -0.537 -0.255 -0.874 0.908 0.342 1.129 1.042 2.055
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More experienced - Less experienced).
Degrees of Freedom: 206
Critical "t" values: +1.96 and -1.96
TABLE F-3
Computed wt” Values Resulting From A Comparison Of More And 
Less Full-Time Safety Experience 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 0.426 0.699 1.591 1.153 1.048 1.660 2.087 2 264 0.754 1.046
T-l 1.552 1.462 1.256 1.832 2.431 1.980 1.731 2.005 1.660 2.348
B -l -1.256 0.857 1.296 1.109 1.595 0.809 1.281 2.065 1.864 0.421
0-2 0.670 1.444 0.692 0.589 0.970 o . 464 -0.627 -0.290 -0.342 -1.040
T-2 0.184 0.182 1.114 1,821 2.061 1.257 1.253 2.007 1.101 1.450
B-2 2.765 2.052 1.250 1.879 2.728 2.648 2.470 1.846 1.554 3.606
0-3 0.389 -0.617 0.054 0.477 -2.039 1.497 -0.399 0.697 0.997 0.932
Note : Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More experienced - Less experienced).
Degrees of Freedom: 206
Critical "tn values: +1.96 and -1.96
TABLE F-4
Computed "t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of More And Less 
Experience In Supervising Safety Personnel 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 0.916 -0.213 1.464 2.107 0.485 0.195 2.516 2.284 2.294 0.975
T-l 1.637 0.653 1.026 2.597 2.003 1.694 1.625 1.357 2.043 2.605
B-l 0.144 1.240 1.396 1.536 1.430 0.306 0.961 1.907 1.986 0.956
0-2 0.341 0.922 0.217 0.831 0.268 1.071 -0.417 0.455 0.052 -0.694
T-2 -0.530 0.080 1.266 1.415 0.613 1.302 1.565 0.907 1.592 O.848
B-2 2.858 1.946 1.5^3 2.563 1.570 1.959 1.858 2.012 2.021 2.563
0-3 0.181 -0.511 -0.870 0.092 -1.863 -0.189 -1.181 -0.975 -0.079 0.339
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .0$ level
of significance (More experienced - Less experienced).
Degrees of Freedom: 206
Critical "t" Values: +1.96 and -1.96
TABLE F-5
Computed nt" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of More And Less 
Years As Safety Director At Present Facility
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 - 2 . 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 0.956 2.252 1.713 2.092 0.609 0.131 2.163 1.822 1.701 0,082
T-l 2.534 1.265 1.593 0.761 0.811 0.030 0.746 1.271 1.316 1.643
B-l 1.139 0.010 1.671 0.566 1.026 0.068 1.333 1.560 1.653 1.341
0-2 1.461 0.166 -0.009 0.585 -0.538 0.877 -0.307 -0.837 -1.153 -1.023
T-2 0.129 0.629 1.421 2.104 1.791 1.909 2.561 1.788 1.657 1.351
B-2 2.796 2.634 1.852 1.961 1.377 1.971 1.167 2.544 1.877 3.001
0-3 1.766 0.157 0.587 -0.712 -0.757 1.918 0.994 1.024 1.490 2.384
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More experienced - Less experienced).
Degrees of Freedom: 206
Critical "t” values: +1.96 and -1,96
TABLE F-6
Computed r,t" Values Resulting From A Comparison 
Of The Older To The Younger 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 -0.966 0.774 -0.570 0.739 0.361 -0.076 1.326 1.603 -0.652 0.419
T-l -0.234 0.376 -1.205 -0.365 0.874 0.224 -0.631 0.000 -1.136 0.872
B-l -2.095 0.769 -0.474 0.230 0.925 -1.091 -0.255 -0.078 -0.635 0.006
0-2 -0.435 1.441 1.462 0.631 -0.402 0.116 0,088 1.181 -0.161 0.629
T-2 0.075 0.431 -1.444 1.437 2.091 -0.359 1.510 0.765 1.061 1.080
B-2 1.716 1.092 0.314 0.554 1.773 1.935 1.476 1.146 0.153 0.742
0-3 -0.269 -0.565 -0.639 -0.322 -0.939 0.579 0.176 1.030 0.804 1.059
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More experienced - Less experienced).
Degrees of Freedom: 206
Critical ntn values: +1.96 and -1.96
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APPENDIX G
SEMANTIC PROFILES BY EXPERIENCE CLASSIFICATION
EXHIBIT 4-5
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
ImportantUnimportant
. WiseFoolish .
. SuccessfulUnsuccessful .
GoodBad .
TrueFalse
. SevereLenient
DeepShallow
HeavyLight
StrongWeak
. HardSoft .
High Total Supervisory Experience
Low Total Supervisory Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-9
Technical Profile One
•"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy-
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: High Total Supervisory Experience
—  — —  Low Total Supervisory Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-10
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING, 
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light
Weak ong
Soft Hard
High Total Supervisory Experience
Low Total Supervisory Experience
251
EXHIBIT 4-11
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant ^ Important
Foolish . . Wise
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad . . Good
False True
Lenient . Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak . Strong
Soft . Hard
Legend: —  High Total Supervisory Experience
— — —  Low Total Supervisory Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-12
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
i Important
Foolish .
. Wise
•. Successful
Bad ,
i Good
False ,
•. True
Lenient .
i Severe
Shallow ,
*____ •_ Deep
Light .
i Heavy
Weak .
*. Strong
Soft .
A Hard
Legend; High Total Supervisory Experienc
—  Low Total Supervisory Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-13
Behavioral Profile Two
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad . Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak . Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: — High Total Supervisory Experience
—  —  —  Low Total Supervisory Experience
EXHIBIT 4-14
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
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Unimportant ± Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad , Good
False True
Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy-
Weak Strong
Soft . Hard
Legend: High Total Supervisory Experience
 —  Low Total Supervisory Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-15
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION”
ImportantUnimportant
WiseFoolish .
. SuccessfulUnsuccessful
GoodBad .
, TrueFalse .
. SevereLenient
. DeepShallow .
HeavyLight
StrongWeak .
HardSoft .
Legend: ----- High Full-Time Safety Experience
  Low Full-Time Safety Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-16
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant  , . . . . . Importantj j -
Foolish .
. SuccessfulUnsuccessful .
. GoodBad .
. TrueFalse .
. SevereLenient .
. DeepShallow .
. Heavy-Light j.
StrongWeak .
HardSoft .
—  ■ - High Full-Time Safety Experience
 —  Low Full-Time Safety Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-17
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant ,
. Important
Foolish ,
Wise
Unsuccessful .
i Successful
Bad .
. Good
False .
Lenient .
i Severe
Shallow .
i Deep
Light .
 j. Heavy
Weak .
i Strong
Soft ,
. Hard
Legend: —  High Full-Time Safety Experi
—  Low Full-Time Safety Experienc
ence 
e
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EXHIBIT 4-16
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant Important
Foolish . . Wise
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad . . Good
False . . True
Lenient Severe
Shallow . Deep
Light Heavy
Weak . r Strong
Soft . Hard
Legend: High Full-Time Safety Experience
  Low Full-Time Safety Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-19
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Vise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient . Severe
Shallow . Deep
Light Heavy
Weak t Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: ■ — 1 High Full-Time Safety Experience
  Low Full-Time Safety Experience
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EXHIBIT 4-20
Behavioral Profile Two
"EMPLOYEES’ ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
. Important
WiseFoolish
SuccessfulUnsuccessful ..
. GoodBad
. TrueFalse
SevereLenient
DeepShallow
Heavy-Light
StrongWeak .
HardSoft
----- High Full-Time Safety Experience
----- Low Full-Time Safety Experience
EXHIBIT 4-21
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Important
Unimportant j,
. Wise
Foolish ^
, Successful
Unsuccessful A
. Good
Bad .
. True
False ±
Severe
Lenient
. Deep
Shallow .
. Heavy
Light j.
Strong
Weak .
Hard
Soft .
;----- High Full-Time Safety Experience
  Low Full-Time Safety Experience
262
EXHIBIT 4-22
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad . Good
False . True
Lenient . . Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak . Strong
Soft . . Hard
Legend: ■ High Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
— — —  Low Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
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EXHIBIT 4-23
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy-
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: -----  High Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
— — — ■ Low Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
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EXHIBIT 4-24
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
GoodBad
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
StrongWeak
HardSoft
Legend: —  High Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
—  —  —  Low Total Supervisory Experience Over 
Safety
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EXHIBIT 4-25
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
ImportantUnimportant
WiseFoolish
SuccessfulUnsuccessful
GoodBad
TrueFalse
SevereLenient
DeepShallow
HeavyLight
StrongWeak
HardSoft
Legend: ----  High Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
  Low Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
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EXHIBIT 4-26
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant i Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful . . Successful
Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow . Deep
Light Heavy
Weak . ^ Strong
Soft . Hard
Legend: ■' High Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
  Low Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
EXHIBIT 4-27
Behavioral Profile Two
"EMPLOYEES* ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
ImportantUnimportant
Foolish ♦
SuccessfulUnsuccessful
. GoodBad
, TrueFalse
SevereLenient .
DeepShallow .
HeavyLight A
. StrongWeak .
. HardSoft .
Legend: ----  High Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
  Low Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
EXHIBIT 4-2S
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Legend:
Important
. Wise
. Successful
U nsuccessful ..
. Good
Bad •
True
False ^
, Severe
Lenient
. Deep
Shallow
. Heavy
Light j.
Strong
Weak
Hard
Soft .
Over  High Total Supervisory Experience
Safety
  Low Total Supervisory Experience Over
Safety
EXHIBIT 4-29
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
Legend:
, Important
Unimportant
. Wise
Foolish
. Successful
Unsuccessful
. Good
Bad
. True
False
. Severe
Lenient
. Deep
Shallow ±
. Heavy
Light A
Weak .
, Hard
Soft .
■ — —  High Total Experience As Safety Director 
At Present Facility
  Low Total Experience As Safety Director
At Present Facility
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EXHIBIT 4-30
Technical Profile One
"MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant i Important
Foolish . . Wise
Unsuccessful . , Successful
Bad . . Good
False . True
Lenient , Severe
Shallow ,
Light ± Heavy
Weak . ± Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: " High Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
 —  Low Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
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EXHIBIT 4-31
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant
i “
Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful . . Successful
Bad Good
False . . True
Lenient . Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: ----  High Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
 —  Low Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
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EXHIBIT 4-32
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful . . Successful
Bad . Good
False True
Lenient , . Severe
Shallow . Deep
Light Heavy-
Weak . Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: ----- High Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
  Low Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
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EXHIBIT 4-33
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful . . Successful
Bad Good
False . True
Lenient . . Severe
Shallow . i Deep
Light  ^Heavy-
Weak . i Strong
Soft Hard
Legend:   High Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
 —  Low Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
EXHIBIT 4-34
Behavioral Profile Two
"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak . Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: ----  High Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
  Low Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
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EXHIBIT 4-35
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
ImportantUnimportant
. WiseFoolish .
. SuccessfulUnsuccessful ±
. GoodBad .
TrueFalse
SevereLenient .
DeepShallow
HeavyLight ^
. Strong
. Hardoft .
High Total Experience as Safety Director 
At Present Facility
Legend:
  Low Total Experience as Safety Director
At Present Facility
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EXHIBIT 4-36
Organizational Profile One
"YOUR ORGANIZATIONAL POSITION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish . Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad . Good
False . True
Lenient . Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft , Hard
Legend: -----  Older Safety Directors
  Younger Safety Directors
EXHIBIT 4-37
Technical Profile One
MECHANICAL CONDITIONS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
. Important
. Wise
Foolish
. Successful
U nsuccessful ^
. Good
Bad .
True
False
. Severe
Lenient
Deep
Shallow .
Heavy
Light ..
. Strong
Weak .
. Hard
Soft .
— ■■■■" Older Safety Directors
 — Younger Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 4-3S
Behavioral Profile One
"EMPHASIS ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION, PLACEMENT, TRAINING,
AND COUNSELING IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak . Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: ----  Older Safety Directors
  Younger Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 4-39
Organizational Profile Two
"MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FOR YOU AND YOUR DEPARTMENT"
Unimportant Important
Foolish . . Wise
Unsuccessful . Successful
Bad . . Good
False True
Lenient . Severe
Shallow ^ Deep
Light Heavy
Weak . i Strong
Soft . Hard
Legend: -----  Older Safety Directors
  Younger Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 4-40
Technical Profile Two
"EMPHASIS ON LAYOUT AND DESIGN OF EQUIPMENT
IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
Weak Strong
Soft Hard
Older Safety Directors
Younger Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 4-41
Behavioral Profile Two
'"EMPLOYEES' ACTS CAUSE MOST ACCIDENTS"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
Unsuccessful Successful
Bad . . Good
False True
Lenient Severe
Deep
Light Heavy-
Weak . Strong
Soft Hard
Legend: -----  Older Safety Directors
  Younger Safety Directors
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EXHIBIT 4-42
Organizational Profile Three
"YOUR POWER AND AUTHORITY"
Unimportant Important
Foolish Wise
SuccessfulUnsuccessful
GoodBad
False True
Lenient Severe
Shallow Deep
Light Heavy
StrongWeak
HardSoft
Legend: -----  Older Safety Directors
  Younger Safety Directors
APPENDIX H 
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER V
TABLE H-l
Computed ”t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 4/2 And 4/3
Bi-Polar Scales
_2  3 . 4 ,._5 6 _? 5 9 JLSL
0-1 0.192 -1.640 -1.021 -0.476 -1.719 -2.533 -0.907 -0.355 -1.234 -1.634
T-l -1.853 -1.192 -1.394 -1.636 -1.584 -0.956 -1.505 -1.451 -1.599 -0.585
B-l 0.158 -0.279 -0.945 -0.781 -1.163 -1.322 -1.205 -0.556 -0.357 -1.172
0-2 0.246 -0.129 0.192 0.772 -0.736 0.242 0.076 0.737 1.399 1.602
T-2 -0.123 -1.192 -0.379 -0.990 -1.787 -0.672 -1.634 -1.181 -1.447 -O.359
B-2 0.370 -0.248 -0.433 -0.266 -0.850 -2.160 -1.069 -1.245 -2.749 -1.916
0-3 -1.522 -1.610 -1.099 -3.332 -0.106 -2.123 -1.418 -2.484 -1.367 -2.038
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (4/2 - 4/3).
Degrees of Freedom: 50
Critical "t" values: +2.^1 and -2.01
TABLE H-2
Computed fttT! Values Resulting From A Comparison Of 
Organizational Levels 4/3 And 4/4 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 -0.671 -0.279 -0.276 0.240 -0.315 0.826 1.249 -0.205 1.954 -0.075
T-l 0.841 0.210 -0.769 0.678 -0.325 0,461 0.778 0 .064 -0.376 -0.841
B-l 0.271 0.378 0.766 1.368 -0.785 0.639 1.224 0 .162 1.948 -1.616
0-2 0.193 -0.798 -0.281 -0.407 -O.O84 -0.135 0.316 0.698 -0.177 -1.594
T-2 2.510 0.670 0.448 -0.650 -0.130 -0.756 O.984 -0.071 -0.061 -1.117
B-2 0.255 0.235 -0.441 0.354 1.195 1.574 0.739 1.141 1.709 0.943
0-3 -0.471 0.726 -0.463 0,616 -0.332 1.768 0.058 0 .462 0.656 -0.685
Note •• Underlined values indicat e significant differentes at the .05 level
of significance (4/3 - 4/4).
Degrees of Freedom: 46
Critical "t" values: +2.01 and -2.01
TABLE H-3
Computed nt" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of 
Organizational Levels 4/2 And 4/4 
Bi-Polar Scales
— 1 _  __2__  2__ _  4 . 5 6 ? 8 9 10
0-1 -0.536 -1.409 -1.122 -0.158 -1.667 -0.889 0.432 -0.870 0.814 -1.572
T-l -0.657 -0.603 -1.982 -0.671 -1.638 -0.294 -0.477 -1.067 -1.673 -1.577
B-l 0.371 0.112 -0.034 0.570 -1.746 -0.463 0.249 -0.245 1.354 -2.181
0-2 0.397 -0.889'-0.121 0.255 -0.588 0.047 0.299 1.036 0.828 -0.239
T-2 1.580 -0.328 0.125 -1.230 -1.420 -1.302 -0.383 -1.107 -1.371 -1.168
B-2 0.550 0.000 -0.765 0.086 0.361 -0.225 -0.155 0.056 -0.622 -0.871
0-3 -1.765 -0.564 -1.270 -1.860 -0.402 0.000 -1.117 -1.271 -0.398 -2.261
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (4/2 - 4/4).
Degrees of Freedom: 26
Critical "t" values: +2.056 and -2.056
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TABLE H-4
Computed nt" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of 
Organizational Levels 5/2 And 5/3 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 -0.064 -0.345 0.591 0.622 0.111 -2.058 -0.641 -1.454 -0.509 -1.554
T-l 0.989 -0.466 -1.441 0.758 0.370 0.610 0.548 -0.208 0.100 -1.482
B-l 0.000 -0.719 -0.309 0.059 -0.172 -0.325 -0.611 -0.232 0.000 -0.428
0-2 0.952 -0.156 0.126 1.046 -0.741 1.610 -0.296 -0,495 0.585 0.427
T-2 0.499 -0.604 -0.552 0.749 1.349 1.594 0.900 -0.056 1.569 1.422
B-2 0.803 -0.400 0.557 0.819 1.251 0.613 -0.596 -1.073 0.000 -0.343
0-3 -0.155 -1.591 -1.211 -O.O83 -0.450 -1.245 -1.917 -1.480 -1.613 -1.697
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (5/2 - 5/3).
Degrees of Freedom: 50
Critical "t” values: +2.01 and -2.01
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TABLE H-5
Computed "t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of 
Organizational Levels 5/3 And 5/4 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 _ 3 k 5 6 7 6 9 10
0-1 0.659 0.767 1.445 1.671 0.226 2.026 0.290 1.315 1.504 0.651
T-l -0.456 0.171 1.202 0.295 0.461 -1.772 -1.323 -0.057 0.591 0.691
B-l 1.453 1.674 1.672 0.542 0.653 1.191 1.100 0.636 1.007 0.907
0-2 0.000 -1.623 -0,653 -2.054 1.269 -0.066 0,534 -0.246 0.217 -1.656
T-2 2.370 1.230 1.450 -0.219 -0.4H 0.991 -0.943 0.413 -1.031 -1.226
B-2 -1.331 -0.666 -1.651 -2.396 -1.545 -1.532 -1.207 -0.391 -0.696 -0.022
0-3 0.991 -0.200 0.401 -1.579 -0.034 1.062 0.306 0.279 0.269 0.916
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (5/3 - 5/4).
Degrees of Freedom: 70
Critical ntn value : +1.99 and -1.99
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TABLE H-6
Computed ,fttf Values Resulting From A Comparison Of 
Organizational Levels 5/2 And 5/4 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 0.401 0.182 1.640 2.044 0.301 -0.676 -0.461 -0.489 0.654 -1.080
T-l 0.780 -0.344 -0,544 0.912 0.708 -0.638 -0.436 -0.253 0.523 -0.807
B-l 1.033 0.712 0.888 0.514 0.319 0.531 0.237 0.263 0.769 0.252
0-2 0.984 -1.524 -0.379 —0.448 0.168 1.655 0.131 -0.618 0.656 -0.886
T-2 1.694 0.305 0.493 0.531 1.026 2.414 0.289 0.261 0.981 0.729
B-2 -0.080 -1.003 -0.745 -1.023 0.097 -0.505 -1.363 -1.298 -0.495 -0.347
0-3 0.542 -1.749 -0.939 -1.262 -0.543 -0.499 -1.424 -1.243 -1.355 -0.809
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (5/2 - 5/4).
Degrees of Freedom: 44
Critical "t” values: +2.02 and -2.02
289
TABLE H-7
1
Computed "t” Values Resulting From A Comparison Of 
Organizational Levels 6/3 And 6/4 
Bi-Polar Scales
2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10
0-1 -0.550 0.353 0.262 1.196 0.134 1.336 0.111 -1.096 0.645 1.241
T-l -0.111 1.352 0.151 0.452 0.561 -0.337 0.216 0.369 0.855 0.544
B-l 0.554 0.772 -0.301 -0.391 0.426 0.447 0.556 0.697 -0.035 1.032
0-2 -0.435 -0.760 -0.226 -1.776 -1.539 0.157 0.063 -0.279 -0.088 0.506
T-2 -1.573 0.456 0.466 -0.244 -0.030 -0.291 -0.650 -0.247 0.390 -0.493
B-2 -0.354 -0.266 -0.241 0.273 0.271 -2.135 -1.539 -2.460 -1.560 -2.071
0-3 1.661 1.096 1.776 -0.625 1.396 -0.412 0.129 0.532 -0.316 0.057
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (6/3 - 6/4).
Degrees of Freedom: 47
Critical "t" values: +2.01 and -2.01
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TABLE H-8
Computed 1,t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 6/4 And 6/5
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 _ k 5 6 7 3 9 10
0-1 2.234 0.129 1.298 -0.029 0.087 -2.160 0.725 2.234 1.640 -0.158
T-l -0.059 -1.165 0.195 0.324 1.229 1.067 1.849 2.072 2.430 0.728
B-l -O.O84 -0.222 1.341 1.019 0.531 0.453 0.728 0.458 0.875 0.190
0-2 1.322 -0.089 -0.805 0.677 1.232 0.000 0.593 0.473 -0.085 0.352
T-2 1,323 0,183 0.691 0.677 -0.229 0.979 0.465 -0.383 -0.010 0.360
B-2 -0.152 -0.181 0.355 0.124 0.578 1.539 1.116 2.036 1.186 1.498
0-3 0.056 0.166 0.114 0.367 -0.513 0.711 -0.248 0.076 -0.386 -0.413
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (6/4 - 6/5).
Degrees of Freedom: 26
Critica? ntn values: +2.056 and -2.056
TABLE H-9
Computed Trt'r Values Resulting From A Comparison Of 
Organizational Levels 6/3 and 6/5 
Bi-Polar Scales
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
O"1 2.471 0.492 1.829 0.998 0.229 -1.303 0.898 1.707 2.599 0.797
T-l -0.172 -0.162 0.374 0.874 2.078 0.974 2.384 2.072 2.264 1.335
B-l 0.438 0.371 1.255 0.899 1.185 1.173 1.690 1.443 1.207 1.381
0-2 0.924 -0.836 -1.063 -0.790 0.141 0.141 0.809 0.347 -0.186 0.931
T-2 0.587 0.604 1.365 0.623 -0.310 0.844 -0.014 -0.757 O.364 0.023
B-2 -0.494 -0.413 0.146 0.328 0.906 -0.148 -0.082 0.510 -0.066 0.108
0-3 1.655 1.127 1.687 -0.391 0.441 0.389 -0.181 O.624 -O.78I -0.436
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (6/3 - 6/5).
Degrees of Freedom: 40
Critical "t" values: +2.02 and -2.02
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TABLE H-10
Computed ,!t'? Values Resulting From A Comparison Of 
Organizational Levels 4/4 And 5/4 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 1.357 0.576 1.556 0.211 0.570 -0.127 -0.362 0.629 -0.746 0.203
T-l -0.649 -0.624 0.951 -0.544 0.533 -0.740 -1.236 -0.105 0.776 0.494
B-l -0.511 0.260 -0.365 -0.727 0.545 -0.051 0.144 0.194 -1.043 1.597
0-2 -0.623 -0.563 0.090 -0.766 -0.123 0.339 -0.106 -0.937 -0.037 0.265
T-2 -1.274 -0.263 0.089 0.986 0.606 1.479 -0.512 0.890 0.493 1.434
B-2 0.054 -0.145 -0.098 -0.661 -1.031 -1.054 -0.432 -0.606 -0.703 -0.301
0-3 0.860 -0.454 0.150 -0.158 0.131 -1.077 -0.373 -0.500 -0.566 1.415
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the ,05 level
of significance (4/4 - 5/4).
Degrees of Freedom: 43
Critical "t" values: +2.02 and -2.02
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TABLE H-ll
Computed "t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 4/4 And 6/5
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
°“1 2-128 1.813 0.063 0.676 -0.804 0.210 1.331 0.263 0.565
T-l -0.378 -0.388 0.380 -0.613 1.619 0.086 0.675 1.102 1.379 O.844
B-l 0.053 0.196 0.236 0.329 1.590 1.016 0.546 1.259 -0,351 1.737
0-2 0.366 0.272 -0.191 -0.373 0.142 0.297 C.351 -0.237 -0.226 1.043
T-2 -0.441 -0.203 -0.078 1.032 0.149 0.972 -0.453 0.194 0.459 1.232
B-2 -0.353 -0.253 -0.154 -0.290 -0.351 -0.424 O.O84 -0.075 -0.586 -0.602
0-3 0.962 0.305 0.953 -0.102 0.316 -0.542 -0.258 0.208 -0.685 0.675
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (4/4 - 6/5).
Degrees of Freedom: 21
Critical ”t ,! values: +2.08 and -2.08
TABLE H-12
Computed fftrT Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 5/4 And 6/5
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 2.112 0.608 0,593 -0.126 0.313 -1.331 1.038 1.731 1.141 0.531
T-l 0.115 0.090 -0.580 -0.070 1.236 0.811 1.971 1.333 0.719 0.463
B-l 0.624 0.000 0.665 1.178 0.918 0.950 0.485 1.049 0.592 0.363
0-2 1.106 0.902 -0.394 0.322 0.330 0.000 0.564 0.741 -0.188 0.097
T-2 0.545 0.000 -0.179 0.198 -0.401 -0.516 -0.074 -0.615 0.071 0.238
B-2 -0.537 -0.168 -0.076 0.210 0.562 0.476 0.542 0.481 0.056 -0.369
0-3 0.224 0.842 1.142 0.047 0.269 0.481 0.116 0.786 -0.240 -0.705
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (5/4 - 6/5).
Degrees of Freedom: 42
Critical T,tTt values: +2.02 and -2.02
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TABLE H-13
Computed T,t” Values Resulting From A Comparison Of 
Organizational Levels 4/4 And 5/2 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10
0-1 -0.606 -0.269 0.000 1.562 -0.239 -0.329 0.401 -1.066 1.146 -1.062
T-l 1.236 0.243 -1.172 1.535 0.151 0.066 0.745 -0.127 -0.245 -1.206
B-l 1.276 0.347 1.002 0.931 -0.251 0.543 O.O64 0.054 1.450 -1.205
0-2 1.279 -0.750 -0.315 0.270 0.216 0.677 0.202 0.333 0.596 -0.977
T-2 1.607 0.462 0.333 -0.472 0.312 0.666 0.573 -0.466 0,362 -0.492
B-2 -0.093 -0.636 -0.501 -0.277 1.016 0.466 -0.797 -0.672 0.169 -0.065
0-3 -0.293 -0.946 -0.613 -0.666 -0.563 0.501 -0.914 -0.533 -0.592 -2.366
Note Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (5/2 - 4/4).
Degrees of Freedom: 23
Critical "t” values: +2.069 and -2,069
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TABLE H-14
Computed *’t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of 
Organizational Levels 5/2 And 6/5 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 1.556 0.547 1.944 1.629 0.479 -1.553 0.560 1.254 1.672 -0.329
T-l 0.779 -0.195 -0.881 0.932 1.712 0.140 1.336 0.990 1.090 -0.224
B-l 1.631 0.584 1.214 1.228 1.343 1.516 0.742 1.476 1.142 0.551
C-2 1.823 -0.472 -0.632 -0.095 0.389 1.414 0.702 0.116 0.457 0.388
T-2 1.448 0.240 0.273 0.625 0.472 1.716 0.162 -0.267 0.832 0.683
B-2 -0.426 —0.884 -0.608 -0.528 0.587 0.013 -0.655 -0.655 -0.362 -0.550
0-3 0.642 -0.609 0.211 -1.159 -0.165 -0.014 -1.393 -0.363 -1.485 -1.659
Note : Underlined values indicate significant differences at the ,05 level
of significance (5/2 - 6/5).
Degrees of Freedom: 22
Critical ”t!1 Values: +2.074 and -2.074
297
TABLE H-15
Computed T,tM Values Resulting From A Comparison Of
Organizational Levels 6/3 And 5/4
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 0.515 -0.066 1.564 1.551 -O.134 -0.390 -0.229 -0.274 1.539 0.323
T-l -0.416 -0.352 1.290 1.057 0.979 0.069 0.316 1.656 1.656 1.179
B-l -0.207 0.517 0.851 -0.289 -0.369 -0.080 1.150 0,211 0.802 1.244
0-2 -0.135 -2.332 -1.150 -1.514 -0.261 0.204 0.308 -0.558 0.008 -0.097
T-2 0.016 0.817 1.835 0.476 0.174 1.779 0.080 -0.195 0.435 -0.310
B-2 0.175 -0.381 0.299 0.225 0.435 -0.884 -0.914 -0.168 -0.166 0.727
0-3 1.719 0.293 0.836 -0.58* 0.183 -0.044 -0.380 -0.318 -0.712 0.428
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (6/3 - 5/4).
Degrees of Freedom: 62
Critical Mt" values: +2.01 and -2.01
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TABLE H-16
Computed ’’t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of'
Organizational Levels 6/3 And 4/4
Bi-Pclar Scales
1 2 . 3 _ 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 •-1.143 -0.554 -0.524 0.932 -0.639 -0.125 0.707 -0.908 1.981 0.018
T-l 0.323 0.359 -0.068 1.684 0.196 0.392 1.663 1.450 0.468 0.456
B-l 0.345 0.100 0.930 0.472 -0.747 -0.006 0.721 -0.055 1.662 -0.815
0-2 0.435 -1.129 -0,792 -0.346 -0.052 -0.213 0.326 0.624 0.093 -0.310
T-2 1.329 0.911 1.405 -0.376 -0.527 -0.099 0.547 -1.041 -0.133 -1.630
B-2 0.065 -0,136 0.333 0.735 1.415 0.336 -0.198 0.696 0.650 0.988
0-3 0.410 0.711 0.442 -0.267 -0.009 0.929 0.129 0.310 0.058 -1.201
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (6/3 - 4/4).
Degrees of Freedom: 41
Critical "t" values: +2.02 and -2.02
TABLE H-17
Computed nt” Values Resulting From A Comparison Of 
Organizational Levels 4/2 And 6/5 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 2.143 -0.495 0.904 -0.034 -0.763 -2.270 0.611 1.460 1.274 -0.583
T-l -1.00? -1.130 -1.553 -1.293 0.079 -0.137 0.399 0.355 0.051 -0.160
B-l 0.499 0.346 0.249 0.923 -0.011 0.470 :■ .123 1.255 0.999 0.031
0-2 0.896 -0.632 -0.407 -0.168 -0.451 0.506 0.759 0.938 0.714 1.081
T-2 1.112 -0.532 0.038 -0.118 -1.223 -0.160 -1.011 -0.823 -0.839 0.254
B-2 0.154 -0.246 -0.890 -0.227 -0.031 -0.711 -0.038 -0.038 -1.255 -1.301
0-3 -0,784 -0.i8l -0.127 -2.394 -0.040 -0.694 -1.760 -1.218 -1.338 -1.478
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (4/2 - 6/5).
Degrees of Freedom: 25
Critical "t" values: +2.06 and -2.06
0-1 
T-l - 
B-l - 
0-2 -  
T-2 
B-2 
0-3 - 
Note:
TABLE H-18
Computed l!tM Values Resulting From A Comparison Of 
Organizational Levels 4/2 And 5/4 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3.935 -1.387 0.469 0.037 -1.442 -1.569 -0.520 -0.279 0.167 -1.512
L.633 -1.664 -0.925 -1.360 -1.312 -1,163 -2,031 -1.265 -0.819 -0.811
3.085 0.449 -0.474 -0.03o -1.064 0.560 0.476 -0.033 0.560 -0.414
3.233 -1.766 -0.072 -0.575 -0.967 0.574 0.272 0.178 0.944 0.006
L.150 -0.738 0.253 -0.380 -1.222 0.470 -1.127 -0.315 -1.111 0.071
3.629 -0,153 -1.061 -0.592 0.691 -1.468 -0.721 -0.644 -1.468 -1.001
L.301 -1.276 -1.545 -2.415 -0.371 -1.295 -1.657 -2.229 -I.I84 -0,623
Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (4/2 - 5/4).
Degrees of Freedom: 47
Critical "t" values: +2.02 and -2.02
TABLL H-19
Computed "t" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of 
Organizational Levels 4/2 And 5/2 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 . 2 . 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 0.281 -1.075 -1.200 -1.919 -1.449 -0.756 -0.010 0.250 -0.551 -0.230
T-l -1.855 -0.990 -0.179 -2.272 -1.767 -0.337 -1.365 -0.913 -1.305 0.145
B-l -1.061 -0.284 -1.237 -0.480 -1.487 -1.008 0.207 -0.336 -0.242 -0.669
C-2 -1.143 -0.277 0.277 -0.057 -0.920 -1.271 0.133 •0.754 0.219 0.965
T-2 -0.517 -0.826 -0.272 -0.806 -1.875 -2.178 -1.089 -0.469 -1.797 -0.550
B-2 0.632 0.655 -0.151 0.371 -0.687 -0.815 0.816 0.816 -0.747 -0.492
0-3 -1.472 0.566 -0.389 -0.916 0.142 -0.625 -0.036 -0.911 0.320 0.295
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (4/2 - 5/2).
Degrees of Freedom: 27
Critical Mt rt values: +2,052 and -2.052
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TABLE H-2Q
Computed ffttr Values Resulting From A Comparison Of 
Organizational Levels 4/2 And 6/3 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 4  5_ 6 7 2 9 10
0-1 0.599 -1.195 -0.247 -1.275 -1.362 -1.120 -0.327 -0.061 -1.22$ -2.016
T-l -1.251 -1.312 -2.404 -2.740 -2.233 -1.410 -2.546 -3.095 -2.719 -2.031
B-l 0.025 0.037 -1.200 0.195 -1.362 -0.607 -0.566 -0.242 -0.099 -1.677
0-2 -0.104 0.202 0.233 0.711 -0.751 0.330 0.019 0.675 0.954 0.026
T-2 1.256 -1.448 -1.496 -0.272 -1.439 -1.159 -1.150 -0.152 -1.351 0.312
B-2 0.797 0.145 -1.371 -0.695 -1.023 -0.591 0.055 -0.720 -1.462 -1.963
0-3 -2.904 -1.649 -2.193 -1.776 -0.570 -1.111 -1.545 -2.173 -0.567 -1.025
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the ,05 level
of significance (4/2 - 6/3).
Degrees of Freedom: 45
Critical "t” values: +2.02 and -2.02
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TABLE H-21
Computed nt" Values Resulting From A Comparison Of 
Organizational Levels 5/2 And 6/3 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 _ 2 _3 _ _4 . 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 0.091 0.208 0.556 0.985 O.414 -0.320 -0.287 -0.315 -0.596 -1.456
T-l 1.054 -0.061 -1,568 0.235 -0.018 -0.756 -0.722 -1.647 -0.776 -1.781
B-l 1.145 0.349 0.243 0.672 0.447 0.717 -0.720 0.126 0.178 -0.723
0-2 1.011 0.487 0.523 0.689 0.355 1.307 -0.121 -0.209 0.662 -0.720
T-2 1.960 -0.312 -0.953 0.260 0.985 1.065 0.223 0.400 0.569 0.930
B-2 -0.210 -0.643 -0.982 -1.059 -0.249 0.179 -0.808 -1.559 -0.410 -0.946
0-3 -0.783 -2.098 -1.535 -0.749 -0.796 -0.411 -1.306 -1.109 -0.809 -1.262
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (5/2 - 6/3).
Degj L.es of Freedom: 42
Critical "t" values: +2.02 and -2.02
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TABLE H-22
Computed ntn Values Resulting From A Comparison 01* The Safety
Directors In High And Low Positions 
Bi-Polar Scales
1 2 3 A 5 6 7 8 9 10
0-1 1.203 -0.539 1.573 1.684 -0.700 -1.435 0.225 -0.035 2.126 -0.609
T-l -0.514 -0.776 -0.397 0.636 0.60? -0.110 0.472 1.067 0.948 0.343
B-l 0.599 0.717 1.091 0.677 -0.276 0.290 1.271 0.591 1.732 0.278
0-2 0.800 -2.464 -1.124 -1.062 -0.348 0.800 0.643 0.138 0.634 -0.081
T-2 1.674 0.390 1.460 0.020 -O.464 1.732 -0.096 -0.726 0.071 -0.334
B-2 0.209 -0.698 -0.592 -0.145 0.649 -0.853 -1.136 -0.532 -0.659 -0.092
0-3 0.409 -0.545 -O.O84 -1.838 -0.219 -0.155 -1.417 -1.142 -1.402 -1.177
Note: Underlined values indicate significant differences at the .05 level
of significance (More powerful - Less powerful).
Degrees of Freedom: 200
Critical T,tn values: +1.96 and -1.96
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